Catherine Lu ,Just and Unjust Interventions in World Politics: Public and Private(New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 2006), 224 pp., £45/$75 hardcover.

2007 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 288-291
Author(s):  
Taryn Shepperd
1995 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Jabara Carley

2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 14-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Biermann ◽  
Philipp Pattberg ◽  
Harro van Asselt ◽  
Fariborz Zelli

Most research on global governance has focused either on theoretical accounts of the overall phenomenon or on empirical studies of distinct institutions that serve to solve particular governance challenges. In this article we analyze instead “governance architectures,” defined as the overarching system of public and private institutions, principles, norms, regulations, decision-making procedures and organizations that are valid or active in a given issue area of world politics. We focus on one aspect that is turning into a major source of concern for scholars and policy-makers alike: the “fragmentation” of governance architectures in important policy domains. The article offers a typology of different degrees of fragmentation, which we describe as synergistic, cooperative, and conflictive fragmentation. We then systematically assess alternative hypotheses over the relative advantages and disadvantages of different degrees of fragmentation. We argue that moderate degrees of fragmentation may entail both significant costs and benefits, while higher degrees of fragmentation are likely to decrease the overall performance of a governance architecture. The article concludes with policy options on how high degrees of fragmentation could be reduced. Fragmentation is prevalent in particular in the current governance of climate change, which we have hence chosen as illustration for our discussion.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 108-124
Author(s):  
Aleksey Grin'ko

Allocation of the burden of proof is a key issue of criminal procedure that is affected by multiple legal and social factors. Under due process principles, the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial is deemed to be the epicenter of the whole structure. However, efficient law enforcement is a prominent public interest that must be considered. This article explores the correlation between public and private interest in proving insanity under the law of New York, which provides great empirical background due to its long history of legal disputes and legislative changes. Considering the nature and structure of the burden of proof, the author concludes that there are several principles for its fair allocation: the due party that bears both the burden and the risk of its nonperformance; the feasibility of the burden; the adequate opportunity for the other party to rebut; the concentration of resources upon needs that are not presumed but in fact exist. All the mentioned principles lay the ground for the harmonization of constitutional guaranties for the defendant as well as the successful enforcement of criminal law. The current New York approach to insanity defense as an affirmative one along with the history of its implementation tends to prove its compliance with such requirements. This finding suggests that bearing the burden shall not be treated as impairment by default, but can protect both the interest of this party and the integrity of the whole process.


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