Xenogenesis and the Technical Legal Subject

Author(s):  
Kieran Tranter
Keyword(s):  

This chapter argues that a detailed reading of Octavia E. Butler’s ‘Xenogenesis’ series clarifies how, notwithstanding the challenges to its being and its agency by technical legality, responsibility to becoming can allow the technical legal subject to live well in the present. The technical legal subject is revealed as a node within the networks, a blob of natureculture, a nexus point for biopolitical operations. Through Butler’s narrative of Lilith and her monstrous, hybrid human-alien children possibilities for the technical legal subject to be ‘embodied’ within a ‘location’ and ‘navigate’ the networks of the present emerge. Not only is agency empowered, notwithstanding the weight of the technical networks and the inclination to automation, but so is a form of ethics. Butler’s afrofuturism present a powerful affirmation that knowing and acting well to nurture life remains ever present, even in technical legality.

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 56
Author(s):  
Nani Mulyati ◽  
Topo Santoso ◽  
Elwi Danil

The definition of person and non-person always change through legal history. Long time ago, law did not recognize the personality of slaves. Recently, it accepted non-human legal subject as legitimate person before the law. This article examines sufficient conditions for being person in the eye of law according to its particular purposes, and then, analyses the meaning of legal person in criminal law. In order to do that, scientific methodology that is adopted in this research is doctrinal legal research combined with philosophical approach. Some theories regarding person and legal person were analysed, and then the concept of person was associated with the accepted definition of legal person that is adopted in the latest Indonesian drafted criminal code. From the study that has been done, can be construed that person in criminal law concerned with norm adressat of the rule, as the author of the acts or omissions, and not merely the holder of rights. It has to be someone or something with the ability to think rationally and the ability to be responsible for the choices he/she made. Drafted penal code embraces human and corporation as its norm adressat. Corporation defined with broad meaning of collectives. Consequently, it will include not only entities with legal personality, but also associations without legal personality. Furthermore, it may also hold all kind of collective namely states, states bodies, political parties, state’s corporation, be criminally liable.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-268
Author(s):  
Jane Krishnadas

AbstractThis article engages with a key question raised by feminist legal scholars from the east to the west: whether women should or should not engage in rights strategies? Are rights systematically exercised to reproduce patriarchal, dominant sites of justice, or do rights constitute a multiple and relational force which may transform sites of justice? The experience of women’s engagements with law in South Asia has created a diversity of critical legal knowledge and scholarship reflecting the pluralism of both women’s identities and needs based on caste, religion, class and sexuality across an array of legal spaces from the family, community and state. Women in South Asian scholarship have complicated the notion of the homogenous legal subject and the static dominant site of justice. In this article I return to my underpinning field research whilst living and working within an earthquake affected area of Maharashtra, India in the post-crisis rehabilitation period (1993–1998). This research explored how women exercised their rights to reconstruct lives at different tiers of justice: in public policy, private legislation and the non-formal sphere of community relations to deconstruct the concept of rights existing within a static framework of justice. Drawing upon feminist discourse across the east to the west, I have analysed the role of rights in post-disaster sites to understand how women move from victims to survivors, beneficiaries to contributors and objects to agents of change to inform contemporary research on how women in post-domestic violence situations may exercise rights to reconstruct their lives in times of crisis in the UK. Through this analysis I argue that rights may be empowering if one can exercise one’s right to identity as agency, resources as capacity and location as mobility, as a three dimensional strategy to transform the framework in which one is situated. Over the last decade, I have actively applied this transformative methodology to create an alternative relational, intersectional and holistic legal paradigm, to transform sites of justice, in times of every day crisis, through the CLOCK/ All India Access to Justice Strategy.


2015 ◽  
Vol 84 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-88
Author(s):  
Ntina Tzouvala

The revelation of a series of child abuse incidents committed by Catholic priests and other members of religious orders has given rise to the question of establishing the responsibility of the Holy See for these acts under international human rights law. This article focuses on the report issued in 2014 by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the monitoring body of the Convention of the Rights of the Child (crc). It is argued that in order to fulfil this task we need to take three steps: first, to establish the relationship between the Vatican City state and the Hole See, a distinct and peculiar international legal subject. To do so, a historical account of the Holy See and its position within the fabric of international law is considered necessary. Secondly, this article argues that the crc was ratified by the Holy See both in its capacity as the government of the Vatican City and as a non-territorial legal subject. Hence, the application of the crc is not confined within the limited territory of the Vatican City, but ‘follows’ the authority of the Holy See irrespective of state borders. Thirdly, it is argued that the vertical, hierarchical structure of the Holy See is homologous to that of the modern state and, therefore, attribution rules can be applied by analogy in this case. The final conclusion is that it is possible to hold the Holy See responsible under the crc for acts of child abuse that occurred under its authority around the globe.


2021 ◽  
pp. 174387212110493
Author(s):  
Gordon Hull

This paper situates the data privacy debate in the context of what I call the death of the data subject. My central claim is that concept of a rights-bearing data subject is being pulled in two contradictory directions at once, and that simultaneous attention to these is necessary to understand and resist the extractive practices of the data industry. Specifically, it is necessary to treat the problems facing the data subject structurally, rather than by narrowly attempting to vindicate its rights. On the one hand, the data industry argues that subjects of biometric identification lack legal standing to pursue claims in court, and Facebook recently denied that that its facial recognition software recognizes faces. On the other hand, industry takes consent to terms of service and arbitration clauses to create enforceable legal subject positions, while using promises of personalization to create a phenomenological subject that is unaware of the extent to which it is being manipulated. Data subjects thus have no legal existence when it is a matter of corporate liability, but legal accountability when it is a matter of their own liability. Successful reform should address the power asymmetries between individuals and data companies that enable this structural disempowerment.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-101
Author(s):  
Benno Zabel

Subjects are not simply found. They are constructed by institutions, social practices and societies. The subject is the result of subjectification. This analysis of transformation aims to show, on the basis of penal practices, that an appropriate understanding of the legal subject cannot begin with a history of progress or decay, however conceived, but has to focus on the dialectic of subjugation and liberation. It then becomes visible that every normative order has to be understood as coping with contingencies, crises and struggles that repeatedly drive law into reflexivity. This reflexivity shows the precariousness of all law and yet makes it clear that free societies cannot do without it.


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