scholarly journals Η ελευθερία της βούλησης ως φυσικό-νοητικό φαινόμενο [The freedom of will as a physical-mental phenomenon]

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Athanassios Protopapas

Στο κείμενο αυτό προτείνεται ένα πλαίσιο διερεύνησης της ελεύθερης βούλησης στο πρότυπο της γνωσιακής επιστήμης και στο πλαίσιο του υλιστικού μονισμού. Η βούληση και η θεωρούμενη ελευθερία αποτελούν φαινομενολογικά νοητικά φαινόμενα που μπορούν να εξεταστούν αποκλειστικά στο νοητικό επίπεδο περιγραφής.

Author(s):  
Mark Textor

When we are aware of our perceiving, we cannot attend to (observe) our perceiving, only the object which we (seem to) perceive. The perceiving is therefore the secondary, the object perceived the primary object. The chapter develops and evaluates Brentano’s grounds for the distinction between the primary and the secondary object. This project is of independent philosophical interest because Brentano’s view promises to shed light on the distinctive character of awareness. Awareness cannot become observation, because mere awareness of a mental phenomenon cannot contrast it with others. I argue further that Brentano’s account of noticing and observation has room for an ‘anatomy of the soul’ that proceeds by noticing the elements of our mental life.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-72
Author(s):  
Carlos Bardavío Antón

The field of cults, and that of destructive or coercive cults in particular, has received little attention from the perspective of criminal law doctrine. Supporters of such groups often claim to be victims of a violation related to freedom of will. In this article, I consider various methodologies and manipulation techniques used by such groups and suggest that comparative law, criminal definitions, and regulatory problems provide the basis for a more comprehensive understanding of criminal phenomenology that includes these concerns: the loss of freedom through coercive persuasion, and thus being the victim of a crime, or through becoming an instrument for the commission of crimes ordered by third parties. Research shows that the conventional definition of crime against freedom of will and physical injury is inadequate. I posit that a new approach to legal doctrine and criminal classification is required to fight against new crime phenomenology. I propose a criminal classification aimed at considering coercive persuasion as a crime, and a definition for the criminalization of certain organizations that engage in willful misconduct or reckless conduct.


Problemos ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 100 ◽  
pp. 139-151
Author(s):  
Riya Manna ◽  
Rajakishore Nath

This paper discusses the philosophical issues pertaining to Kantian moral agency and artificial intelligence (AI). Here, our objective is to offer a comprehensive analysis of Kantian ethics to elucidate the non-feasibility of Kantian machines. Meanwhile, the possibility of Kantian machines seems to contend with the genuine human Kantian agency. We argue that in machine morality, ‘duty’ should be performed with ‘freedom of will’ and ‘happiness’ because Kant narrated the human tendency of evaluating our ‘natural necessity’ through ‘happiness’ as the end. Lastly, we argue that the Kantian ‘freedom of will’ and ‘faculty of choice’ do not belong to any deterministic model of ‘agency’ as these are sacrosanct systems. The conclusion narrates the non-feasibility of Kantian AI agents from the genuine Kantian ethical outset, offering a utility-based Kantian ethical performer instead.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Desseilles ◽  
Christophe Phillips

AbstractIn this commentary on Borsboom et al.’s target article, we argue that researchers should be aware of the historical development of models in neuroscience. Considering the importance of causality in anatomo-clinical approach and stressing the complexity of mental phenomenon, we provide new insight on reductionism and representation limitation.


1860 ◽  
Vol 7 (35) ◽  
pp. 59-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. M'Ilwaine

The regions of religion and philosophy are distinct, but by no means opposed. Some professors of the Christian faith may have fallen into the error that revelation and science are antagonistic, but such a position has neither any foundation in fact, nor any countenance in the Divine record. Warnings, no doubt, occur in the apostolic writings under the head of science and philosophy; but these are directed against “science falsely so called“, and such philosophy as is identified with “vain deceit.” There can be no opposition between nature and revelation, inasmuch as the author of both is the same God, who is “light“, and whose essence is “truth”. In examining therefore a mental phenomenon, such as that of Revivalism, as lately exhibited in the northern counties of Ireland, and during whose rise and progress so much of a religious element was developed, it would be, in a manner, impossible to do justice to the subject, without a direct reference to this element; nor will the interests of evangelical truth be injured, by an endeavour to discriminate between the false and the true, the genuine and the factitious, in this singular excitement; neither, I must presume, will the pages of a journal devoted mainly to subjects of a psychological character be diverted from their legitimate application if the Religious Aspect of Ulster Revivalism be introduced to them.


Metaphysica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Maller

Abstract Alvin Plantinga’s controversial free will defense (FWD) for the problem of evil is an important attempt to show with certainty that moral evils are compatible and justifiable with God’s omnipotence and omniscience. I agree with critics who argue that it is untenable and the FWD fails. This paper proposes new criticisms by analyzing Plantinga’s presuppositions and objectionable assumptions in God, Freedom and Evil. Notably, his limited concept of omnipotence, and possible worlds theory lack rigorous argument and are subjectively biased with irrelevant weak examples. My ontological possible worlds theory (Possible Conditional Timelines) shows that it is very likely that the omnipotent God exists of necessity in some worlds but perhaps not this one. Omnipotence is total and absolute, and should imply the freedom of will to actualize all worlds God chooses. Plantinga’s position regarding God’s omniscience of future counterfactuals is implausible based on modal logic conjecture.


Author(s):  
Yuliana M. Terletska ◽  

Science still does not have a single scientifically sound concept of mental deprivation, which would explain its psychological essence, this mental phenomenon cannot be adequately assessed, or measures to prevent or eliminate negative mental phenomena it provoked cannot be developed. The article aims to reveal the basic principles and substantiate the main provisions of the functional-procedural concept of mental deprivation. Psycho-energetic and energy-psycho-functional approaches were used, as well as methods of analysis, synthesis, abstraction, specification, comparison, generalisation, and grouping of knowledge about the human psyche. The functional-procedural concept of mental deprivation of humans covers an interconnected system of provisions. According to them, mental deprivation is a course of more or less powerful destructive processes in the functioning of his psyche. Such processes arose from the destruction of mental parameters in various areas due to long-term unfulfilling necessary for normal functioning and development. The development of a functional-procedural concept of mental deprivation of a human will make it possible, first, to adequately define its essence and content in the scientific dimension as a phenomenon of the psyche; secondly, to assess its impact on the functioning of the whole psyche; third, to disclose the impact on development or its delay, actions, behaviour, and activities of an individual; fourth, to develop psychotherapeutic measures to prevent the occurrence of mental deprivation and eliminate its negative consequences.


2013 ◽  
pp. 339-354
Author(s):  
Rogers Albritton

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