scholarly journals Government Regulations on Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Evolutionarily Stable Strategy

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (18) ◽  
pp. 5030 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ziang Liu ◽  
Tatsushi Nishi

The government plays a critical role in the promotion of recycling strategy among supply chain members. The purpose of this study is to investigate the optimal government policies on closed-loop supply chains and how these policies impact the market demand and the returning strategies of manufacturers and retailers. This paper presents a design of closed-loop supply chains under government regulation by considering a novel three-stage game theoretic model. Firstly, Stackelberg models are adopted to describe the one-shot game between the manufacturer and the retailer in a local market. Secondly, based on the Stackelberg equilibriums, a repeated and dynamic population game is developed. Thirdly, the government analyzes the population game to find the optimal tax and subsidy policies in the whole market. To solve the proposed model, the idea of backward induction is adopted. The results suggest that, by collecting tax and allocating subsidy, the government can influence the market demands and return rates. The centralized supply chain structure is always preferred for the government and the market. The government prefers to allocate subsidy to low-pollution, low-profit remanufactured products. The environmental attention of the government affects the subsidy policy.

Author(s):  
Dooho Lee

As awareness of environmental protection increases worldwide, enterprises have been building their supply chains in ways that conserve natural resources and minimize the creation of pollutants. One of the practical ways to make supply chains more sustainable is for enterprises to utilize green innovation strategies and to increase resource reuse. In this work, we focus on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a collector. In the investigated CLSC, the manufacturer and the retailer drive the green innovation strategy either individually or simultaneously to boost market demand. In the reverse flow of the CLSC, the collector is responsible for collecting consumers’ used products and transferring them to the manufacturer for remanufacturing. By combining two types of the market leadership and three types of green innovation strategies, we establish six different Stackelberg game models and solve them analytically. Through an extensive comparative analysis, we show who should have market leadership and who should drive the green innovation strategy in the CLSC. Various numerical examples are also given to support our major findings. One of our key findings suggests that the supply chain members must participate in green innovation activities at the same time to achieve a win-win scenario in the CLSC.


2012 ◽  
pp. 313-342
Author(s):  
Roberto Poles

In the past, many companies were concerned with managing activities primarily along the traditional supply chain to optimize operational processes and thereby economic benefits, without considering new economic or environmental opportunities in relation to the reverse supply chain and the use of used or reclaimed products. In contrast, companies are now showing increased interest in reverse logistics and closed loop supply chains (CLSCs) and their economic benefits and environmental impacts. In this chapter, our focus is the study of remanufacturing activity, which is one of the main recovery methods applied to closed loop supply chains. Specifically, the authors investigate and evaluate strategies for effective management of inventory control and production planning of a remanufacturing system. To pursue this objective, they model a production and inventory system for remanufacturing using the System Dynamics (SD) simulation modeling approach. The authors primary interest is in the returns process of such a system. Case studies will be referred to in this chapter to support some of the findings and to further validate the developed model.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (15) ◽  
pp. 4237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Lingfei Yu ◽  
Wei Li

The closed-loop supply chain management model is an effective way to promote sustainable economic development and environmental protection. Increasing the sales volume of remanufactured products to stimulate green growth is a key issue in the development of closed-loop supply chains. By designing an effective warranty strategy, customer’s perceived value can be enhanced and market demand can be stimulated. This study cuts through the warranty period of closed-loop supply chain products. Based on the perspective of consumer behavior, game theory is used to construct the optimal decision-making model for closed-loop supply chains. The optimal warranty decision making for new products and remanufactured products under centralized and decentralized decision-making models is discussed. Further, the impact of the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services and the design of contract coordination is also shown. We show that consumer preference has a positive impact on the sales of remanufactured products and the profits of enterprises; with the extension of the new product and remanufacturing warranty period, the profit of the supply chain system first increases and then decreases, and the value is maximized at the extreme point in the manufacturer-led decision-making model. Furthermore, the leader gains higher profits with bargaining power, but the profit of the supply chain system under decentralized decision model is less than that of the centralized decision model, reflecting the double marginalization effect. The revenue sharing contract and the two-charge contract designed in this study coordinate the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services, so that the member companies in the supply chain can achieve Pareto improvement.


2018 ◽  
Vol 118 (2) ◽  
pp. 480-498 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yacan Wang ◽  
Benjamin T. Hazen ◽  
Diane A. Mollenkopf

Purpose The success of closed loop supply chains is contingent upon consumer acceptance of remanufactured products, yet little is known about how consumers value such products. The purpose of this paper is to provide theoretical grounding for understanding consumers’ value perceptions as related to remanufactured products. Design/methodology/approach Diffusion of innovation theory and customer perceived value literature help form the theoretical model, which is tested empirically using survey data of consumers. Structural equation modeling was employed to test the hypotheses. Findings Perceived value of remanufactured products is measured as a function of perceived benefits (environmental benefits; price advantage) and perceived sacrifices (perceived quality; perceived risk), all of which are shown to impact perceived value. Additionally, perceived risk is found to partially mediate the relationship between perceived quality and perceived value. Originality/value This research makes two significant contributions. First, mid-range theory that is contextualized to the closed loop supply chain is developed to aid researchers and practitioners in better understanding the consumer’s role in the closed loop supply chain, as related to the acceptance of remanufactured products. Second, consumer acceptance of remanufactured products represents a form of supply chain demand risk that has previously been unrecognized. The results provide a foundation for incorporating this type of demand risk in to future research efforts.


2012 ◽  
Vol 472-475 ◽  
pp. 3305-3311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abu Hassan Zarina ◽  
Luong Lee ◽  
Sang Heon Lee

This paper deals with production-inventory policy in the context of multi-echelon closed-loop supply chains. The system comprises of a number of distributors, single manufacturer, single supplier and single dismantler. The objective is to develop and formulate the mathematical modeling for deterministic approach.


Author(s):  
Roberto Poles

In the past, many companies were concerned with managing activities primarily along the traditional supply chain to optimize operational processes and thereby economic benefits, without considering new economic or environmental opportunities in relation to the reverse supply chain and the use of used or reclaimed products. In contrast, companies are now showing increased interest in reverse logistics and closed loop supply chains (CLSCs) and their economic benefits and environmental impacts. In this chapter, our focus is the study of remanufacturing activity, which is one of the main recovery methods applied to closed loop supply chains. Specifically, the authors investigate and evaluate strategies for effective management of inventory control and production planning of a remanufacturing system. To pursue this objective, they model a production and inventory system for remanufacturing using the System Dynamics (SD) simulation modeling approach. The authors primary interest is in the returns process of such a system. Case studies will be referred to in this chapter to support some of the findings and to further validate the developed model.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 1420 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Lingfei Yu

Consumers cannot fully assess the quality of remanufactured products prior to purchase. To reduce consumer risk, closed-loop supply chains adopt a warranty strategy to enhance perceived value among customers and stimulate green growth. Based on Stackelberg game theory and considering consumers’ low-carbon and remanufactured product preferences, this paper aims to explore the decision-making efficiency of closed-loop supply chains with warranty services. The results of the study show that consumers’ confidence in purchasing remanufactured products has increased the demand for new products and remanufactured products, in turn also increasing the interest of the member companies of the supply chain, and stimulating the realization of the potential value of remanufacturing, which is conducive to green growth. When a remanufactured product warranty period meets certain conditions, the member companies of the supply chain can obtain optimal profit. The optimal warranty entity selection of a closed-loop supply chain with a warranty service depends on the warranty efficiency of each entity, thus making it necessary to examine the products of each warranty party.


Author(s):  
Christos I. Papanagnou

AbstractClosed-loop supply chains are complex systems as they involve the seamless backward and forward flow of products and information. With the advent of e-commerce and online shopping, there has been a growing interest in product returns and the associated impact on inventory variance and the bullwhip effect. In this paper, a novel four-echelon closed-loop supply chain model is presented, where base-stock replenishment policies are modelled by means of a proportional controller. A stochastic state-space model is implemented, initially to capture the supply chain dynamics while the model is analysed under stationarity conditions with the aid of a covariance matrix. This allows the bullwhip effect to be expressed as a function of replenishment policies and product return rates. Next, an optimisation method is introduced to study the impact of the Internet of Things on inventory variance and the bullwhip effect. The results show that the Internet of Things can reduce costs associated with inventory fluctuations and eliminate the bullwhip effect in closed-loop supply chains.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document