scholarly journals God Below: A Faith Born in Hell—Life and Fate and the Otherwise Than Being

Humanities ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 84
Author(s):  
Karl Shankar SenGupta

This essay examines the idea of kenosis and holy folly in the years before, during, and after the Holocaust. The primary focus will be Vasily Grossman’s Life and Fate, though it also will touch upon Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Demons and the ethics of the Lithuanian-Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, speaking to their intersecting ideas. Dostoevsky, true enough, predates the Shoah, whereas Grossman was a Soviet Jew who served as a journalist (most famously at the Battle of Stalingrad), and Levinas was a soldier in the French army, captured by the Nazis and placed in a POW camp. Each of these writers wrestles with the problem of evil in various ways, Dostoevsky and Levinas as theists—one Christian, the other Jewish—and Grossman as an atheist; yet, despite their differences, there are ever deeper resonances in that all are drawn to the idea of kenosis and the holy fool, and each writer employs variations of this idea in their respective answers to the problem of evil. Each argues, more or less, that evil arises in totalizing utopian thought which reifies individual humans to abstractions—to The Human, and goodness to The Good. Each looks to kenosis as the “antidote” to this utopian reification.

2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-215
Author(s):  
Fedor Stanjevskiy

The objective of this article is to present and analyze some theses advanced in “Lectures 3” by Paul Ricoeur. The book is devoted to the boundaries of philosophy, to non-philosophical sources of philosophy and finally to the other par excellence of philosophy—to religion. The book is composed of a series of essays divided thematically into three parts. The first part deals with Kant's and Hegel's philosophy of religion. Then in the course of the book the author gradually moves away from the philosophical logos (the second part deals with prophets, the problem of evil, the tragic etc) to arrive at a point where recourse to the exegesis of the Bible becomes for him indispensable.


Philosophy ◽  
1973 ◽  
Vol 48 (183) ◽  
pp. 7-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. T. Geach

It is fortunate for my purposes that English has the two words ‘almighty’ and ‘omnipotent’, and that apart from any stipulation by me the words have rather different associations and suggestions. ‘Almighty’ is the familiar word that comes in the creeds of the Church; ‘omnipotent’ is at home rather in formal theological discussions and controversies, e.g. about miracles and about the problem of evil. ‘Almighty’ derives by way of Latin ‘omnipotens’ from the Greek word ‘pantokratōr’; and both this Greek word, like the more classical ‘pankratēs’, and ‘almighty’ itself suggest God's having power over all things. On the other hand the English word ‘omnipotent’ would ordinarily be taken to imply ability to do everything; the Latin word ‘omnipotens’ also predominantly has this meaning in Scholastic writers, even though in origin it is a Latinization of ‘pantocratōr’. So there already is a tendency to distinguish the two words; and in this paper I shall make the distinction a strict one. I shall use the word ‘almighty’ to express God's power over all things, and I shall take ‘omnipotence’ to mean ability to do everything.


1908 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-222
Author(s):  
B. A. G. Fuller

A favourite argument of the neo-Hegelian apologists for the appearance of evil in a perfect world is the contention that without evil good could not exist. By this we are to understand, not that evil is a sine qua non of the existence of the good, unavoidably incidental to its production and maintenance, but rather, indeed, that it is an indispensable factor in the very essence of perfection and positively contributive to its value. Unaltered in accidents yet changed in substance, it is, as it were, transubstantiated by an eternal act of consecration in the mind and purpose of God. That we neither perceive nor comprehend the miracle is due to our human limitations. Could we see things as God sees them, “under the aspect of eternity,” we should then understand how what we call sin and suffering and defeat and shame have their place in the economy of the whole, and provide, along with the other oppositions and conflicts in the world, the indispensable condition of that victorious battle with obstacles and limitations and that triumphant resolution of contradictories in higher syntheses in which the life and happiness of the absolute consists. So, though our partial and superficial experiences do not enjoy the triumph (and indeed cannot, since were we conquerors or indifferent to defeat there would be no evil to transcend), we may yet have faith that in our deepest and total self the victory has been won and peace attained. Thus God's ways are justified to man; and though the world is apparently full of evil, we are still entitled to believe it really good, and are able intelligently to account for and defend our belief.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-168
Author(s):  
Jessica Novia Layantara

Selama berabad-abad, para teolog Kristen mencoba menanggapi pergumulan filosofis mengenai masalah kejahatan. Bapa-bapa Gereja dan tokoh-tokoh reformasi di masa lalu telah mencoba menanggapi permasalahan ini dengan argumen kebaikan yang lebih tinggi (greater good). Tetapi solusi-solusi semacam itu ditolak mentah-mentah setelah peristiwa Holocaust (Auschwitz), yang merupakan peristiwa kejahatan sangat dahsyat dan mengakibatkan penderitaan banyak sekali orang. Solusi tradisional dianggap sudah tidak relevan dalam menanggapi masalah kejahatan. Teologi proses kemudian mencoba menanggapi masalah ini dengan cara mereduksi atribut-atribut Allah. Tujuan karya tulis ini adalah untuk mengkritik pandangan kontemporer khususnya teologi proses dalam menanggapi masalah kejahatan, dan juga membela pandangan greater good sebagai solusi yang masih tetap dapat dipertahankan walaupun dengan beberapa penyesuaian. Kata-kata kunci: Teodisi, Soft-determinism, Kompatibilisme, Kedaulatan Allah, Masalah Kejahatan, Holocaust, Auschwitz, Teologi Proses, Pembelaan Kehendak Bebas, Teodisi Pembentukan Jiwa, Greater Good Theodicy, John Calvin, John Feinberg   English: Throughout the ages Christian theologians have attempted to understand, from a philosophical vantagepoint, the problem of evil. The Church Fathers as well as theologians during the era of the Reformation have offered a solution that argues from the basis of the greater good. However, solutions of that nature seem to ring hollow when one considers the magnitude and scope of the Holocaust (Auschwitz). In light of that historical reality traditional solutions to the problem of evil seem inadequate. Process theology attempts to overcome the impasse by restricting the attributes of God. The purpose of this article is to critically evaluate contemporary solutions to the problem of evil, especially process theology, as inadequate solutions. Further, to argue for the traditional positional argument of the greater good as offering a tenable solution. Keywords: Theodicy, Soft-determinism, Compatibilism, Sovereignty of God, Problem of Evil, Holocaust, Auschwitz, Process Theology, Free Will Defense, Soul-shaping Theodicy, Greater Good Theodicy, John Calvin, John Feinberg


Author(s):  
Edward Lamberti

In Otherwise than Being, Emmanuel Levinas talks of ethics state as being ‘a passivity more passive than all passivity’, the idea that we want nothing for ourselves and that this is what enables us to be devoted to the Other. The Paul Schrader films that this chapter analyses – The Comfort of Strangers (1990), adapted from the Ian McEwan novel, Dominion: Prequel to the Exorcist (2005) and Adam Resurrected (2008), from a novel by Yoram Kaniuk – focus on protagonists who are passive in their wants, desires and relationship with life, and my readings of these films will discuss Levinasian passivity and its ethical importance to film. These protagonists are affected by their passivity in different ways: Colin (Rupert Everett) in The Comfort of Strangers comes up against a man who wishes to murder him; Father Merrin (Stellan Skarsgård) in Dominion faces off against Satan; Adam (Jeff Goldblum) in Adam Resurrected is fighting the trauma of his own persecuted past during the Holocaust and his present-day struggles to control his overactive but fractured sense of self. Schrader shows in these films that ethical engagement has passivity as a necessary component, and that passivity is perhaps the most demanding aspect of Levinas’s ethics.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 278-292
Author(s):  
David Tollerton

Abstract Responding to Zachary Braiterman’s and Daniel Garner’s ideas on post-Holocaust religious thought, the author proposes a new model of relationships between theodicy and antitheodicy in which divine perfection is no longer privileged as the single key factor. Building on Peter Berger’s and Clifford Geertz’s treatments of the problem of evil, it is suggested that focusing on meaning-making and tradition can result in a stratified view of theodicy–antitheodicy more able to engage with the dynamics of several well-known thinkers associated with religious responses to the Holocaust.


1999 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 246-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonard Berkowitz

Social psychology as a discipline has given relatively little attention to the problem of evil in society, and those discussions in this field that do exist typically regard evil actions as only varieties of aggression without any characteristics that distinguish them from other forms of intentional mistreatment of others. Because of the field's situationistic perspective emphasizing the individual's susceptibility to the power of the immediate situation, social psychologists generally view the fairly high levels of obedience to authority displayed in Milgram's (1963, 1974) classic experiment as the paradigmatic example of evil behavior. For them, much evil is, in Arendt's (1963) well-known phrase, only “banal,” and Milgram's findings are often viewed as illustrating the “central dynamic” involved in the slaughter of millions of Jews and other “undesirables” in the Holocaust. This article holds that Milgram's (1974) obedience research does not represent significant features of the Holocaust, especially the sadism that occurred not infrequently, and disregards the vital difference between those who initiated the murderous policy and the others who followed their orders. Building on Darley's (1992) earlier conjectures about the features that ordinary people might consider in judging whether any given action is evil, I suggest that many persons have a prototypic conception of evil and speculate about the dimensions that could be involved in this prototype.


1987 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Mason Myers

Hume after arguing for the compatibility of liberty and necessity, a view now known as soft determinism or compatibilism, noted that it is not ‘possible to explain distinctly, how the Deity can be the mediate cause of the actions of sin and moral turpitude’. It seems that Hume is correct if the explanation must show specifically why an omnipotent and omnibenevolent deity must permit certain actions that to human reason seem to be unnecessary evils. On the other hand if such specifity is not required, the soft determinist who also happens to be a theist can argue that it is possible that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds even though the reason for any specific apparent evil cannot be known. If seemingly evil choices are free in the soft determinist's sense but determined by an omnipotent and omniscient deity, then either that deity is not omnibenevolent or that deity has determined the world to have the maximum possible goodness through including seemingly evil choices in the scheme of things. Consequently if, as the traditional theist believes, the creator is omnibenevolent as well as omnipotent and omniscient, the occurrence of seemingly evil choices are necessary for maximizing the goodness of the whole.


Author(s):  
Juan Pablo Martínez Martínez

A lo largo de la historia de la filosofía, el problema del mal ha sido enfocado o desde un punto de vista moralizante o desde un punto de vista metafísico, que difícilmente puede dar respuesta a la pregunta por el origen del mal radical en el hombre. Partiendo de la distinción entre mal sufrido y mal cometido o mal moral —que establece Paul Ricoeur—, se tratará de mostrar que el mal sufrido realmente no es un mal. Por su parte, la experiencia genuina del mal sufrido que se concreta en la pregunta al aire del justo sufriente nos permitirá, por un lado, deslindar las concepciones de sufrimiento y mal mediante el uso del concepto dolor, y por otro lado, una revisión antropológica del problema del mal, que cuadra perfectamente con la línea de propuesta de Paul Ricoeur, cuya teoría acerca de la experiencia del mal será comentada y ampliada desde un antropología trascendental, no desde una metafísica, ni desde la perspectiva simbólica de Ricoeur.Throughout the history of philosophy the problem of evil has been examined either from a moral or a metaphysical point of view, neither of which can answer the question of the radical origin of evil in human life. By distinguishing between suffered evil and committed or moral evil —a distinction that Paul Ricoeur established— we will try to show that suffered evil is not really an evil. On the one hand, the genuine experience of suffered evil, which takes form in the questions of the just man who suffers, will allow us to make a distinction between suffering and evil through the concept of pain. On the other hand, it will also help us to conduct an anthropologic review of the problem of evil. This approach fits perfectly with Paul Ricoeur’s line of thought, since his theory about the experience of evil will be studied and delved into through a transcendental anthropology, not from a metaphysical approach, and not from Ricoeur’s symbolic perspective.


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