scholarly journals Tax Aversion, Optimal Tax Rates, and Indexation

10.3386/w2643 ◽  
1988 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger Waud
Keyword(s):  
Taxation ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 37-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Fleurbaey

The economic theory of income taxation has recently been eager to apply philosophically prominent approaches to the selection of the optimal tax on earnings. This chapter presents and compares the consequentialist–utilitarian approach to taxation developed by Mirrlees and defended by Murphy and Nagel, to the fair allocation approach, as adapted to taxation problems by Fleurbaey and Maniquet. The fairness approach does retain an element of libertarianism and gives some value to market earnings. The two approaches have different recommendations for taxation, especially regarding low incomes, which are given absolute priority under the fairness approach, and may be submitted to lower tax rates out of respect for the diversity of preferences among the least skilled workers.


2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
James J. Fogarty

The 2010 Australian government tax review suggested Australia move to a uniform excise tax rate for all alcoholic beverages. Here, a model is presented and calibrated that shows the optimal per litre of pure alcohol (LAL) tax rates for beer, wine, spirits, and ready-to-drink spirits are substantially different to both current alcohol tax rates and the uniform tax rate recommended by the tax review. Specifically, given an individual consumer utility model, the best estimate values of the welfare maximising LAL tax rates are: $37 for beer, $11 for wine, $50 for spirits, and $77 for ready-to-drink spirits. The variation in the optimal tax rate across beverage types flows from differences in the externality costs associated with the consumption of each beverage type, and differences in the proportion of moderate consumption and abusive consumption associated with each beverage type. In addition, it is shown that the optimal tax rates are influenced by the range of costs that are considered to be externality costs, and the relative price responsiveness of abusers and moderate consumers.


2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 155-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Frankel

I present a simple and tractable model of the optimal taxation of married couples, working off of the multidimensional screening framework of Armstrong and Rochet (1999). In particular, I study how the tax code varies with the degree of assortative mating. One result is that the “negative jointness” of marginal tax rates found in Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2007, 2009) for couples with uncorrelated earnings should be attenuated in the presence of assortative mating. When mating is sufficiently assortative, the optimal tax schedule is separable: an individual's taxes do not depend on his or her spouse's income. (JEL D82, H21, H24, J12)


2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (5) ◽  
pp. 2532-2547 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe Choné ◽  
Guy Laroque

Heterogeneity is an important determinant of the shape of optimal tax schemes. This is shown here in a model à la Mirrlees. The agents differ in their productivities and opportunity costs of work, but their labor supplies depend only on a given unidimensional combination of these two characteristics. Conditions are provided under which marginal tax rates are everywhere nonnegative. This is the case when work opportunity costs are distributed independently of income. But one can also get negative marginal tax rates, in particular at the bottom of the income distribution. A numerical illustration is given, based on UK data. (JEL H21, H24, H31, J22)


2011 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Terrance Jalbert ◽  
Eric Rask ◽  
Mercedes Jalbert

<p class="MsoBodyText" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt;"><span style="font-style: normal; font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">In this paper the attractiveness of tax-deferred and non-deferred investments in periods of changing tax regimes are examined.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Specifically the desirability of deferring taxes given one&rsquo;s current tax rate, estimate of future tax rates, number of years until retirement, and the expected rate of return on investment is explored.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Under some combinations of tax rates and investment horizons, tax deferral is found to be undesirable while in others it is found to be desirable.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Using the formulas and tables developed here, an individual can identify the rate of return on investment at which he is indifferent between deferring and not deferring, rates at which tax deferral is preferred and rates at which tax deferral is inferior.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>In addition, the sensitivity of the decision to the timing of future tax rate changes is explored.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>This research provides investors a more comprehensive understanding of the factors that determine optimal tax deferral choices and will permit investors to make better tax deferral decisions. </span></span></p>


Author(s):  
Pēteris Grabusts

For the purpose of simulation models visualization of various economic disciplines, it is appropriate to use specialized programs that allow to characterize the nature of a particular model, but also make it possible to carry out a simulation model based on various parameters. This article substantiates the usefulness of introduction the simulation models at the initial research process, when simulation models can be imported parallel with analytical relations acquisition. Series of research were carried out in order to demonstrate the suitability of the Matlab Simulink for the purpose of visualization of various simulation models of various economic disciplines. Often, the analytical solution is much simpler than the visual Simulink model, but in the perspective of training purposes, it gives an understanding of the usefulness of such models. In the research part of the study the modelling capabilities in economic studies were demonstrated- adapted models in optimal tax rates computing and equilibrium determination in the competitive market.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 298-327
Author(s):  
Benjamin B. Lockwood

Work often entails up-front effort costs in exchange for delayed benefits, and mounting evidence documents present bias over effort in the face of such delays. This paper studies the implications for the optimal income tax. Optimal tax rates are computed for present-biased workers who choose multiple dimensions of labor effort, some of which occur prior to compensation. Present bias reduces optimal tax rates, with a larger effect when the elasticity of taxable income is high. Optimal marginal tax rates may be negative at low incomes, providing an alternative, corrective rationale for work subsidies like the Earned Income Tax Credit. (JEL D91, H21, H24)


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