The number is — nothing personal! — the intimasy of the gullotine

2021 ◽  
pp. 417-421
Author(s):  
E.R. Menshikova
Keyword(s):  
Unity Of Consciousness ◽  
Freedom Of Will

The unfolded by us in the pressconcept of “Trojan terrorism” testifies that the Idea, having acquired the Image of the Сoncept: capture as a formality, owns society as a sovereign, establishing its Principle, demonstrating not only quasi and ultra anarchic freedom of will (as dogma and credo) of everyone, but also quite Martian chronicles of existence in every state on the planet, wills and completely the Martian chronicles of existence, relying on the 'multiple unity' of Consciousness in the context of total human (humanistic) impoverishment.

Judging for Reasons

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Leech
Keyword(s):  
Unity Of Consciousness ◽  
The Relationship

What, if any, is the relation between modal judgment and our capacity to make judgments at all? On a plausible interpretation, Kant connects what he calls the modality of a judgment to its location in a course of reasoning: actual inferential relations between that act of judgment and others. However, there is a puzzling consequence of this interpretation. It is natural to understand Kant as claiming that every judgment has some modality, but if the modality of a judgment is its location in a course of reasoning, then the implication is that every judgment must occur as part of a course of reasoning. Why think this? This chapter proposes an answer that draws on the relationship between judgment, judging for reasons, and the unity of consciousness.

Idealism Without God

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helen Yetter-Chappell
Keyword(s):  
Unity Of Consciousness ◽  
Sensory Experiences ◽  
Familiar World ◽  
Attributes Of God ◽  
Physical Laws

This chapter develops a novel non-theistic (quasi-)Berkeleyan idealism. The strategy is to peel away the attributes of God that aren’t essential for the role he plays in idealist metaphysics. Neither God’s desires, intentions, beliefs, nor his status as an agent is relevant to the metaphysical work he does in sustaining a robust reality. When we peel away these things, we’re left with a view on which reality is a vast unity of consciousness, weaving together sensory experiences into the familiar world around us. The chapter argues that if reality is fundamentally phenomenal in this way, we can give a unique account of perception that robustly captures direct realist intuitions of reality forming the ‘constituents’ of our experiences. The chapter assesses the unique virtues and challenges such a view faces, paying particular attention to the question of whether idealism entails a profligacy of physical laws.

Coercive Persuasion As a Specific Type of Violence in Criminal Law

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-72
Author(s):  
Carlos Bardavío Antón
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Comparative Law ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Physical Injury ◽  
Comprehensive Understanding ◽  
Legal Doctrine ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Freedom Of Will ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Regulatory Problems

The field of cults, and that of destructive or coercive cults in particular, has received little attention from the perspective of criminal law doctrine. Supporters of such groups often claim to be victims of a violation related to freedom of will. In this article, I consider various methodologies and manipulation techniques used by such groups and suggest that comparative law, criminal definitions, and regulatory problems provide the basis for a more comprehensive understanding of criminal phenomenology that includes these concerns: the loss of freedom through coercive persuasion, and thus being the victim of a crime, or through becoming an instrument for the commission of crimes ordered by third parties. Research shows that the conventional definition of crime against freedom of will and physical injury is inadequate. I posit that a new approach to legal doctrine and criminal classification is required to fight against new crime phenomenology. I propose a criminal classification aimed at considering coercive persuasion as a crime, and a definition for the criminalization of certain organizations that engage in willful misconduct or reckless conduct.

Unity of Consciousness and Bi-Level Externalism

2000 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 528-544 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard W. Kobes
Keyword(s):  
Unity Of Consciousness

scholarly journals Kantian Moral Agency and the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence

Problemos ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 100 ◽  
pp. 139-151
Author(s):  
Riya Manna ◽  
Rajakishore Nath
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Deterministic Model ◽  
Comprehensive Analysis ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Freedom Of Will ◽  
Machine Morality ◽  
Human Tendency ◽  
Natural Necessity

This paper discusses the philosophical issues pertaining to Kantian moral agency and artificial intelligence (AI). Here, our objective is to offer a comprehensive analysis of Kantian ethics to elucidate the non-feasibility of Kantian machines. Meanwhile, the possibility of Kantian machines seems to contend with the genuine human Kantian agency. We argue that in machine morality, ‘duty’ should be performed with ‘freedom of will’ and ‘happiness’ because Kant narrated the human tendency of evaluating our ‘natural necessity’ through ‘happiness’ as the end. Lastly, we argue that the Kantian ‘freedom of will’ and ‘faculty of choice’ do not belong to any deterministic model of ‘agency’ as these are sacrosanct systems. The conclusion narrates the non-feasibility of Kantian AI agents from the genuine Kantian ethical outset, offering a utility-based Kantian ethical performer instead.

scholarly journals Η ελευθερία της βούλησης ως φυσικό-νοητικό φαινόμενο [The freedom of will as a physical-mental phenomenon]

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Athanassios Protopapas
Keyword(s):  
Mental Phenomenon ◽  
Freedom Of Will

Στο κείμενο αυτό προτείνεται ένα πλαίσιο διερεύνησης της ελεύθερης βούλησης στο πρότυπο της γνωσιακής επιστήμης και στο πλαίσιο του υλιστικού μονισμού. Η βούληση και η θεωρούμενη ελευθερία αποτελούν φαινομενολογικά νοητικά φαινόμενα που μπορούν να εξεταστούν αποκλειστικά στο νοητικό επίπεδο περιγραφής.

scholarly journals Representation, Consciousness, and Time

Metaphysica ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-155
Author(s):  
Sean Allen-Hermanson
Keyword(s):  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Unity Of Consciousness ◽  
Intentional States ◽  
Empirical Argument

Abstract I criticize Bourget’s intuitive and empirical arguments for thinking that all possible conscious states are underived if intentional. An underived state is one of which it is not the case that it must be realized, at least in part, by intentional states distinct from itself. The intuitive argument depends upon a thought experiment about a subject who exists for only a split second while undergoing a single conscious experience. This, however, trades on an ambiguity in “split second.” Meanwhile, Bourget’s empirical argument is question-begging. My critique also has implications for debates about the essential temporality and unity of consciousness experience, and, phenomenal atomism.

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