scholarly journals The (Non) Economic Properties of the Law

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 26
Author(s):  
Leo Katz ◽  
Alvaro Sandroni

This paper shows that the logical properties of constraints imposed by law are fundamentally different from other constraints considered in economics such as budget constraints and bounded rationality constraints, such as the ones based on inattention or shortlisting. This suggests that to fully incorporate law into economics may require a revision of economic theory.

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maya Tsoklinova

The main purpose of this article is to study and analyze the economic behaviour of market participants in real conditions, and to outline the very natural trait of individuals to show bounded rationality. The theoretical framework of bounded rationality is presented, and a comparative analysis is carried out between the neoclassical theory of rational behaviour and the concept of quasi-rational economic agents according to behavioural economics. Special emphasis is placed on the correlation between the decisionmaking process and the concept of limited rationality. This article confirms the thesis that the model of the rational economic individual is not the best model. Research in this area proves that this model has great imperfections, but, at the moment, the empirical material is still not enough to create another, newer and practically applicable model of behaviour of the real economic person, which is characterized by bounded rationality.


Author(s):  
Eyal Zamir ◽  
Doron Teichman

This chapter presents an overview of the behavioral analysis of the law of consumer contracts. The chapter reviews various marketing techniques that build upon consumers’ bounded rationality, including the manner of presenting information, limited availability, low-ball and bait-and-switch techniques, and lenient return policies. It also analyzes several pricing techniques, such as price framing, multidimensional prices, deferred and contingent payments, and odd pricing. The chapter then turns to examining the content of consumer contracts, and highlights how pricing methods, non-salient clauses, and modifications might also exploit consumers’ limited rationality. In light of this overview, the chapter examines market-based (primarily competition and reputation) and legal solutions (primarily disclosure and mandatory regulations) to the challenges posed by consumer contracts.


1951 ◽  
Vol 37 (8) ◽  
pp. 1083
Author(s):  
David McCord Wright
Keyword(s):  

1990 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Moffitt

In the last several years, a branch of applied econometrics has developed that is devoted to the development of techniques for the estimation of demand and other functions when the budget constraint is “piecewise-linear,” or “kinky”—that is, when the constraint consists of a number of segments joined together at kink points. Such constraints most frequently arise from government tax and transfer programs. But kinked constraints sometimes arise in nongovernment contexts, a well-known example being the block pricing schedule commonly set by utilities and volume discounting in general. Kinked budget constraints create two difficulties. First, changes in tax and transfer schedules can have unexpected effects that can be exactly the opposite in sign to those expected from economic theory. Examples of this phenomenon are given below. Second, kinked budget constraints make the estimation of demand functions quite difficult.


2003 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 191-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Owen A Lamont ◽  
Richard H Thaler

The Law of One price states that identical goods (or securities) should sell for identical prices. In financial markets the law of one price is thought to hold almost exactly, and is the basis for much of financial economic theory. We present evidence on several examples of violations of this law, including closed-end country funds, twin shares, dual class shares, and corporate spinoffs. We analyze the causes of these violations, and show they all stem from some limits on the extent to which rational arbitrageurs can intervene.


Author(s):  
Roger Koppl

The division of labor creates a division of knowledge, which creates expertise and the problem of experts. The rule of experts exists when experts have an epistemic monopoly and choose for others. Generally, experts may have power that threatens individual autonomy. Competition tends to dissipate the power of experts, although the details of market structure matter. Even well-meaning experts may fail because they have bounded rationality. Epistemic monopoly increases the risks of error and expert failure; competition reduces them. Information choice theory is an economic theory of experts. It may help in the design of epistemic systems, which are agent-based processes viewed from perspective of their knowledge properties. Epistemic engineering studies the design principles of epistemic systems. Economists should consider the epistemic properties of alternative institutions to minimize the problem of experts and avoid the rule of experts. Applications discussed include religion, law and justice, and medical research.


Author(s):  
Keith N. Hylton

Criminal law consists of substantive and procedural parts. Substantive law is the set of rules defining conduct that violates the law. Procedural criminal law is the set of rules regulating the process of punishment. Substantive rules apply mostly to individual actors, and procedural rules apply to public enforcement agencies and adjudicators. Economic theory of criminal law consists of normative and positive parts. Normative economic theory, which began with writings by Beccaria and Bentham, aims to recommend an ideal criminal punishment scheme. Positive economic theory, which appeared later in writings by Holmes and Posner, aims to justify and to better understand the criminal law rules that exist. Since the purpose of criminal law is to deter socially undesirable conduct, economic theory, which emphasizes incentives, would appear to be an important perspective from which to examine criminal law. Positive economic theory, applied to substantive criminal law, seeks to explain and to justify criminal law doctrine in economic terms—that is, in terms that emphasize the incentive effects created by the law. The positive economic theory of criminal law literature can be divided into three phases: Classical deterrence theory, neoclassical deterrence, and modern synthesis. The modern synthesis provides a rationale for fundamental criminal law doctrines and also more puzzling portions of the law such as the doctrines of intent and necessity. Positive economic theory also provides a rationale for the allocation of enforcement responsibilities.


2010 ◽  
Vol 55 (186) ◽  
pp. 67-87
Author(s):  
Petar Filipic

The concept of utility became rightfully recognized in economic theory with the introduction of decreasing marginal utility. However a question that arises is: does an increasing consumption of goods always and without exception lead to diminishing marginal utility? It is quite possible that in some cases marginal utility of goods and services actually increases. If this fact is true, it might additionally strengthen the utility theory and make it applicable in numerous cases of economic and social reality. This paper uses the example of the utility of studying at university (i.e. the utility of university examinations), and tries to add a few arguments in favour of the statement that the law of increasing utility exists.


2013 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 528-543 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Rabin

Harstad and Selten (this forum) raise interesting questions about the relative promise of optimization models and bounded-rationality models in making progress in economics. This article builds from their analysis by indicating the potential for using neoclassical (broadly defined) optimization models to integrate insights from psychology on the limits to rationality into economics. I lay out an approach to making (imperfect and incremental) improvements over previous economic theory by incorporating greater realism while attempting to maintain the breadth of application, the precision of predictions, and the insights of neoclassical theory. I then discuss how many human limits to full rationality are, in fact, well understood in terms of optimization. (JEL B49, D01, D03, D81, D84)


2021 ◽  
pp. 001946622110172
Author(s):  
Christian Gehrke

The study discusses Krishna Bharadwaj’s elaboration of the Sraffian critique of the currently dominating supply-and-demand equilibrium theories that are based on the marginalist approach by making use of documents from the Sraffa archive. Starting from Krishna Bharadwaj’s astute observation that the law of diminishing returns ‘was the thin end of the wedge by which the marginal analysis was introduced and generalised’ the study is concerned with Sraffa’s critique of the marginalist treatment of intensive diminishing returns and his return to a pre-marginalist and non-mechanical analysis of the intensification of land use. In the opening part of the article, the development of the friendship and collaboration between Piero Sraffa and Krishna Bharadwaj is briefly recalled, based on information provided in the correspondence files and diary entries in Sraffa’s papers. JEL Code: B24, B31, B51


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