Corporatism has played a core role in Danish policy-making for a long time. Based on positive feedback mechanisms, privileged interest groups increasingly came to be integrated in the preparation and implementation of most policy decisions during the twentieth century. After the 1970s, reform policies have sharpened the political exchange relation between state actors and interest groups. Interest groups must contribute to the realization of political preferences if they want to remain privileged insiders. If they cannot or will not contribute, they risk being left outside the decision-making arena. In such cases, state actors seek to control the policy process in order to avoid mobilization of reform resistance. Corporatism’s alternative is not pluralism but more closed decision-making processes. However, corporatism is not an either/or. Corporatism is weakened in some cases but still viable in others, even within the same sector. Danish unions have suffered many defeats on unemployment and early retirement schemes and have been kept out of decisions where heart-blood was at play. Simultaneously, the unions have entered a number of agreements using traditional corporatist means of policy-making. In the same sector and involving the same actors, corporatist structures coexist with strategic exclusion. The rumours of corporatism’s death are exaggerated.
A Search for the Decision-Making Model Proper for Educational Policy Making -From Government Initiative and Competition of Interest Groups to Citizen Assembly Model-