scholarly journals Cognitive Mechanisms Underlying Risky Decision-Making. A Study of Patients with Alzheimer’s Dementia

Author(s):  
Aurora Moreno ◽  
José Ramón Alameda

Patients with mild dementia of Alzheimer’s type (DAT) use to present problems in decision making. Several studies have analyzed the cognitive functions in the process of decision making, especially in situations under ambiguity. One approach is the somatic marker hypothesis from the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and the Gambling Index (IG). One problem is the lack of specificity from IGT indicators, for this reason some hypotheses have been proposed in order to solve these deficiencies, i.e. the Prospective Valence Learning (PVL). In this study, we apply the IGT to 10 patients and 10 control subjects. We analyze the PVL parameter: loss aversion parameter (λ), shape parameter (α), recency parameter (A), consistency (c) and task development in function of advantageous choices. Our results show that control subjects’ performance is better than DAT´, nevertheless, in the first stages there are not differences, these appear in the two last blocks. Whit the PVL parameters we obtain differences in α and c, and, to a lesser extent, in λ. According to PVL parameters, DAT patients can be described as sensible at loss subjects who are more influenced by immediate choice and a very low level of consistence, what implies the use of random choice strategies.

Author(s):  
Aurora Moreno ◽  
José Ramón Alameda

Patients with mild dementia of Alzheimer’s type (DAT) use to present problems in decision making. Several studies have analyzed the cognitive functions in the process of decision making, especially in situations under ambiguity. One approach is the somatic marker hypothesis from the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and the Gambling Index (IG). One problem is the lack of specificity from IGT indicators, for this reason some hypotheses have been proposed in order to solve these deficiencies, i.e. the Prospective Valence Learning (PVL). In this study, we apply the IGT to 10 patients and 10 control subjects. We analyze the PVL parameter: loss aversion parameter (λ), shape parameter (α), recency parameter (A), consistency (c) and task development in function of advantageous choices. Our results show that control subjects’ performance is better than DAT´, nevertheless, in the first stages there are not differences, these appear in the two last blocks. Whit the PVL parameters we obtain differences in α and c, and, to a lesser extent, in λ. According to PVL parameters, DAT patients can be described as sensible at loss subjects who are more influenced by immediate choice and a very low level of consistence, what implies the use of random choice strategies.


2020 ◽  
pp. 7-20
Author(s):  
Michela Balconi ◽  
Laura Angioletti

Within the neuroeconomics field, there are two evident situations in which decisionmaking process do not respect the rule of expected utility: gambling and moral behaviors. In the case of gambling behavior, a tendency to engage in risky decision-making could lead to choose disadvantageous options (loss vs gain) and long-term negative economic consequences. Regarding moral behavior, subjects prefer options not always related to their expected utility, but more to their social and ethical significance (fair vs unfair). This commentary discusses both the theoretical and empirical basis of these behaviors, focusing on neurophysiological methods adopted to investigate commonalities and differences in physiological and behavioral subjects’ responses. The dichotomy between emotions and rationality will be explored considering two popular economics games, Iowa Gambling Task and Ultimatum Game, and will be discussed in the light of somatic marker hypothesis frame. We propose a multidimensional approach to describe more in-depth real-world decision-making situations in neuroeconomics.


Author(s):  
Marco Verweij ◽  
Antonio Damasio

The somatic marker hypothesis has not always been fully understood, or properly applied, in political science. The hypothesis was developed to explain the personally and socially harmful decision-making of neurological patients who appeared to have largely intact cognitive skills. It posits that affect (consisting of emotions, feelings, and drives) facilitates and expands cognition, is grounded in states of bodily physiology and on the processing of those states in the entire nervous system, and is shaped by a person’s past experiences in similar situations. Thus far, it has received empirical support from lesion studies, experiments based on the Iowa Gambling Task, and brain imaging studies. The somatic marker hypothesis is not compatible with key assumptions on which various influential political and social approaches are based. It disagrees with the largely cognitive view of decision-making presented in rational choice analysis. Contrary to behavioral public policy, the somatic marker hypothesis emphasizes the extent to which affect and cognition are integrated and mutually enabling. Finally, it differs from poststructuralist frameworks by highlighting the constraints that evolutionarily older bodily and neuronal networks impose on decision-making. Rather, the somatic marker hypothesis implies that political decision-making is socially constructed yet subject to constraints, is often sluggish but also is prone to wholesale, occasional reversals, takes place at both conscious and unconscious levels, and subserves dynamic, sociocultural homeostasis.


2003 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atsunobu Suzuki ◽  
Akihisa Hirota ◽  
Noriyoshi Takasawa ◽  
Kazuo Shigemasu

2021 ◽  
pp. 135245852110593
Author(s):  
Rodrigo S Fernández ◽  
Lucia Crivelli ◽  
María E Pedreira ◽  
Ricardo F Allegri ◽  
Jorge Correale

Background: Multiple sclerosis (MS) is commonly associated with decision-making, neurocognitive impairments, and mood and motivational symptoms. However, their relationship may be obscured by traditional scoring methods. Objectives: To study the computational basis underlying decision-making impairments in MS and their interaction with neurocognitive and neuropsychiatric measures. Methods: Twenty-nine MS patients and 26 matched control subjects completed a computer version of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). Participants underwent neurocognitive evaluation using an expanded version of the Brief Repeatable Battery. Hierarchical Bayesian Analysis was used to estimate three established computational models to compare parameters between groups. Results: Patients showed increased learning rate and reduced loss-aversion during decision-making relative to control subjects. These alterations were associated with: (1) reduced net gains in the IGT; (2) processing speed, executive functioning and memory impairments; and (3) higher levels of depression and current apathy. Conclusion: Decision-making deficits in MS patients could be described by the interplay between latent computational processes, neurocognitive impairments, and mood/motivational symptoms.


2010 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Fridberg ◽  
Sarah Queller ◽  
Woo-Young Ahn ◽  
Woojae Kim ◽  
Anthony J. Bishara ◽  
...  

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tochukwu Nweze ◽  
Agu Ethelbert ◽  
Florian Lange

Online sports betting is a popular recreational activity in Nigeria. Like other forms of gambling, risk of pathological progression exists for gamblers who continue betting despite severe financial and psychosocial consequences. In the present study, we examined whether this population of gamblers shows deficits in decision making and cognitive flexibility that have been documented in Western gambling populations. Thirty-six online sports bettors and 42 non-gambling participants completed a version of the Iowa gambling task (IGT) and an established set-shifting task for the assessment of cognitive flexibility. The two groups did not differ significantly in the selection of disadvantageous decks on the IGT. In contrast, sports bettors committed significantly more errors on the set-shifting task than non-gambling control participants. As this performance deficit was not specific to trials requiring a set shift, it most likely resulted from gambling-related changes in general cognitive or motivational abilities that are required to successfully complete challenging mental tasks. While our results illustrate that findings from Western populations cannot automatically be generalized to other contexts, it should be noted that we focused on only one particular type of gambling and included mostly participants with mild gambling-related problems.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariya V. Cherkasova ◽  
Luke Clark ◽  
Jason J.S. Barton ◽  
Michael Schulzer ◽  
Mahsa Shafiee ◽  
...  

ABSTRACTReward-related stimuli can potently influence behaviour; for example, exposure to drug-paired cues can trigger drug use and relapse in people with addictions. Psychological mechanisms that generate such outcomes likely include cue-induced cravings and attentional biases. Recent animal data suggest another candidate mechanism: reward-paired cues can enhance risky decision making, yet whether this translates to humans is unknown. Here, we examined whether sensory reward-paired cues alter decision making under uncertainty and risk, as measured respectively by the Iowa Gambling Task and a two-choice lottery task. In the cued version of both tasks, gain feedback was augmented with reward-concurrent audiovisual stimuli. Healthy human volunteers (53 males, 78 females) performed each task once, one with and the other without cues (cued IGT/uncued VGT: n = 63; uncued IGT/cued VGT: n = 68), with concurrent eye-tracking. Reward-paired cues did not affect choice on the Iowa Gambling Task. On the two-choice lottery task, the cued group displayed riskier choice and reduced sensitivity to probability information. The cued condition was associated with reduced eye fixations on probability information shown on the screen and greater pupil dilation related to decision and reward anticipation. This pupil effect was unrelated to the risk-promoting effects of cues: the degree of pupil dilation for risky versus risk-averse choices did not differ as a function of cues. Taken together, our data show that sensory reward cues can promote riskier decisions and have additional and distinct effects on arousal.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT:Animal data suggest that reward-paired cues can promote maladaptive reward-seeking by biasing cost-benefit decision making. Whether this finding translates to humans is unknown. We examined the effects of salient reward-paired audio-visual cues on decision making under risk and uncertainty in human volunteers. Cues had risk-promoting effects on a risky choice task and independently increased task-related arousal as measured by pupil dilation. By demonstrating risk-promoting effects of cues in human participants, our data identify a mechanism whereby cue reactivity could translate into maladaptive behavioural outcomes in people with addictions.


1996 ◽  
Vol 351 (1346) ◽  
pp. 1413-1420 ◽  

In this article I discuss a hypothesis, known as the somatic marker hypothesis, which I believe is relevant to the understanding of processes of human reasoning and decision making. The ventromedial sector of the prefrontal cortices is critical to the operations postulated here, but the hypothesis does not necessarily apply to prefrontal cortex as a whole and should not be seen as an attempt to unify frontal lobe functions under a single mechanism. The key idea in the hypothesis is that ‘marker’ signals influence the processes of response to stimuli, at multiple levels of operation, some of which occur overtly (consciously, ‘in mind’) and some of which occur covertly (non-consciously, in a non-minded manner). The marker signals arise in bioregulatory processes, including those which express themselves in emotions and feelings, but are not necessarily confined to those alone. This is the reason why the markers are termed somatic: they relate to body-state structure and regulation even when they do not arise in the body proper but rather in the brain’s representation of the body. Examples of the covert action of ‘marker’ signals are the undeliberated inhibition of a response learned previously; the introduction of a bias in the selection of an aversive or appetitive mode of behaviour, or in the otherwise deliberate evaluation of varied option-outcome scenarios. Examples of overt action include the conscious ‘qualifying’ of certain option-outcome scenarios as dangerous or advantageous. The hypothesis rejects attempts to limit human reasoning and decision making to mechanisms relying, in an exclusive and unrelated manner, on either conditioning alone or cognition alone.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document