scholarly journals Implementation of a Multi-Agent Carbon Emission Reduction Strategy under the Chinese Dual Governance System: An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (22) ◽  
pp. 8463
Author(s):  
Wenke Wang ◽  
Xiaoqiong You ◽  
Kebei Liu ◽  
Yenchun Jim Wu ◽  
Daming You
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Evaluation System ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Reduction Strategy ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Interactive Decision Making ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism

A central-local dual governance system is the basic system of environmental governance in China. Co-governance between the central environmental protection department (CEPD) and local environmental protection departments (LEPDs) is an important means to effectively promote China’s carbon emission reduction strategy. Accordingly, this paper discusses their interactive decision-making and investigates how to optimize the strategic relationships between the CEPD, LEPDs, and carbon emission enterprises (CEEs) under the dual governance system by constructing a trilateral evolutionary game model and analyzing evolutionary stability strategies, achieving a numerical experiment simulation of evolution processes and determining the impacts of various factors using MATLAB, leading to several countermeasures and suggestions. The results indicate that the CEPD should rationally use the incentive mechanism for LEPDs, improve the carbon tax system, and further penalize the nepotistic relationship of LEPDs and CEEs. Furthermore, it is essential to reform the current LEPD performance evaluation system and reduce the cost of LEPD positive regulation through subsidies and financial transfer payments. Additionally, the CEE strategy is affected by carbon reduction tax rates, penalties, subsides, and emission reduction costs and revenues. This study reveals the consequences of interactions between CEPD, LEPDs, and CEEs and presents options for the redesign of incentive and regulatory mechanisms to improve carbon emission reduction performance in China.

scholarly journals Industrial Symbiosis Systems: Promoting Carbon Emission Reduction Activities

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (7) ◽  
pp. 1093 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haiyan Shan ◽  
Junliang Yang ◽  
Guo Wei
Keyword(s):  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Effective Means ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Behavioral Characteristics ◽  
Industrial Symbiosis ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Reduction ◽  
High Opportunity Cost ◽  
Evolutionary Speed

The carbon emission problem in China needs to be solved urgently. Industrial symbiosis, as an effective means to improve resource efficiency, can better alleviate the carbon emission problem. Under such a circumstance, this paper regards an industrial symbiosis system as a collection of producers, consumers and decomposers, and analyzes the strategic selections and behavioral characteristics of their carbon emission reduction activities through a tripartite evolutionary game model, and then the effects of related parameters on the evolutionary stable strategies of stakeholders are discussed. The results demonstrate that: (1) the regular return and the rate of return determine the ability of stakeholders to undertake carbon reduction activities; (2) the initial willingness of stakeholders to participate will affect the evolutionary speed of the strategies; (3) a high opportunity cost reduces the inertia of stakeholders to carry out carbon emission reductions; (4) producers, consumers and decomposers can avoid “free rides” by signing agreements or adopting punitive measures.

scholarly journals Collaborative carbon emission reduction in supply chains: an evolutionary game-theoretic study

2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 1087-1107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bangdong Zhi ◽  
Xiaohong Liu ◽  
Junlin Chen ◽  
Fu Jia
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chains ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Path Dependent

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to employ an emerging phenomenon in China concerning collaborative carbon emission reduction (CCER) to investigate: first, the coordination of suppliers and manufacturers within supply chains to reduce carbon emissions, and second, the role of governmental policy in facilitating this process. Design/methodology/approach This paper draws upon evolutionary game theory to develop an evolutionary game model for CCER for suppliers and manufacturers within supply chains. This includes a detailed analysis of the evolutionary direction and process in different areas, both with, and in the absence of, governmental subsidies. Findings The results demonstrate that CCER is path dependent and that its evolutionary process is influenced by the following four factors: the initial status within supply chains; the cost; the additional benefit; and the investment risk related to CCER. The research also reveals that the reward provided by manufacturers is rational over the long term, due to the excessive cost of incentives potentially preventing the implementation of CCER. Originality/value This study represents the first attempt to investigate CCER within supply chains through the application of an evolutionary game-theoretic model. The investigation of multiple factors in the model will deepen understanding of the collaborative role required for the carbon emission reduction.

scholarly journals Analysis on Evolutionary Stability Strategies of Carbon Emission of Logistics Enterprises Based on Carbon Tax

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Xiaoping Wu ◽  
Peng Liu ◽  
Qi Wei
Keyword(s):  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Logistics Enterprises ◽  
The Government

In view of the problem of high carbon emissions of logistics enterprises, the government’s carbon tax policy, consumers’ willingness to purchase low-carbon services, and the carbon emission reduction behavior of logistics enterprises, the evolutionary game model between the government, consumers, and logistics enterprises is established by using the theory and method of evolutionary game, and the evolutionary stabilization strategies of the three parties under different parameters are analyzed. The research results show the following. (1) When setting the carbon tax rate, the government can ignore the impact on consumers and give more consideration to the influencing factors of logistics enterprises, which is conducive to the formulation of carbon emission reduction policies for logistics enterprises. (2) When the government sets a lower carbon tax rate, it can not only promote the carbon emission reduction of logistics enterprises but also be conducive to government supervision. (3) The evolution direction of the government’s final decision will not change due to the size of Y and Z. The government’s final decision is to adopt a regulatory strategy. The study provides theoretical guidance for the government to formulate carbon tax policies, guides consumers to purchase low-carbon services, and promotes carbon emission reduction in logistics enterprises.

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