Kantian Moral Agency and the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence

This paper discusses the philosophical issues pertaining to Kantian moral agency and artificial intelligence (AI). Here, our objective is to offer a comprehensive analysis of Kantian ethics to elucidate the non-feasibility of Kantian machines. Meanwhile, the possibility of Kantian machines seems to contend with the genuine human Kantian agency. We argue that in machine morality, ‘duty’ should be performed with ‘freedom of will’ and ‘happiness’ because Kant narrated the human tendency of evaluating our ‘natural necessity’ through ‘happiness’ as the end. Lastly, we argue that the Kantian ‘freedom of will’ and ‘faculty of choice’ do not belong to any deterministic model of ‘agency’ as these are sacrosanct systems. The conclusion narrates the non-feasibility of Kantian AI agents from the genuine Kantian ethical outset, offering a utility-based Kantian ethical performer instead.

Basic critical realist concepts

Chapter 2 sets out basic critical realism concepts to show how they help to resolve the problems examined in Chapter 1. The concepts or themes include: the need to separate ontology-being from epistemology-thinking; the transitive and intransitive; the semiotic triangle; open and closed systems and demi-regs; the possibility of naturalism; natural necessity or the three levels of reality, the empirical, actual and real; a detailed example of the three levels in Mexican neonatal research; retroduction; creative power1 and coercive power2; time sequencing; political economy; the search for generative mechanisms; dichotomies, and policy.

The Tasks Of Tourism In Aesthetic Education: The Harmony Of Historicity And Modernity

The article analyzes such conclusions as the rational use of national values in the improvement of environmental ecology through tourism, the development of the current sphere of enlightenment with folk mythology, oral and written creativity. The tasks of tourism activity in aesthetic education is mentioned about the function of providing information (informative), regulating (regulative), entertaining, educational, communicative activities, making educated, enlightening. Also, the fact that tourism is a complex system that includes the emotional and mental abilities of a person, his imagination about life, not only natural necessity, but also the real thing that is created on the basis of the laws of beauty-together with phenomena, forms of behavior, the harmonization of historicity and modernity are dialectically analyzed.

A Rose by Any Other Name…

The question of how, according to Aristotle, the principles of science are acquired remains contested among scholars. An aspect of this broader topic concerns the role of induction, and whether it is able to provide us with knowledge of natural necessity without the assistance of intuition (nous). In a recent publication in this journal, David Botting argues in favour of the enumerative/empiricist interpretation of induction and criticizes the intuitive/rationalist interpretation of it, a version of which was defended in one of my publications. He thinks that Aristotle is like Hume: both understand the cognitive process of induction similarly; and, both are equally skeptical about acquiring knowledge of natural necessity through induction. My reply argues that reading Aristotle’s induction in Humean terms is problematic in several respects. I argue, in addition, that natural necessity can be known through induction if nous is involved. My explanation of how this is possible relies on thinking of the act of noēsis in terms of an act of recognition. Botting claims, furthermore, that Aristotle only differs from Hume in that the former does have a non-inductive and non-intuitive method by which natural necessity may become known, and which Botting calls “the constructive proof of necessity”. My reply examines this method, showing how certain steps in it rely on cognitive acts that are really acts of intuition merely expressed in Humean terms. Despite the criticisms, I end with suggestions for how Botting’s account might offer original paths of research to Aristotle scholars seeking to answer the question of the acquisition of principles of science, particularly in the early stages of this process.

Cumberland

This chapter discusses the views on self-interest and morality of Richard Cumberland (1631–1718). Cumberland’s view that it is a natural necessity that human beings act always to advance their own self-interest (this view being a form of psychological egoism) is explained, along with his claim that ultimate moral motivation is possible, despite the fact that agents can never do what they believe will be worse for them overall. His utilitarian natural law ethics is described. His arguments for utilitarianism—based on preservation, sanctions, human make-up, agreement, and maximization—are critically interpreted.

Counterfactuals and Humean Reduction

This chapter comprises an exposition and critique of David Lewis’s metaphysical thesis of Humean supervenience and the reductive account of counterfactuals and other concepts in the natural necessity family that is given in this framework. Hume’s rejection of primitive natural necessity was grounded in his empiricist epistemology, but Lewis’s Humean metaphysics involves a radical separation of metaphysical and epistemological principles, and it is argued in this chapter that his metaphysics is unmotivated, and requires an implausible conception of the nature of fundamental natural properties. The chapter defends an alternative picture that picks up on a different more naturalistic Humean theme, tying the cluster of concepts that involve natural necessity to their role in an explanation of inductive practice.