PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAMES WITH SOME TROUBLEMAKERS IN A RANDOM NETWORK

2009 ◽  
Vol 20 (03) ◽  
pp. 491-499
Author(s):  
ZHI-XUAN YANG ◽  
XUE-QING WANG ◽  
XIAO-LI HUANG ◽  
SHOU-LIANG BU
Keyword(s):  
Monte Carlo ◽  
Monte Carlo Simulations ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Random Network ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Sharp Decline ◽  
B Values ◽  
Cooperative Strategies

We further study the competition among loner, cooperative and defective strategies by considering an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma (PD) game with some troublemakers in the random network by means of Monte Carlo simulations. It can be observed that the frequency of cooperators (fc) decreases with increasing of loners' (e) and defectors' payoffs (b). In particular, fc has a sharp decline when the loners' payoffs approximate 1.0. In addition, we find that introduction of troublemaker strategies prevents the uniform defection in the spatial evolutionary PD games for large b values and small e values. In practice, it also prevents cooperative strategies and defective strategies from vanishing for large e values.

The analysis of evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game based on weighting effect

2021 ◽  
pp. 2150066
Author(s):  
Xinting Hu ◽  
Mengyun Wu
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Weighting Function ◽  
Random Network ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Real ◽  
Scale Free ◽  
Cooperative Strategies ◽  
Average Payoff

In this paper, an improved evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game model is proposed by considering the weighting effect. Taking into account individual’s perceived payoff (benefits), the evolutionary tendency of the cooperators and three equilibrium points of the proposed model are obtained. We then numerically investigate how different exterior and interior factors influence on individuals’ cooperative behavior and their payoff both in the ER random network and the BA scale-free network. Our results reveal that the heterogeneous network structure is conducive to cooperation. In addition, the existence of leader nodes is an important driving force for promoting individuals’ cooperation. By further analyzing the rationality coefficient which appears in the weighting function, we obtain that a greater of irrationality could lead more people to take cooperative strategies. Finally, two indicators which are used to measure the real average payoff and perceived average payoff are defined. The results show that the real average payoff and perceived average payoff are larger in the heterogeneity network than that in homogeneous network.

scholarly journals Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World

2012 ◽  
Vol 102 (2) ◽  
pp. 720-749 ◽  
Author(s):  
Drew Fudenberg ◽  
David G Rand ◽  
Anna Dreber
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Cooperative Strategies ◽  
Repeated Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

We study the experimental play of the repeated prisoner's dilemma when intended actions are implemented with noise. In treatments where cooperation is an equilibrium, subjects cooperate substantially more than in treatments without cooperative equilibria. In all settings there was considerable strategic diversity, indicating that subjects had not fully learned the distribution of play. Furthermore, cooperative strategies yielded higher payoffs than uncooperative strategies in the treatments with cooperative equilibria. In these treatments successful strategies were “lenient” in not retaliating for the first defection, and many were “forgiving” in trying to return to cooperation after inflicting a punishment. (JEL C72, C73, D81)

scholarly journals Consensus towards Partially Cooperative Strategies in Self-Regulated Evolutionary Games on Networks

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 60
Author(s):  
Dario Madeo ◽  
Chiara Mocenni
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Balanced Development ◽  
Cooperative Strategies ◽  
Partial Cooperation ◽  
Stag Hunt Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Cooperation is widely recognized to be fundamental for the well-balanced development of human societies. Several different approaches have been proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation in populations of individuals playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, characterized by two concurrent natural mechanisms: the temptation to defect and the fear to be betrayed by others. Few results are available for analyzing situations where only the temptation to defect (Chicken game) or the fear to be betrayed (Stag-Hunt game) is present. In this paper, we analyze the emergence of full and partial cooperation for these classes of games. We find the conditions for which these Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable, and we show that the partial one is also globally stable. Furthermore, in the Chicken and Stag-Hunt games, partial cooperation has been found to be more rewarding than the full one of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. This result highlights the importance of such games for understanding and sustaining different levels of cooperation in social networks.

scholarly journals Learning Dynamics and Norm Psychology Supports Human Cooperation in a Large-Scale Prisoner’s Dilemma on Networks

Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 90 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Realpe-Gómez ◽  
Daniele Vilone ◽  
Giulia Andrighetto ◽  
Luis Nardin ◽  
Javier Montoya
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Network Structure ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Random Network ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Extended Model ◽  
Fixed Position ◽  
Learning Dynamics

In this work, we explore the role of learning dynamics and social norms in human cooperation on networks. We study the model recently introduced in [Physical Review E, 97, 042321 (2018)] that integrates the well-studied Experience Weighted Attraction learning model with some features characterizing human norm psychology, namely the set of cognitive abilities humans have evolved to deal with social norms. We provide further evidence that this extended model—that we refer to as Experience Weighted Attraction with Norm Psychology—closely reproduces cooperative patterns of behavior observed in large-scale experiments with humans. In particular, we provide additional support for the finding that, when deciding to cooperate, humans balance between the choice that returns higher payoffs with the choice in agreement with social norms. In our experiment, agents play a prisoner’s dilemma game on various network structures: (i) a static lattice where agents have a fixed position; (ii) a regular random network where agents have a fixed position; and (iii) a dynamic lattice where agents are randomly re-positioned at each game iteration. Our results show that the network structure does not affect the dynamics of cooperation, which corroborates results of prior laboratory experiments. However, the network structure does seem to affect how individuals balance between their self-interested and normative choices.

Low-voltage EDS of magnesium ferrite Dendrites in a FEG-SEM

1996 ◽  
Vol 54 ◽  
pp. 478-479
Author(s):  
Matthew T. Johnson ◽  
Ian M. Anderson ◽  
Jim Bentley ◽  
C. Barry Carter
Keyword(s):  
Monte Carlo ◽  
Quantitative Analysis ◽  
Monte Carlo Simulations ◽  
Cross Section ◽  
Spatial Resolution ◽  
Low Voltage ◽  
Magnesium Ferrite ◽  
X Ray ◽  
Interaction Volume ◽  
Ferrite Spinel

Energy-dispersive X-ray spectrometry (EDS) performed at low (≤ 5 kV) accelerating voltages in the SEM has the potential for providing quantitative microanalytical information with a spatial resolution of ∼100 nm. In the present work, EDS analyses were performed on magnesium ferrite spinel [(MgxFe1−x)Fe2O4] dendrites embedded in a MgO matrix, as shown in Fig. 1. spatial resolution of X-ray microanalysis at conventional accelerating voltages is insufficient for the quantitative analysis of these dendrites, which have widths of the order of a few hundred nanometers, without deconvolution of contributions from the MgO matrix. However, Monte Carlo simulations indicate that the interaction volume for MgFe2O4 is ∼150 nm at 3 kV accelerating voltage and therefore sufficient to analyze the dendrites without matrix contributions.Single-crystal {001}-oriented MgO was reacted with hematite (Fe2O3) powder for 6 h at 1450°C in air and furnace cooled. The specimen was then cleaved to expose a clean cross-section suitable for microanalysis.

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