scholarly journals Interventional Impacts of Watershed Ecological Compensation on Regional Economic Differences: Evidence from Xin’an River, China

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (17) ◽  
pp. 6389
Author(s):  
Bing Yu ◽  
Linan Chen
Keyword(s):  
Protected Areas ◽  
River Basin ◽  
Policy Instrument ◽  
Upstream Region ◽  
Analysis Model ◽  
Ecological Compensation ◽  
Regional Economic ◽  
Balanced Development ◽  
Development Capacity ◽  
Effective Policy

Watershed ecological compensation (WEC) is a popular and effective policy instrument for promoting the coordinated development of environment protection and the regional economy in river basin areas. WEC affects the regional economic differences between upstream and downstream regions, as well as between protected areas and areas surrounding upstream regions. Thus, it is necessary to quantify these changes to ensure the balanced development of regions after the implementation of ecological compensation. In the present study, we established two types of Theil indexes for between-group inequalities (THH and THS) and an intervention analysis model in order to evaluate and predict the effects on regional economic differences caused by WEC in the Xin’an River basin. The results showed that the intervention comprising WEC affected regional economic differences, where the economic gap widened between Huangshan City in the upstream region and Hangzhou City in the downstream region, as well as between Huangshan and its surrounding cities. However, the impacts of the intervention gradually decreased in the later pilot period. Considering the fairness of regional social development, we recommend increasing the compensation for protected areas in order to improve the self-development capacity of upstream regions.

scholarly journals Dynamic Optimal Control Differential Game of Ecological Compensation for Multipollutant Transboundary Pollution

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Zhigang Chen ◽  
Qianyue Meng ◽  
Huichuan Wang ◽  
Rongwei Xu ◽  
Yongxi Yi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
River Basin ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Transboundary Pollution ◽  
Upstream Region ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Ecological Compensation ◽  
Stackelberg Differential Game ◽  
Downstream Region ◽  
Compensation Rate

This paper studies a Stackelberg differential game between an upstream region and a downstream region for transboundary pollution control and ecological compensation in a river basin and increases the number of pollutants assumed in the model to multiple. Emission and green innovation investment between upstream and downstream regions in the same basin is a Stackelberg game, and the downstream region provides economic compensation for green innovation investment in the upstream region. The results show that there is an optimal ecological compensation rate, and a Pareto improvement result can be obtained by implementing ecological compensation. Increasing the proportion of ecological compensation can improve the nonvirtuous chain reaction between green innovation investment cost, pollutant transfer rate, and ecological compensation rate. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a joint mechanism composed of the government and the market and formulate a reasonable green innovation subsidy scheme according to the actual situation of the basin, so as to restrict the emergence of this “individual rational” behavior. For river basin areas that can establish a unified management department and organize the implementation of decision-making, the cooperative game is a very effective pollution control decision.

scholarly journals A Differential Game of Transboundary Pollution Control and Ecological Compensation in a River Basin

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongxi Yi ◽  
Zhongjun Wei ◽  
Chunyan Fu
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
River Basin ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Learning By Doing ◽  
Upstream Region ◽  
Ecological Compensation ◽  
Investment Activity ◽  
Downstream Region ◽  
Investment Level ◽  
Compensation Rate

This paper investigates a Stackelberg differential game between an upstream region and a downstream region for transboundary pollution control and ecological compensation (EC) in a river basin. Among them, the downstream region as the leader chooses its abatement investment level and an ecological compensation rate to encourage upstream investing in water pollution control firstly. After then, the upstream region as the follower determines its abatement investment level to maximize welfare. FFurthermore, we take into consideration the effects of efficiency-improving and cost-reducing learning by doing which are originated from abatement investment activity of both regions simultaneously. The results show the following. (i) There is an optimal ecological compensation rate and under which a Pareto improvement result can be obtained. (ii) Carrying out EC will shift some abatement investment from the downstream region into the upstream region. (iii) The efficiency-improving and cost-reducing learning by doing derived from abatement investment activity of both regions can decrease the optimal ecological compensation rate, increase abatement investment,and improve the social welfare.

The conservation of migratory fishes in the second largest river basin of South America depends on the creation of new protected areas

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dayani Bailly ◽  
Valéria Flavia Batista‐Silva ◽  
Fernanda A. Silva Cassemiro ◽  
Priscila Lemes ◽  
Weferson Junio Graça ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
South America ◽  
Protected Areas ◽  
River Basin ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Migratory Fishes

scholarly journals Emergy Analysis and Ecological Spillover as Tools to Quantify Ecological Compensation in Xuchang City, Qingyi River Basin, China

Water ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 414
Author(s):  
Huiqin Li ◽  
Cuimei Lv ◽  
Minhua Ling ◽  
Changkuan Gu ◽  
Yang Li ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Ecosystem Services ◽  
River Basin ◽  
Water Footprint ◽  
Effective Means ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Emergy Analysis ◽  
Ecological Compensation ◽  
Freshwater Resources ◽  
Ecological Protection ◽  
Complex Relationships

As an effective means to coordinate cost–benefit allocation of ecological protection between upstream and downstream cities, ecological compensation is often used to improve collaborative basin-wide freshwater resources management. Yet, due to the complex relationships between upstream and downstream ecosystem services, calculating eco-compensation is not an easy task. We used ecological spillover (the amount of local ecosystem services not used in the region and thus flows to downstream areas) and emergy analysis to determine the amount of eco-compensation that the city of Xuchang should pay to the upstream city of Xinzheng (Qingyi River Basin, China) from 2010 to 2014. Eco-compensation was determined by deducting the emergy of the local, self-supplied ecosystem services of Xuchang City, calculated using an ecological-water-footprint-based analysis, from the emergy of the total ecosystem services used in Xuchang, and monetized accordingly. The results showed that the self-supplied ecosystem services decreased from 2010 to 2014 and, thus, Xuchang relied more on the ecological spillover services flowing from Xinzheng. As a result, eco-compensation increased from 990 million Chinese Yuan (¥) in 2010 to ¥509 billion in 2014, mostly due to increased demands for water purification and reduced precipitation around Xuchang. This method can be further enhanced by introducing larger datasets and can be replicated elsewhere to accurately determine ecological compensation, ensuring basin-wide collaboration towards the sustainable management of freshwater resources.

Regional Economic Development: The River Basin Approach in Mexico.

1971 ◽  
Vol 81 (323) ◽  
pp. 676
Author(s):  
Peter Robson ◽  
D. Barkin ◽  
T. King ◽  
M. Yudelman ◽  
F. Howard
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
River Basin ◽  
Regional Economic Development ◽  
Regional Economic

Relationship Analysis between the Response to Participate in Eco-Compensation and Livelihood Assets: A HeiHe River Basin Example

2010 ◽  
Vol 113-116 ◽  
pp. 317-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fang Su ◽  
Hai Yang Shang
Keyword(s):  
River Basin ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Natural Capital ◽  
Physical Capital ◽  
Heihe River Basin ◽  
Heihe River ◽  
Ecological Compensation ◽  
Relationship Analysis ◽  
Livelihood Assets ◽  
Physical Assets

For a long time, these are deeply entrenched in people’s thinking and the institutions or policies of economic activities that the resources are unlimited and the environment exists priceless. Environmentally augmented household livelihood assets were collected from 300 sample households within the HeiHe River Basin. Results show that physical assets possess a maximum value (0.609) and natural assets possess relatively low values (0.241). The human capital, natural capital, physical capital, financial capital and social capital are all important factors to influence the responses. An increment of one unit should reduce the occurrence to participate in ecological compensation for natural capital. Therefore, the local governments should actively introduce the relevant supporting measures in order to provide more non-agricultural employment opportunities for farmers.

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