scholarly journals Learning Dynamics and Norm Psychology Supports Human Cooperation in a Large-Scale Prisoner’s Dilemma on Networks

Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 90 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Realpe-Gómez ◽  
Daniele Vilone ◽  
Giulia Andrighetto ◽  
Luis Nardin ◽  
Javier Montoya
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Network Structure ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Random Network ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Extended Model ◽  
Fixed Position ◽  
Learning Dynamics

In this work, we explore the role of learning dynamics and social norms in human cooperation on networks. We study the model recently introduced in [Physical Review E, 97, 042321 (2018)] that integrates the well-studied Experience Weighted Attraction learning model with some features characterizing human norm psychology, namely the set of cognitive abilities humans have evolved to deal with social norms. We provide further evidence that this extended model—that we refer to as Experience Weighted Attraction with Norm Psychology—closely reproduces cooperative patterns of behavior observed in large-scale experiments with humans. In particular, we provide additional support for the finding that, when deciding to cooperate, humans balance between the choice that returns higher payoffs with the choice in agreement with social norms. In our experiment, agents play a prisoner’s dilemma game on various network structures: (i) a static lattice where agents have a fixed position; (ii) a regular random network where agents have a fixed position; and (iii) a dynamic lattice where agents are randomly re-positioned at each game iteration. Our results show that the network structure does not affect the dynamics of cooperation, which corroborates results of prior laboratory experiments. However, the network structure does seem to affect how individuals balance between their self-interested and normative choices.

scholarly journals Moral labels increase cooperation and costly punishment in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with punishment option

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Mieth ◽  
Axel Buchner ◽  
Raoul Bell
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Framing Effects ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Moral Framing ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

AbstractTo determine the role of moral norms in cooperation and punishment, we examined the effects of a moral-framing manipulation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a costly punishment option. In each round of the game, participants decided whether to cooperate or to defect. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game was identical for all participants with the exception that the behavioral options were paired with moral labels (“I cooperate” and “I cheat”) in the moral-framing condition and with neutral labels (“A” and “B”) in the neutral-framing condition. After each round of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, participants had the opportunity to invest some of their money to punish their partners. In two experiments, moral framing increased moral and hypocritical punishment: participants were more likely to punish partners for defection when moral labels were used than when neutral labels were used. When the participants’ cooperation was enforced by their partners’ moral punishment, moral framing did not only increase moral and hypocritical punishment but also cooperation. The results suggest that moral framing activates a cooperative norm that specifically increases moral and hypocritical punishment. Furthermore, the experience of moral punishment by the partners may increase the importance of social norms for cooperation, which may explain why moral framing effects on cooperation were found only when participants were subject to moral punishment.

The analysis of evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game based on weighting effect

2021 ◽  
pp. 2150066
Author(s):  
Xinting Hu ◽  
Mengyun Wu
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Weighting Function ◽  
Random Network ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Real ◽  
Scale Free ◽  
Cooperative Strategies ◽  
Average Payoff

In this paper, an improved evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game model is proposed by considering the weighting effect. Taking into account individual’s perceived payoff (benefits), the evolutionary tendency of the cooperators and three equilibrium points of the proposed model are obtained. We then numerically investigate how different exterior and interior factors influence on individuals’ cooperative behavior and their payoff both in the ER random network and the BA scale-free network. Our results reveal that the heterogeneous network structure is conducive to cooperation. In addition, the existence of leader nodes is an important driving force for promoting individuals’ cooperation. By further analyzing the rationality coefficient which appears in the weighting function, we obtain that a greater of irrationality could lead more people to take cooperative strategies. Finally, two indicators which are used to measure the real average payoff and perceived average payoff are defined. The results show that the real average payoff and perceived average payoff are larger in the heterogeneity network than that in homogeneous network.

PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAMES WITH SOME TROUBLEMAKERS IN A RANDOM NETWORK

2009 ◽  
Vol 20 (03) ◽  
pp. 491-499
Author(s):  
ZHI-XUAN YANG ◽  
XUE-QING WANG ◽  
XIAO-LI HUANG ◽  
SHOU-LIANG BU
Keyword(s):  
Monte Carlo ◽  
Monte Carlo Simulations ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Random Network ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Sharp Decline ◽  
B Values ◽  
Cooperative Strategies

We further study the competition among loner, cooperative and defective strategies by considering an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma (PD) game with some troublemakers in the random network by means of Monte Carlo simulations. It can be observed that the frequency of cooperators (fc) decreases with increasing of loners' (e) and defectors' payoffs (b). In particular, fc has a sharp decline when the loners' payoffs approximate 1.0. In addition, we find that introduction of troublemaker strategies prevents the uniform defection in the spatial evolutionary PD games for large b values and small e values. In practice, it also prevents cooperative strategies and defective strategies from vanishing for large e values.

scholarly journals Evolution of cooperation by generalized reciprocity

2005 ◽  
Vol 272 (1568) ◽  
pp. 1115-1120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Pfeiffer ◽  
Claudia Rutte ◽  
Timothy Killingback ◽  
Michael Taborsky ◽  
Sebastian Bonhoeffer
Keyword(s):  
Small Groups ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation

The evolution of cooperation by direct reciprocity requires that individuals recognize their present partner and remember the outcome of their last encounter with that specific partner. Direct reciprocity thus requires advanced cognitive abilities. Here, we demonstrate that if individuals repeatedly interact within small groups with different partners in a two person Prisoner's Dilemma, cooperation can emerge and also be maintained in the absence of such cognitive capabilities. It is sufficient for an individual to base their decision of whether or not to cooperate on the outcome of their last encounter—even if it was with a different partner.

scholarly journals Exit rights open complex pathways to cooperation

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (174) ◽  
pp. 20200777
Author(s):  
Chen Shen ◽  
Marko Jusup ◽  
Lei Shi ◽  
Zhen Wang ◽  
Matjaž Perc ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Network Structure ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Complex Dynamics ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Simple Extension ◽  
Structure Changes ◽  
Exit Option ◽  
Mixed Populations ◽  
Rational Behaviour

We study the evolutionary dynamics of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in which cooperators and defectors interact with another actor type called exiters. Rather than being exploited by defectors, exiters exit the game in favour of a small pay-off. We find that this simple extension of the game allows cooperation to flourish in well-mixed populations when iterations or reputation are added. In networked populations, however, the exit option is less conducive to cooperation. Instead, it enables the coexistence of cooperators, defectors, and exiters through cyclic dominance. Other outcomes are also possible as the exit pay-off increases or the network structure changes, including network-wide oscillations in actor abundances that may cause the extinction of exiters and the domination of defectors, although game parameters should favour exiting. The complex dynamics that emerges in the wake of a simple option to exit the game implies that nuances matter even if our analyses are restricted to incentives for rational behaviour.

Exploring social influence on evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games in networks

2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (30) ◽  
pp. 1550184
Author(s):  
Hengshan Zong ◽  
Guozhu Jia ◽  
Yang Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Influence ◽  
Network Structure ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Mediating Effect ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Individual Decision ◽  
Individual Decision Making ◽  
Game Dynamics

Though numerous studies demonstrate the importance of social influence in deciding individual decision-making process in networks, little has been done to explore its impact on players’ behavioral patterns in evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games (PDGs). This study investigates how social influenced strategy updating rules may affect the final equilibrium of game dynamics. The results show that weak social influence usually inhibits cooperation, while strong social influence has a mediating effect. The impacts of network structure and the existence of rebels in social influence scenarios are also tested. The paper provides a comprehensive interpretation on social influence effects on evolutionary PDGs in networks.

scholarly journals Enforcing social norms: Trust‐building and community enforcement

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 1387-1433 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joyee Deb ◽  
Julio González-Díaz
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Initial Phase ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Trust Building ◽  
Random Matching ◽  
Cooperative Play ◽  
Short Run ◽  
Matching Games

We study impersonal exchange and ask how agents can behave honestly in anonymous transactions without contracts. We analyze repeated anonymous random matching games, where agents observe only their own transactions. Little is known about cooperation in this setting beyond the prisoner's dilemma. We show that cooperation can be sustained quite generally, using community enforcement and “trust‐building.” The latter refers to an initial phase in which one community builds trust by not deviating despite a short‐run incentive to cheat; the other community reciprocates trust by not punishing deviations during this phase. Trust‐building is followed by cooperative play, sustained through community enforcement.

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