scholarly journals Judging the Judges

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-138
Author(s):  
Muhammad Munir

This work attempts to analyze what precisely is meant by judicial immunity and why is it necessary to protect judges for judging? Secondly, how did the jurisprudence of judicial immunity evolve in Pakistan? Presenting a thorough analysis of the decisions in recent cases, this article argues that although the juridical position on the question of judicial immunity has gone back and forth, the Supreme Court has finally laid down a judicial doctrine that extends judicial immunity to administrative, executive, consultative, and legislative decisions of judges of the High Court. It has also made clear that High Court is not allowed to issue a writ against administrative, executive or consultative acts of its own or another High Court for the purpose of ensuring harmony in the working of judiciary.  

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sipho Stephen Nkosi

The note is about the appeal lodged by the late Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela to the SCA against the decision of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, dismissing her application for review in 2014. In that application, she sought to have reviewed the decision of the Minister of Land Affairs, to transfer the now extended and renovated Qunu property to Mr Mandela and to register it in his name. Because her application was out of time, she also applied for condonation of her delay in making the application. The court a quo dismissed both applications with costs, holding that there had been an undue delay on her part. Mrs Mandela then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal, for special leave to appeal the decision of the court a quo. Two questions fell for decision by the SCA: whether there was an unreasonable and undue delay on Mrs Mandela’s part in instituting review proceedings; and whether the order for costs was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The SCA held that there was indeed an unreasonable delay (of seventeen years). Shongwe AP (with Swain, Mathopo JJA, Mokgothloa and Rodgers AJJA concurring) held that the fact that there had been an undue delay does not necessarily mean that an order for costs should, of necessity, particularly where, as in this case, the other litigant is the state. It is the writer’s view that two other ancillary points needed to be raised by counsel and pronounced on by the Court: (a) the lawfulness and regularity of the transfer of the Qunu property to Mr Mandela; and (b) Mrs Mandela’s status as a customary-law widow—in relation to Mr Mandela.


2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 459-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Bodansky ◽  
Orna Ben-Naftali ◽  
Keren Michaeli

Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel. Case No. HCJ 769/02. At <http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf>.Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, December 13, 2006.In Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel1 Targeted Killings) the Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, examined the legality of Israel's “preventative targeted killings” of members of militant Palestinian organizations. The Court's unanimous conclusion reads:The result of the examination is not that such strikes are always permissible or that they are always forbidden. The approach of customary international law applying to armed conflicts of an international nature is that civilians are protected from attacks by the army. However, that protection does not exist regarding those civilians “for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities” (§51(3) of [Additional Protocol I]). Harming such civilians, even if the result is death, is permitted, on the condition that there is no less harmful means, and on the condition that innocent civilians are not harmed. Harm to the latter must be proportional. (Para. 60)


Acta Juridica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 141-176
Author(s):  
F Brand

The role of abstract values such as equity and fairness in our law of contract has been the subject of controversy for a number of years. In 2002 the Supreme Court of Appeal took the position that these values do not constitute self-standing grounds for interfering with contractual relationships. Despite this being consistently maintained by the SCA in a number of cases, some High Court judges deviated from this position on the basis that they were permitted to do so by some minority judgments and obiter dicta in the Constitutional Court. The uncertainty thus created has fortunately now been removed by the judgment of the Constitutional Court in Beadica v The Trustees for the Time being of the Oregon Trust.


Author(s):  
Michael Tsele

When a party refers to evidentiary material in the course of litigation, ordinarily this party is under an obligation to make this evidence available to his opponent, particularly when called upon to do so. However, over the years various principles have developed which make this obligation subject to certain limitations. The Fochville cases dealt with a situation where a party to litigation sought to withhold certain information from its adversary, notwithstanding the fact that the material had been relied upon as a ground for the institution of the litigation. This note critiques the judgments of the High Court and in particular the Supreme Court of Appeal in this dispute. In so doing, it draws on useful foreign law to argue that the Supreme Court of Appeal's judgment was an unfortunate one in that the court failed to clarify with reasonable precision the circumstances in which a party to litigation involving children's interests may legitimately resist disclosing evidence to his adversary, in which the party resisting disclosure invokes the principle of public interest immunity. In this regard, the note concludes that the High Court's overall approach to the issue is to be preferred.       


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-352
Author(s):  
Devina Puspita Sari

The photocopy acceptable in the court if it matched with the original letter and the strength of that photocopy is the same as the original letter. However, sometimes the original letter has been lost so that it cannot be shown at trial. This paper discusses whether a photocopy that cannot be matched with the original letter can be accepted in the civil procedural law and if it can be accepted how the strength of it, then the discussion will look at the judge’s consideration in two cases related to the issue. The results of discussions are that photocopies that cannot be matched with the original letter can be accepted as evidence if the photocopy matches or is strengthened with other evidence, as the jurisprudence of Decision Nr. 112 K/Pdt/1996 and Decision Nr. 410 K/pdt/2004. The jurisprudence has been followed by similar cases, which is the Decision of the Central Jakarta District Court Nr. 164/Pdt.G/2004/PN.Jkt.Pst jo. Decision of The Jakarta High Court Nr. 234/Pdt/2005/PT.DKI jo. Decision of The Supreme Court Nr. 1498 K/Pdt/2006 which in this case a photocopy can be accepted because it is strengthened by the recognition of the opposing party and The Pontianak District Court Nr.52/Pdt.G/2003/PN.Ptk which received a photocopy because it was strengthened with  witness testimony. The photocopy has a free power of proof (depends on the judge’s assessment). The use and assessment of the strength of the photocopy cannot be independent, but must be linked to other valid evidence. Abstrak Fotokopi surat dapat diterima dalam persidangan apabila dapat dicocokkan dengan aslinya, dan kekuatan pembuktiannya sama seperti surat aslinya. Tulisan ini membahas, dalam hal surat aslinya tidak dapat ditunjukkan di persidangan, apakah fotokopi surat dapat diterima dalam pembuktian hukum acara perdata, dan, apabila dapat diterima, bagaimanakah kekuatan pembuktiannya. Artikel ini menunjukkan, fotokopi surat yang tidak dapat dicocokkan dengan aslinya dapat diterima sebagai alat bukti surat jika bersesuaian atau dikuatkan dengan alat bukti lain, sebagaimana Putusan Mahkamah Agung Nomor 112 K/Pdt/1996 dan Putusan Nomor 410 K/pdt/2004 yang telah menjadi yurisprudensi. Yurisprudensi ini telah diikuti dalam perkara serupa, yaitu dalam Putusan Pengadilan Negeri Jakarta Pusat Nomor 164/Pdt.G/2004/PN.Jkt.Pst jo. Putusan Pengadilan Tinggi Jakarta Nomor 234/Pdt/2005/PT.DKI jo. Putusan Mahkamah Agung Nomor 1498 K/Pdt/2006, di mana dalam perkara ini fotokopi surat dapat diterima karena dikuatkan dengan pengakuan pihak lawan. Demikian juga dalam Putusan Pengadilan Negeri Pontianak Nomor 52/Pdt.G/2003/PN.Ptk, yang menerima fotokopi surat yang tidak dapat dicocokkan dengan aslinya karena dikuatkan dengan alat bukti keterangan saksi. Dengan demikian, fotokopi surat memiliki kekuatan pembuktian yang bebas, artinya diserahkan kepada penilaian hakim. Penggunaan dan penilaian kekuatan pembuktian fotokopi tersebut tidak dapat berdiri sendiri, tetapi harus dikaitkan dengan alat bukti lainnya yang sah.  


Author(s):  
Motseotsile Clement Marumoagae

This article reflects on the law relating to pension interest in South Africa. In particular, it assesses whether the Supreme Court of Appeal in Ndaba v Ndaba had adequately clarified how this area of law should be understood. In light of the inconsistent approaches from various divisions of the High Court, it has not always been clear how the courts should interpret the law relating to pension interest in South Africa. In this paper, aspects of this area of law which have been clarified by the Supreme Court of Appeal are highlighted. This paper further demonstrates aspects of this area of law which the Supreme Court of Appeal did not settle and would potentially be subject to future litigation. This paper is based on the premise that while Ndaba v Ndaba is welcomed, the Supreme Court of Appeal nonetheless, missed a golden opportunity to authoritatively provide a basis upon which the law relating to pension interest in South Africa should be understood. 


2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-77
Author(s):  
Uday Shankar ◽  
Sourya Bandyopadhyay

Studies in Public interest Litigation (PIL) in India are predominantly about the Supreme Court's approach in meeting the ends of justice through indigenously evolved jurisdiction. The High Courts as important constitutional bodies are more often than not remain out of detailed discussion. As the High Courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court with regard to PILs, this paper aims to study the pattern of invocation of the jurisdiction at the regional level. It surveys the variety of pleas and consequent action under PIL jurisdiction (or inaction, as the case may be) of different High Courts in India relating to covid crisis and consequential matters. To that end, it undertakes a survey of High Court orders or judgments from April to July, 2020. It seeks to lay bare the extent of demands that are made before the Courts through PIL. What kinds of action were expected from the High Courts during the pandemic? How did different Courts respond to such pleas? Were the directions and level of response homogenous or varied? The paper pursues these questions, and describes the pandemic though the lens of PIL in Indian High Courts. It goes on to argue that the High Courts in India need to take greater cognizance of their orders inter-se especially in PIL matters, as human rights protection through PIL cannot have contradictory voices.


2021 ◽  
pp. 613-648
Author(s):  
Ian Loveland

This chapter analyses the conduct and constitutional implications of the United Kingdom’s proposed withdrawal from the European Union. The chapter begins by examining the legal basis, conduct, and result of the withdrawal referendum. The chapter then assesses the High Court and Supreme Court decisions in the first of the two Miller judgments. It continues with a discussion on the extreme positions of ‘hard brexit’ and ‘soft brexit’ and the assesses the significance of the results of the unexpected 2017 general election. The chapter goes on to examine the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 and the subsequent fall of the May government and its replacement by an administration led by Boris Johnson. In the final part of the chapter the Miller (No 2) and Cherry litigation and its political aftermath are discussed in full, with a particular focus laid on the controversial way in which the Supreme Court deployed the notion of ‘justiciability’ in its judgment in Miller (No 2).


Author(s):  
Mercedes Iglesias Bárez

The case is somewhat Bildu a break with the doctrine that the Constitutional Court has constructed about the outlawing of political parties. The control of political parties in the process of proclamation of candidates, the value of the condemnation of terrorism and the role to be played to the High Court in monitoring the decisions of the Supreme Court, are in part a new meaning in the controversial decision the Constitutional Court.El caso Bildu representa, en cierta forma, una ruptura con la doctrina que el Tribunal Constitucional ha construido acerca de la ilegalización de partidos políticos. El control de formaciones políticas en la fase de proclamación de candidatos, el valor de la condena del terrorismo o el papel que le corresponde desempeñar al Alto Tribunal en la fiscalización de las decisiones del Tribunal Supremo, tienen en parte un nuevo sentido en la controvertida decisión del Tribunal Constitucional.


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