AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

scholarly journals The Reluctance Phenomenon of Islamic Banks to Offer Profit-Loss Sharing Financing

JEJAK ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 242-264
Author(s):  
Sabrina Sabrina ◽  
M. Shabri Abd Majid
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Product Innovation ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
The Public ◽  
Low Volume ◽  
Grounded Theory Approach

This study contributes to the existing literature on the phenomenon of lower valume of Profit-Loss Sharing (PLS)-based products offered by Islamic banks by comprehensively discussing and analyzing the issue from the internal, external, and regulation perspectives, taking the case of PT. Bank Aceh Syariah (BAS) in Indonesia. Using a grounded theory approach, this study interviews selected informants who are knowledgeable in Islamic economics, banking, and financial theories and practices, including experts, practitioners, customers, and regulators. Viewed from three aspects, namely: internal, external, and regulation, the study found that, from the internal aspect, the problem of the low volume of PLS-based financing products is caused by six factors, namely: high risk, lack of quality and quantity of human resources, complicated handling, lack of banking product innovation, asymmetric information, and lack of socialization. Meanwhile, from the external aspects, it is caused by three factors, namely: moral hazard, lack of community's knowledge of Islamic banking products, and low demand. Finally, from the aspect of the regulation, it is caused by a lack of supportive regulation. By tackling these issues, it is believed that the Islamic bank could offer more PLS-based products that finally contribute to the prosperity of the public.

scholarly journals Analisis Kritis Atas Rendahnya Pembiayaan Berbasis Bagi Hasil Pada BMT di Jepara

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 141
Author(s):  
Fatkur Rohman Ahmad
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Product Innovation ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
Economic Welfare ◽  
Factors Influencing ◽  
Low Volume ◽  
Islamic Society

<p><em>T</em><em>he purpose of this study is to identify factors influencing the low volume of profit sharing-based financing products of BMT Jepara. This study uses interviews with several related parties, including: the academician, practitioners, and customers. The problem of low profit sharing-based financing products in this study is viewed from three aspects: internal,  external, and regulation aspects. Based on the results of the study, from the internal aspect of BMT, the problem of profit sharing-based financing productst is caused by six factors, namely: High risk, Lack of quality and quantity of Human Resources, Complicated handling, No product innovation, Asymmatric information, and Lack of socialization. Meanwhile, the external aspects of BMT is caused by three factors, namely: Moral hazard, Lack of community’s knowledge on Islamic banking products, and Low of demand. Finally, from the aspect of the regulation, the low profit sharing-based financing products caused by lack of support from the regulator. Based on the results of this study, BMT is expected to develop and innovate its products in order to minimize the risk, as well as to socialize  to  the  community  so  that  people  know  the  products  of  BMT.  To  the customers of BMT are expected to better understand   products of the Syariah Banking. The Regulators are expected to regulate supporting policies to encourage the  growth of profit sharing-based financing products so that the Islamic Bank would enhance the  economic welfare of the Islamic society in the future.</em></p>

scholarly journals The Importance of Good Customer Ethics in Improving The Financing Portion of Mudharabah

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 015
Author(s):  
Khotibul Umam
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Business Ethics ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
Islamic Bank ◽  
Bank Financing

Mudharabah is a partnership contract (reputation agreement) in which one party (shahibul maal) will give his property to another party (mudharib) as productive business capital  with profit sharing between the owner of the funds/capital based on the agreed ratio in advance. In practice, the application of financing mudharabah is not easy to be implemented in Islamic banking because financing mudharabah will make the asymmetric information between the customer and Islamic banking. Mudharabah client have more information than Islamic banking about all of that business.  Asymmetric information sometimes can make the costumer do the moral hazard and adverse selection acts with the result that Islamic banking didn't take that risk and make the distribution of mudharabah financing portion becomes very small when compared to the total number of Islamic bank financing. Mudharabah Customers must have a good business ethics and always have advanced principle of honesty, trustworthy and transparent in managing shahibul maal funds in orther to they can minimize the risk of financing mudharabah and make Islamic banking be confident to grant the decision of financing mudharabah.

scholarly journals Aplikasi Pembiayaan di Bank Syari’ah

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-233
Author(s):  
Ahmad Dahlan
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Capitalist System ◽  
Information Problem ◽  
Sociological Aspect

The aplication of Syari’ah bank financial which is based on profit and loss sharing, known as margin profit sharing, seems facing many challenges. From the financing side, the obstacles are asymmetric information problem, side streaming, adverse selection, and moral hazard. The indirect obstacles are the sociological aspect, such as a domination of capitalist system in banking and the non optimum human resources.

scholarly journals Sistem Informasi Dalam Hubungan Prinsipal – Agen Di RSU-BLUD Bahteramas, Kota Kendari Provinsi Sulawesi Tenggara

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-85
Author(s):  
Zainul Abidin
Keyword(s):  
Information Systems ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Qualitative Approach ◽  
Conventional Systems ◽  
Reporting Procedures

 This study aims to analyze the information systems that occur, especially in terms of reporting procedures, budgeting systems and the role of the supervisory board at the Bahteramas Hospital, Kendari City, Southeast Sulawesi Province. This research uses a qualitative approach. The results show that the reporting procedure uses a combination of computers and manuals, but manual systems are still dominant. The budgeting system still uses conventional systems and also uses performance-based budgets. The supervisory board has carried out its duties, but it is still not optimal. Even so, there is complete information where the principal knows what the agent is doing. Even though in reality, there are still agency problems (moral hazard and adverse selection) both potentially and factually. For example, negligence in the supply of drugs, but on the whole does not hinder the disclosure of information by the principal.

Improving Trustworthiness in E-Market Using Attack Resilient Reputation Modeling

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 57-82
Author(s):  
Neeraj Kumar Sharma ◽  
Vibha Gaur ◽  
Punam Bedi
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Reputation Systems ◽  
Trust And Reputation ◽  
Reputation Mechanisms ◽  
Reputation Building ◽  
Building Parameters

Asymmetric information is a major problem in e-commerce transactions as it gives rise to adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Reputation mechanisms provide a solution to this problem by discouraging fraudulent behavior and encouraging honest behavior of participants in the uncertain and un-trusted environment of e-market. This paper discusses trust and reputation relationships, and highlights the importance of key reputation building parameters to enhance trustworthiness of participants. Finally, it proposes reputation metrics that guard reputation systems from various attacks by malicious participants to improve the quality of e-market and presents a working prototype.

Is Your Lawyer a Lemon? Incentives and Selection in the Public Provision of Criminal Defense

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-51
Author(s):  
Amanda Agan ◽  
Matthew Freedman ◽  
Emily Owens
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Low Income ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Legal Services ◽  
Public Provision ◽  
Court Records ◽  
The Public ◽  
Criminal Defense ◽  
The U.S

Governments in the U.S. must offer free legal services to low-income people accused of crimes. To provide these services, many jurisdictions rely on assigned counsel systems, where private attorneys represent indigent defendants on a contract basis. These defendants are more likely to be convicted and incarcerated than defendants with privately retained attorneys. Using detailed court records, we investigate the mechanisms behind this disparity and consider their policy implications. We find that adverse selection among lawyers is not the primary contributor to the assigned counsel penalty. We conclude that reform efforts should address moral hazard in assigned counsel systems.

Moral Hazard and Internal Discipline: Theory and Evidence

2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (4) ◽  
pp. 365-400 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meng Li
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Incentive Pay ◽  
The Public ◽  
External Monitoring ◽  
Confidentiality Agreement ◽  
Theoretical Predictions ◽  
Empirical Tests ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT This paper studies, both theoretically and empirically, how subordinates to CEOs can discipline the CEOs' self-serving activities. I predict that because CEOs' self-serving activities hurt the subordinates through the subordinates' stakes in the firms, the subordinates who observe these activities will take actions that negatively affect the CEOs, and that in anticipation of such reactions by subordinates, the CEOs will limit their own misbehaviors. This disciplinary mechanism will become more effective when the CEOs' self-serving activities are more observable to subordinates. Further, the sensitivity of CEOs' self-serving activities to observability will increase (1) as the agency problem between CEOs and their subordinates intensifies, and (2) when external monitoring is less effective. The incentive pay for the subordinates will also decrease with the strength of external monitoring. Using a series of empirical tests, I find results that are largely consistent with my theoretical predictions. JEL Classifications: G34; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text, except for Glassdoor data, which are obtained by the author under a confidentiality agreement with Glassdoor, Inc.

Information Asymmetry and Levels of Agency Relationships

1998 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Debi Prasad Mishra ◽  
Jan B. Heide ◽  
Stanton G. Cort
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Customer Relationship ◽  
Price Premiums ◽  
Agency Relationships ◽  
Institutional Differences ◽  
Service Managers

Many marketing exchanges are characterized by an information asymmetry between suppliers and customers. Specifically, customers are faced with both adverse selection and moral hazard problems that involve, respectively, uncertainty about supplier characteristics and the risk of quality cheating. Drawing on prior research, the authors propose that agency problems in a customer relationship can be resolved by means of customer bonds and price premiums, which serve as signals and supplier incentives, respectively. The authors also propose that adverse selection and moral hazard problems exist in relationships between suppliers and their employees. Similar to the customer relationship, these problems can be addressed with signals and incentives of various kinds. The authors present hypotheses regarding the agency problems in both of these relationships and test them empirically in the context of automotive service purchases. Data obtained from 287 service managers support the hypotheses. The data also suggest that institutional differences across service outlets (e.g., ownership structure and size) influence how the two types of agency problems are managed.

Agency, Information, and the Structure of Moral Problems in Business

2006 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryan W. Husted
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Information Economics ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Ethical Problems ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Moral Problems ◽  
Principal Agent Model

Many ethical problems in business can be characterized as having elements of incomplete and/or asymmetric information. This paper analyzes such problems using information economics and the principal-agent model. It defines the nature of moral problems in business and then applies principal-agent models involving adverse selection and moral hazard to these problems. Possible solutions to conditions of information asymmetry are examined in order to support the development of organizational virtue.

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