scholarly journals A Bargaining Game with Proposers in the Hot Seat

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 87
Author(s):  
Bram Driesen

This note reconsiders the Rubinstein bargaining game under the assumption that a rejected offer is only costly to the proposer who made the rejected offer. It is shown that then, the classic result of Shaked that, in the multilateral version of this game, every division of the good can be sustained in SPE no longer holds. Specifically, there are many SPE, but players’ (expected) payoffs in SPE are unique. The assumption further leads to a responder advantage.

Author(s):  
Ashwin Sah ◽  
Mehtaab Sawhney ◽  
Yufei Zhao

Abstract Does every $n$-vertex Cayley graph have an orthonormal eigenbasis all of whose coordinates are $O(1/\sqrt{n})$? While the answer is yes for abelian groups, we show that it is no in general. On the other hand, we show that every $n$-vertex Cayley graph (and more generally, vertex-transitive graph) has an orthonormal basis whose coordinates are all $O(\sqrt{\log n / n})$, and that this bound is nearly best possible. Our investigation is motivated by a question of Assaf Naor, who proved that random abelian Cayley graphs are small-set expanders, extending a classic result of Alon–Roichman. His proof relies on the existence of a bounded eigenbasis for abelian Cayley graphs, which we now know cannot hold for general groups. On the other hand, we navigate around this obstruction and extend Naor’s result to nonabelian groups.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (8) ◽  
Author(s):  
Petr Kravchuk ◽  
Jiaxin Qiao ◽  
Slava Rychkov

Abstract CFTs in Euclidean signature satisfy well-accepted rules, such as the convergent Euclidean OPE. It is nowadays common to assume that CFT correlators exist and have various properties also in Lorentzian signature. Some of these properties may represent extra assumptions, and it is an open question if they hold for familiar statistical-physics CFTs such as the critical 3d Ising model. Here we consider Wightman 4-point functions of scalar primaries in Lorentzian signature. We derive a minimal set of their properties solely from the Euclidean unitary CFT axioms, without using extra assumptions. We establish all Wightman axioms (temperedness, spectral property, local commutativity, clustering), Lorentzian conformal invariance, and distributional convergence of the s-channel Lorentzian OPE. This is done constructively, by analytically continuing the 4-point functions using the s-channel OPE expansion in the radial cross-ratios ρ, $$ \overline{\rho} $$ ρ ¯ . We prove a key fact that |ρ|, $$ \left|\overline{\rho}\right| $$ ρ ¯ < 1 inside the forward tube, and set bounds on how fast |ρ|, $$ \left|\overline{\rho}\right| $$ ρ ¯ may tend to 1 when approaching the Minkowski space.We also provide a guide to the axiomatic QFT literature for the modern CFT audience. We review the Wightman and Osterwalder-Schrader (OS) axioms for Lorentzian and Euclidean QFTs, and the celebrated OS theorem connecting them. We also review a classic result of Mack about the distributional OPE convergence. Some of the classic arguments turn out useful in our setup. Others fall short of our needs due to Lorentzian assumptions (Mack) or unverifiable Euclidean assumptions (OS theorem).


2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 452-477
Author(s):  
Xiao-Bing Zhang ◽  
Magnus Hennlock

AbstractThis paper investigates the benefits of international cooperation under uncertainty about global warming through a stochastic dynamic game. We analyze the benefits of cooperation both for the case of symmetric and asymmetric players. It is shown that the players’ combined expected payoffs decrease as climate uncertainty becomes larger, whether or not they cooperate. However, the benefits from cooperation increase with climate uncertainty. In other words, it is more important to cooperate when facing higher uncertainty. At the same time, more transfers will be needed to ensure stable cooperation among asymmetric players.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (8) ◽  
pp. 4721-4730 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lu An ◽  
Jie Duan ◽  
Mo-Yuen Chow ◽  
Alexandra Duel-Hallen

2007 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 871-889 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bård Harstad

For two districts or countries that try to internalize externalities, I analyze a bargaining game under private information. I derive conditions for when it is efficient with uniform policies across regions—with and without side payments—and when it is efficient to prohibit side payments in the negotiations. While policy differentiation and side payments allow the policy to better reflect local conditions, they create conflicts between the regions and, thus, delay. The results also describe when political centralization outperforms decentralized cooperation, and they provide a theoretical foundation for the controversial “uniformity assumption” traditionally used by the fiscal federalism literature. (JEL C78, D72, D82, H77)


2016 ◽  
Vol 07 (04) ◽  
pp. 1650011
Author(s):  
ZILI YANG

Climate damage and greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation cost plays important roles in a region’s willingness and incentives to join the global climate coalition. Negotiation of climate treaty can be modeled as a cooperative bargaining game of externality provision. The core of this game is a good representation of incentives of the participants. In this paper, we examine the relationship between the shocks of mitigation cost/climate damage and the shifts of the core of cooperative bargaining game of climate negotiation within the framework of RICE [Nordhaus and Yang, 1996. A regional dynamic general equilibrium model of alternative climate change strategies. American Economic Review, 86, 741–765], a widely used integrated assessment model (IAM) of climate change. Constructing a method that maps the core allocations onto a convex hull on the simplex of social welfare weights, we describe the scope of the core in simple metrics and capture the shifts of the core representation on the simplex in response to the shocks of mitigation cost and climate damage. A series of simulations are conducted in RICE to demonstrate the usefulness of the approach explored here. In addition, policy implications of methodological results are indicated.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document