scholarly journals Examining the Continuity between Life and Mind: Is There a Continuity between Autopoietic Intentionality and Representationality?

Philosophies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 18
Author(s):  
Wanja Wiese ◽  
Karl J. Friston
Keyword(s):  
Free Energy ◽  
Living System ◽  
Living Systems ◽  
Weak Version ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
Strong Continuity ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Free Energy Principle ◽  
Continuity Thesis ◽  
As If

A weak version of life-mind continuity thesis entails that every living system also has a basic mind (with a non-representational form of intentionality). The strong version entails that the same concepts that are sufficient to explain basic minds (with non-representational states) are also central to understanding non-basic minds (with representational states). We argue that recent work on the free energy principle supports the following claims with respect to the life-mind continuity thesis: (i) there is a strong continuity between life and mind; (ii) all living systems can be described as if they had representational states; (iii) the ’as-if representationality’ entailed by the free energy principle is central to understanding both basic forms of intentionality and intentionality in non-basic minds. In addition to this, we argue that the free energy principle also renders realism about computation and representation compatible with a strong life-mind continuity thesis (although the free energy principle does not entail computational and representational realism). In particular, we show how representationality proper can be grounded in ’as-if representationality’.

scholarly journals Is free-energy minimisation the mark of the cognitive?

2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Kiverstein ◽  
Matt Sims
Keyword(s):  
Nervous System ◽  
Free Energy ◽  
Problem Solving ◽  
Living Systems ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Free Energy Principle ◽  
Energy Minimisation ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Evolution Of Life ◽  
Mark Of The Cognitive

AbstractA mark of the cognitive should allow us to specify theoretical principles for demarcating cognitive from non-cognitive causes of behaviour in organisms. Specific criteria are required to settle the question of when in the evolution of life cognition first emerged. An answer to this question should however avoid two pitfalls. It should avoid overintellectualising the minds of other organisms, ascribing to them cognitive capacities for which they have no need given the lives they lead within the niches they inhabit. But equally it should do justice to the remarkable flexibility and adaptiveness that can be observed in the behaviour of microorganisms that do not have a nervous system. We should resist seeking non-cognitive explanations of behaviour simply because an organism fails to exhibit human-like feats of thinking, reasoning and problem-solving. We will show how Karl Friston’s Free-Energy Principle (FEP) can serve as the basis for a mark of the cognitive that avoids the twin pitfalls of overintellectualising or underestimating the cognitive achievements of evolutionarily primitive organisms. The FEP purports to describe principles of organisation that any organism must instantiate if it is to remain well-adapted to its environment. Living systems from plants and microorganisms all the way up to humans act in ways that tend in the long run to minimise free energy. If the FEP provides a mark of the cognitive, as we will argue it does, it mandates that cognition should indeed be ascribed to plants, microorganisms and other organisms that lack a nervous system.

scholarly journals Living models or life modelled? On the use of models in the free energy principle

2020 ◽  
pp. 105971232091867
Author(s):  
Thomas van Es
Keyword(s):  
Free Energy ◽  
Second Law Of Thermodynamics ◽  
Living Systems ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Free Energy Principle ◽  
Information Theoretic ◽  
Conceptual Clarity ◽  
The Status ◽  
Information Theoretic Approach

The free energy principle (FEP) is an information-theoretic approach to living systems. FEP characterizes life by living systems’ resistance to the second law of thermodynamics: living systems do not randomly visit the possible states, but actively work to remain within a set of viable states. In FEP, this is modelled mathematically. Yet, the status of these models is typically unclear: are these models employed by organisms or strictly scientific tools of understanding? In this article, I argue for an instrumentalist take on models in FEP. I shall argue that models used as instruments for knowledge by scientists and models as implemented by organisms to navigate the world are being conflated, which leads to erroneous conclusions. I further argue that a realist position is unwarranted. First, it overgenerates models and thus trivializes the notion of modelling. Second, even when the mathematical mechanisms described by FEP are implemented in an organism, they do not constitute a model. They are covariational, not representational in nature, and precede the social practices that have shaped our scientific modelling practice. I finally argue that the above arguments do not affect the instrumentalist position. An instrumentalist approach can further add to conceptual clarity in the FEP literature.

Encultured minds, not error reduction minds

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Mirski ◽  
Mark H. Bickhard ◽  
David Eck ◽  
Arkadiusz Gut
Keyword(s):  
Free Energy ◽  
Error Reduction ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Free Energy Principle ◽  
Current Article

Abstract There are serious theoretical problems with the free-energy principle model, which are shown in the current article. We discuss the proposed model's inability to account for culturally emergent normativities, and point out the foundational issues that we claim this inability stems from.

scholarly journals Modelling ourselves: what the free energy principle reveals about our implicit notions of representation

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matt Sims ◽  
Giovanni Pezzulo
Keyword(s):  
Free Energy ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Philosophical Debate ◽  
Free Energy Principle ◽  
Self Organized ◽  
Functional Aspects ◽  
Structural Content ◽  
Unified View

AbstractPredictive processing theories are increasingly popular in philosophy of mind; such process theories often gain support from the Free Energy Principle (FEP)—a normative principle for adaptive self-organized systems. Yet there is a current and much discussed debate about conflicting philosophical interpretations of FEP, e.g., representational versus non-representational. Here we argue that these different interpretations depend on implicit assumptions about what qualifies (or fails to qualify) as representational. We deploy the Free Energy Principle (FEP) instrumentally to distinguish four main notions of representation, which focus on organizational, structural, content-related and functional aspects, respectively. The various ways that these different aspects matter in arriving at representational or non-representational interpretations of the Free Energy Principle are discussed. We also discuss how the Free Energy Principle may be seen as a unified view where terms that traditionally belong to different ontologies—e.g., notions of model and expectation versus notions of autopoiesis and synchronization—can be harmonized. However, rather than attempting to settle the representationalist versus non-representationalist debate and reveal something about what representations are simpliciter, this paper demonstrates how the Free Energy Principle may be used to reveal something about those partaking in the debate; namely, what our hidden assumptions about what representations are—assumptions that act as sometimes antithetical starting points in this persistent philosophical debate.

Learned Uncertainty: A Free Energy Principle Perspective on Anxiety

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugh McGovern ◽  
Alexander De Foe ◽  
Pantelis Leptourgos ◽  
Philip R. Corlett ◽  
Kavindu Bandara ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Free Energy ◽  
Anxiety Disorder ◽  
Biological System ◽  
Predictive Modelling ◽  
Generative Models ◽  
Generalized Anxiety ◽  
Unified Theory ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Free Energy Principle

Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) is among the world’s most prevalent psychiatric disorders. Affecting an eighth of the world’s population, it often manifests as persistent apprehension which is difficult to control. Despite its prevalence, neuroscientific efforts to understand the cognitive mechanisms of GAD remain sparse. This has resulted in a fractured theoretical landscape, lacking a unitary framework. While prior theories of anxiety describe the cognitive, affective and behavioral dimensions of anxiety, a unified theory is lacking. Here, we point out that postulates derived from the Free Energy Principle (FEP) may allow for a unified theory to emerge. We argue an approach focused on predictive modelling may afford opportunities to re-conceptualize anxiety within the framework of working generative models, rather than static beliefs. We suggest that a biological system—having had persistent uncertainty in its past—will form posteriors in line with uncertainty in its future, irrespective of whether that uncertainty is real. After discussing the FEP, we explain how anxiety develops through learning uncertainty before suggesting predictions for how the model can be tested.

Generalization of Fuels Swelling Data by Means of Linear Free Energy Principle

2014 ◽  
pp. 125-149
Author(s):  
Roman Makitra ◽  
Halyna Midyana ◽  
Liliya Bazylyak ◽  
Olena Palchykova
Keyword(s):  
Free Energy ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Free Energy Principle ◽  
Linear Free Energy

scholarly journals Allostasis, interoception, and the free energy principle: Feeling our way forward

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew W Corcoran ◽  
Jakob Hohwy
Keyword(s):  
Free Energy ◽  
Regulatory Mechanisms ◽  
Tissue Viability ◽  
Physiological Control ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Biological Regulation ◽  
Free Energy Principle ◽  
Sensory Experiences ◽  
Regulatory Dynamics

Interoceptive processing is commonly understood in terms of the monitoring and representation of the body’s current physiological (i.e. homeostatic) status, with aversive sensory experiences encoding some impending threat to tissue viability. However, claims that homeostasis fails to fully account for the sophisticated regulatory dynamics observed in complex organisms have led some theorists to incorporate predictive (i.e. allostatic) regulatory mechanisms within broader accounts of interoceptive processing. Critically, these frameworks invoke diverse – and potentially mutually inconsistent – interpretations of the role allostasis plays in the scheme of biological regulation. We argue in favour of a moderate, reconciliatory position in which homeostasis and allostasis are conceived as equally vital (but functionally distinct) modes of physiological control. We explore the implications of this interpretation for free energy-based accounts of interoceptive inference, advocating a similarly complementary (and hierarchical) view of homeostatic and allostatic processing.

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