Kantian Moral Agency and the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence

This paper discusses the philosophical issues pertaining to Kantian moral agency and artificial intelligence (AI). Here, our objective is to offer a comprehensive analysis of Kantian ethics to elucidate the non-feasibility of Kantian machines. Meanwhile, the possibility of Kantian machines seems to contend with the genuine human Kantian agency. We argue that in machine morality, ‘duty’ should be performed with ‘freedom of will’ and ‘happiness’ because Kant narrated the human tendency of evaluating our ‘natural necessity’ through ‘happiness’ as the end. Lastly, we argue that the Kantian ‘freedom of will’ and ‘faculty of choice’ do not belong to any deterministic model of ‘agency’ as these are sacrosanct systems. The conclusion narrates the non-feasibility of Kantian AI agents from the genuine Kantian ethical outset, offering a utility-based Kantian ethical performer instead.

HUMAN MORALITY, MACHINE MORALITY: PROGRAMMING MACHINE ETHICS AS A LEGAL PROBLEM

This article begins with a contextualization of the artificial decision and of the fields of action of autonomous software and machines, considering the underlying need to establish ethical-legal programming standards. The fundamental problem of the text is to establish the biological root of human morality and the (im)possibility of mimicking it. In fact, a profound anthropological view of the origin of compassion and the processes of man's domestication by man make it possible to see an innate morality and also a biological substratum for the construction of moral patterns of conduct. In this way, the programming processes that take place in a prosthodox and "in silico" universe are far from configuring an authentic valorative programming. Making the artificial decision more adequate will imply formalizing the so-called ethical empowerment and the intrinsic motivation of automatons, through a principialist ethical-legalistic architecture. Keywords: artificial intelligence; moral; ethics; robotics