Additional Resources for Sparse Theories of Phenomenal Consciousness

The phenomenal overflow debate is a debate about the richness of phenomenal consciousness. There are two candidate views: the rich view and the sparse view. The rich view says phenomenal consciousness outstrips access consciousness and the contents of working memory. The sparse view denies this. Moreover, according to some conceptions of the sparse view, the subjective impression of richness depends on scene statistics and the refrigerator-light illusion. The purpose of this paper is to show there are additional resources available to the sparse view in accommodating intuitions of richness that have yet to be fully appreciated by participants in the debate. To this end, research pertaining to feature binding and activity-silent working memory will be discussed.

How Judgments of Visual Resemblance are Induced by Visual Experience

Judgments of visual resemblance ('A looks like B'), unlike other judgments of resemblance, are often induced directly by visual experience. What is the nature of this experience? We argue that the visual experience that prompts a subject looking at A to judge that A looks like B is a visual experience of B. After elucidating this thesis, we defend it, using the 'phenomenal contrast' method. Comparing our account to competing accounts, we show that the phenomenal contrast between a visual experience that induces the judgment that A looks like B, and a visual experience that does not induce this judgment, is best explained by the fact that the former visually represents B, whereas the latter does not.

Integrated Information Theory, Intrinsicality, and Overlapping Conscious Systems

Integrated information theory (IIT) identifies consciousness with having a maximum amount of integrated information. But a thing's having the maximum amount of anything cannot be intrinsic to it, for that depends on how that thing compares to certain other things. IIT's consciousness, then, is not intrinsic. A mereological argument elaborates this consequence: IIT implies that one physical system can be conscious while a physical duplicate of it is not conscious. Thus, by a common and reasonable conception of intrinsicality, IIT's consciousness is not intrinsic. It is then argued that to avoid the implication that consciousness is not intrinsic, IIT must abandon its exclusion postulate, which prohibits overlapping conscious systems. Indeed, theories of consciousness that attribute consciousness to physical systems should embrace the view that some conscious systems overlap. A discussion of the admittedly counterintuitive nature of this solution, along with some medical and neuroscientific realities that would seem to support it, is included.

Is One Spring Enough for a Conscious Stream? Comments on Mark Solms' The Hidden Spring

In this commentary, I discuss my main points of convergence and divergence with Mark Solms' conception of consciousness presented in his very stimulating opus, The Hidden Spring, and then frame two proposals to integrate some of his key concepts into the global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT) of consciousness.

A Framework for Evolution and Consciousness: Panpsychism Without Tears?

Giving an account of the relation between evolution and consciousness is painted as posing a dilemma between panpsychism, with minimal consciousness in every grain of matter, and radical emergence, with consciousness appearing as from nowhere in living structures. Panpsychism has been seen as suffering from a combination problem and radical emergence as unjustified in physics. The underpinning of physics now lies in field theory, which may provide a way out on both sides. Only, and always, in a field theory account do influences at different points in space-time combine in the same indivisible event. Radical emergence is also inherent to field theory. Moreover, by providing rich patterns of influence involving both discrete identities and quantitative values, field theory might provide a basis for sensed propositional meaning with subjects and predicates. Ordered condensed matter within living tissue may support unusual emergent dynamic units uniquely suited to building representations of the world with sensed meaning. The evolution of consciousness may then be seen as a tractable biological problem centred on increasingly sophisticated ways for external world dynamics to be mirrored by internal representations with semantic content, based in field relations within condensed matter with genetically encoded complex order.

Influence of Mindfulness on the Processes of Consciousness Measured via Evoked Potentials A Theoretical Review

The study of brain changes in response to mindfulness (MF) practice could serve as a way to expand our understanding of key cognitive processes such as consciousness, attention, or executive functions. The aim of this work is to offer an updated review of the studies that have investigated the effects of MF on cognition; specifically, the processes of consciousness, attention, and executive functioning, measured by evoked potentials (EP). The main studies on this topic from 2006 to the present are reviewed and the principal findings are grouped according to the EP measured, mainly N1, N2, and P3. The convergent evidence derived from the updated research allows us to propose a hypothetical model of the existing correlations between the influences of MF on cognitive processes and the associated EP components. However, the methodological limitations found mean that we should take these results with caution and advise a methodological refinement for future research.