Legal Pluralism: An Adequate Instrument for the Recognition of Multiculturalism?

ICR Journal ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Giordano

According to the most authoritative experts, there are two principal types of legal pluralism, which can be identified as minimalist and maximalist. This is why legal anthropologist Norbert Rouland speaks of a weak version and a strong version. The weak version simply refers to the presence of different juridical mechanisms applied to identical circumstances within a given society. A further differentiation is that the weak version implies a plurality of legal solutions that may be applied within a legal system guaranteed by specific state provisions. In order to define the strong version of legal pluralism we need to bear in mind that several concurrent legal orders, i.e., state law as well as extra-state systems, meet and clash within a given society. The various juridical orders may either converge or diverge, i.e., they may have normative similarities or differences.

Author(s):  
Anak Agung Istri Ari Atu Dewi

The purpose of this research is to discover the existence of autonomy of Desa Pakraman in legal pluralism perspective. Related with that purpose, there are two issues that will be discussed, first, how does the existence of the autonomy of Desa Pakraman in Indonesia’s legal system?,Second, how does the existence of the autonomy of Desa Pakraman in legal pluralism perspective?. The research method is normative legal research using statue approach, concept approach and analytical approach and law analysis by using legal interpretation. Based on the problems, the results of discussion are : first, the existence of the autonomy of Desa Pakraman within the Indonesia’s legal system has regulated in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, national and local Regulations. In the Constitution, specifically Article 18 B of paragraph (2), declare that the states recognizes Desa Pakraman and their traditional rights. In regulation of Law No.5 of 1960 concerning basic Agrarian Law (UUPA), regulation of Human Rights, and regulation of Desa (Village) are clearly recognize Desa Pakraman as traditional institution has traditional rights, one of it is the autonomy of Desa Pakraman. At the local regulation, autonomy Desa Pakraman has regulated in Local Regulation about Desa Pakraman. Second, that existence of autonomy Desa Pakraman in perspective legal pluralism is that the existence autonomy Desa Pakraman is a weak legal pluralism. In perspective weak legal pluralism the state law as a superior and the customary law as an inferior, its position in the hierarchy under State law. As a theory, the semi-autonomous social field from Sally Falk Moore perspectives that Desa Pakraman is semi-autonomous. Desa Pakraman has capacity to hold their village based on the customary law and outomaticly Desa Pakraman to be in framework of state law.


Author(s):  
Helen Quane

This chapter studies the jurisdictional boundaries between state and non-state law with specific reference to religious, or customary, law. The determination of these regulatory forms as state law depends on the extent to which they perform prescriptive, adjudicative, or enforcement functions. Indeed, the boundaries between state and non-state law are not as stable as they may appear, as they are liable to shift according to circumstances and over time. The chapter then argues that the issue of classification acquires resonance in cases where legal pluralism occurs as the character and scope of a state’s exercise of jurisdiction becomes far more ambiguous in such situations. This can create uncertainty about the jurisdiction of the respective systems, the status of norms from one system that are given effect in another, and how these norms should be interpreted and applied given their concurrent existence within more than one legal system.


2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon R Woodman

It is a great honour to be invited to give this 8th Ahmad Ibrahim Memorial Lecture. I met Ahmad Ibrahim several times during his period as founding Dean of the Kulliyyah of Laws of the International Islamic University Malaysia, when we both attended conferences of the Commonwealth Legal Education Association in Cumberland Lodge, Windsor, Britain. He was immensely respected in the field of legal education in the Commonwealth; his interventions in our discussions were fewer than those of some colleagues, who liked to talk at lenght on every occassion and about every topic, but when he made comments they were always efective, being evidently based on long experience and deep thought. I have since read some of his work and learnt from it - as will appear , in small measure, from some references i make later in this lecture.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aba Szollosi ◽  
David Kellen ◽  
Danielle Navarro ◽  
Rich Shiffrin ◽  
Iris van Rooij ◽  
...  

Proponents of preregistration argue that, among other benefits, it improves the diagnosticity of statistical tests [1]. In the strong version of this argument, preregistration does this by solving statistical problems, such as family-wise error rates. In the weak version, it nudges people to think more deeply about their theories, methods, and analyses. We argue against both: the diagnosticity of statistical tests depend entirely on how well statistical models map onto underlying theories, and so improving statistical techniques does little to improve theories when the mapping is weak. There is also little reason to expect that preregistration will spontaneously help researchers to develop better theories (and, hence, better methods and analyses).


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 21
Author(s):  
Fais Yonas Bo’a

Pancasila sebagai sumber segala sumber hukum sudah mendapatkan legitimasi secara yuridis melalui TAP MPR Nomor XX/MPRS/1966 tentang Memorandum DPR-GR Mengenai Sumber Tertib Hukum Republik Indonesia dan Tata Urutan Peraturan Perundang Republik Indonesia. Setelah reformasi, keberadaan Pancasila tersebut kembali dikukuhkan dalam Undang-Undang Nomor 10 Tahun 2004 yang kemudian diganti dengan Undang-Undang Nomor 12 Tahun 2011 tentang Peraturan Perundang-Undangan. Pancasila sebagai sumber segala sumber hukum memberi makna bahwa sistem hukum nasional wajib berlandaskan Pancasila. Akan tetapi, keberadaan Pancasila tersebut semakin tergerus dalam sistem hukum nasional. Hal demikian dilatarbelakangi oleh tiga alasan yaitu: pertama, adanya sikap resistensi terhadap Orde Baru yang memanfaatkan Pancasila demi kelanggengan kekuasaan yang bersifat otoriter. Kedua, menguatnya pluralisme hukum yang mengakibatkan terjadinya kontradiksi-kontradiksi atau disharmonisasi hukum. Ketiga, status Pancasila tersebut hanya dijadikan simbol dalam hukum. Untuk itu, perlu dilakukan upaya-upaya untuk menerapkan Pancasila sebagai sumber segala sumber hukum dalam sistem hukum nasional yaitu: pertama, menjadikan Pancasila sebagai suatu aliran hukum agar tidak terjadi lagi disharmonisasi hukum akibat diterapkannya pluralisme hukum. Kedua, mendudukkan Pancasila sebagai puncak peraturan perundang-undangan agar Pancasila memiliki daya mengikat terhadap segala jenis peraturan perundang-undangan sehingga tidak melanggar asas lex superiori derogat legi inferiori.Pancasila as the source of all sources of law has obtained legitimacy legally through the Decree of the People’s Consultative Assembly Number XX / MPRS / 1966 on the Memorandum of the House of Representatives-Gotong Royong Regarding the Sources of Law and the Order of the Republic of Indonesia. After the reformation, the existence of Pancasila was re-confirmed in Law Number 10 Year 2004 which was subsequently replaced by Law Number 12 Year 2011 on Legislation Regulation. Pancasila as the source of all sources of law gives meaning that the national legal system must be based on Pancasila. However, now the existence of Pancasila is increasingly eroded in the national legal system. This is motivated by three reasons: first, the existence of resistance to the New Order that utilizes Pancasila for the sake of perpetuity of authoritarian power. Second, the strengthening of legal pluralism that resulted in legal contradictions or disharmony. Third, the status of Pancasila is only used as a symbol in law. Therefore, efforts should be made to implement Pancasila as the source of all sources of law in the national legal system: first, make Pancasila as a flow of law in order to avoid legal disharmonization due to the application of legal pluralism. Secondly, Pretend Pancasila as the top of legislation so that Pancasila have binding power against all kinds of laws and regulations so that it does not violate the principle of lex superiori derogat legi inferiori.


Author(s):  
Carleilton Severino Silva

Since 1742, the year in which the Prussian Christian Goldbach wrote a letter to Leonhard Euler with his Conjecture in the weak version, mathematicians have been working on the problem. The tools in number theory become the most sophisticated thanks to the resolution solutions. Euler himself said he was unable to prove it. The weak guess in the modern version states the following: any odd number greater than 5 can be written as the sum of 3 primes. In response to Goldbach's letter, Euler reminded him of a conversation in which he proposed what is now known as Goldbach's strong conjecture: any even number greater than 2 can be written as a sum of 2 prime numbers. The most interesting result came in 2013, with proof of weak version by the Peruvian Mathematician Harald Helfgott, however the strong version remained without a definitive proof. The weak version can be demonstrated without major difficulties and will not be described in this article, as it becomes a corollary of the strong version. Despite the enormous intellectual baggage that great mathematicians have had over the centuries, the Conjecture in question has not been validated or refuted until today.


1970 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-92
Author(s):  
Yishai A. Cohen

In this paper I articulate and defend a new anti-theodicy challenge to Skeptical Theism. More specifically, I defend the Threshold Problem according to which there is a threshold to the kinds of evils that are in principle justifiable for God to permit, and certain instances of evil are beyond that threshold. I further argue that Skeptical Theism does not have the resources to adequately rebut the Threshold Problem. I argue for this claim by drawing a distinction between a weak and strong version of Skeptical Theism, such that the strong version must be defended in order to rebut the Threshold Problem. However, the skeptical theist’s appeal to our limited cognitive faculties only supports the weak version.


Author(s):  
John R. Bowen

This chapter focuses on the fears and accusations about the English law's recognition of shariʻa. In his February 2008 remarks, Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams explored ways in which the legal system might “recognise shariʻa.” Despite the storm of media criticism, he was joined later that year by Britain's highest justice, Lord Phillips, in saying that English law should recognize certain elements of shariʻa. It is in the domain of family law where suggestions that private Islamic bodies might take on a function of the civil courts raise the greatest degree of legal and social concern. Although some Islamic scholars have urged Parliament to create formal linkages between law courts and Islamic shariʻa councils, these councils carry out no actions that have the force of state law. For the moment, then, the main possibility for legal “recognition” of Islamic law in England would be if civil courts were to act on some elements of an Islamic divorce proceeding.


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