scholarly journals A Compositional Model of Consciousness Based on Consciousness-Only

Entropy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 308
Author(s):  
Camilo Miguel Signorelli ◽  
Quanlong Wang ◽  
Ilyas Khan
Keyword(s):  
Hard Problem ◽  
Compositional Model ◽  
Closed Category ◽  
Combination Problem ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
Conscious Processes

Scientific studies of consciousness rely on objects whose existence is assumed to be independent of any consciousness. On the contrary, we assume consciousness to be fundamental, and that one of the main features of consciousness is characterized as being other-dependent. We set up a framework which naturally subsumes this feature by defining a compact closed category where morphisms represent conscious processes. These morphisms are a composition of a set of generators, each being specified by their relations with other generators, and therefore co-dependent. The framework is general enough and fits well into a compositional model of consciousness. Interestingly, we also show how our proposal may become a step towards avoiding the hard problem of consciousness, and thereby address the combination problem of conscious experiences.

scholarly journals The Quest to Solve Problems That Don’t Exist: Thought Artifacts in Contemporary Ontology

Studia Humana ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 45-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernardo Kastrup
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Problem ◽  
Conceptual Structure ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Empirical Reality ◽  
Semantic Paradoxes ◽  
Philosophy Today ◽  
Combination Problem ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Hard Problem

Abstract Questions about the nature of reality and consciousness remain unresolved in philosophy today, but not for lack of hypotheses. Ontologies as varied as physicalism, microexperientialism and cosmopsychism enrich the philosophical menu. Each of these ontologies faces a seemingly fundamental problem: under physicalism, for instance, we have the ‘hard problem of consciousness,’ whereas under microexperientialism we have the ‘subject combination problem.’ I argue that these problems are thought artifacts, having no grounding in empirical reality. In a manner akin to semantic paradoxes, they exist only in the internal logico-conceptual structure of their respective ontologies.

A Solution to the Combination Problem and the Future of Panpsychism

2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (9) ◽  
pp. 129-140
Author(s):  
A. Harris
Keyword(s):  
First Century ◽  
Fundamental Aspect ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Scientific Question ◽  
Combination Problem ◽  
The Future ◽  
Way Of Thinking ◽  
Twenty First Century ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Universe

This paper supports the scientific position that panpsychism is a valid category of possible resolutions to the hard problem of consciousness, and it focuses on a solution to the 'combination problem' in panpsychism. I argue for a new way of thinking about consciousness in which consciousness is not viewed in reference to subjects, and that the concept of a 'subject' is borne of the illusion of self. Therefore, we don't face a combination problem if the notion of a subject is superfluous and consciousness itself is pervasive in the form of a field. The paper is also a more general discussion about the importance of pursuing this scientific question in the twenty-first century: is consciousness a more fundamental aspect of the universe than we have previously assumed?

Zombies and Dolls

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcello Massimini ◽  
Giulio Tononi
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Turing Test ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

This chapter uses thought experiments and practical examples to introduce, in a very accessible way, the hard problem of consciousness. Soon, machines may behave like us to pass the Turing test and scientists may succeed in copying and simulating the inner workings of the brain. Will all this take us any closer to solving the mysteries of consciousness? The reader is taken to meet different kind of zombies, the philosophical, the digital, and the inner ones, to understand why many, scientists and philosophers alike, doubt that the mind–body problem will ever be solved.

scholarly journals Animal Evolution: The Hard Problem of Cartilage Origins

2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (14) ◽  
pp. R685-R688 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thibaut Brunet ◽  
Detlev Arendt
Keyword(s):  
Hard Problem ◽  
Animal Evolution ◽  
The Hard Problem

Going Radical

2018 ◽  
pp. 94-116
Author(s):  
Daniel D. Hutto ◽  
Erik Myin
Keyword(s):  
Research Program ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
New Paradigm ◽  
Positive Research ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
Conceptual Revolution ◽  
Hard Problem Of Content

E-approaches to cognition—enactive, embodied, ecological—conceive of minds as fundamentally relational and interactive. They are often heralded as offering a new paradigm for thinking about the mental. Yet only the most radical versions of E-approaches—those that seek not to complement but to replace traditional cognitivist accounts of mind—have any prospect of ushering in a truly revolutionary rethink of the nature of cognition. This chapter considers whether such a conceptual revolution might really be in the cards. It identities the major options proposed by E-theorists, rating each in terms of degree of radicality. It reminds readers of the hard problem of content and reviews the range of options for handling it. It argues that “going radical” is one of the most attractive ways of dealing with the hard problem of content and that it is worth exploring the positive research program that going radical opens up.

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