Dissecting the Win-Loss Framing Effect of Intertemporal Choice: Researches from Intertemporal Choice of Money-Gain & Loss

2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (8) ◽  
pp. 1038-1046
Author(s):  
Wen-Juan MA ◽  
Tao SUO ◽  
Ya-Dan LI ◽  
Li-Zhu LUO ◽  
Ting-Yong FENG ◽  
...  
2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosa Li ◽  
David V. Smith ◽  
John A. Clithero ◽  
Vinod Venkatraman ◽  
R. McKell Carter ◽  
...  

AbstractIn the classic gain/loss framing effect, describing a gamble as a potential gain or loss biases people to make risk-averse or risk-seeking decisions, respectively. The canonical explanation for this effect is that frames differentially modulate emotional processes – which in turn leads to irrational choice behavior. Here, we evaluate the source of framing biases by integrating functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data from 143 human participants performing a gain/loss framing task with meta-analytic data from over 8000 neuroimaging studies. We found that activation during choices consistent with the framing effect were most correlated with activation associated with the resting or default brain, while activation during choices inconsistent with the framing effect most correlated with the task-engaged brain. Our findings argue against the common interpretation of gain/loss framing as a competition between emotion and control. Instead, our study indicates that this effect results from differential cognitive engagement across decision frames.Significance StatementThe biases frequently exhibited by human decision-makers have often been attributed to the presence of emotion. Using a large fMRI sample and analysis of whole-brain networks defined with the meta-analytic tool Neurosynth, we find that neural activity during frame-biased decisions are more significantly associated with default behaviors (and the absence of executive control) than with emotion. These findings point to a role for neuroscience in shaping longstanding psychological theories in decision science.


2003 ◽  
Vol 93 (3_suppl) ◽  
pp. 1077-1079 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Mancini ◽  
Amelia Gangemi

We hypothesize that individuals' choices (risk-seeking/risk-aversion) depend on moral values and, in particular, on how subjects evaluate themselves as guilty or as victims of a wrong rather than on the descriptions of the outcomes as given in the options and evaluated accordingly as gains or losses (framing effect). People who evaluate themselves as victims are expected to show a risk-seeking preference (context of innocence). People who evaluate themselves as guilty are expected to show a risk-averse preference (context of guilt). Responses of 232 participants to a decision problem were compared in four different conditions involving two-story formats (innocence/guilt) and two-question-options formats (gain/loss). Regardless of the format of the question options, the story format appears to be an important determinant of individuals' preferences.


2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (7) ◽  
pp. 2743-2755 ◽  
Author(s):  
David V. Smith ◽  
Kamila E. Sip ◽  
Mauricio R. Delgado

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chi Ngo ◽  
Nora Newcombe ◽  
Ingrid R. Olson

Episodic memory relies on discriminating among similar elements of episodes. Mnemonic discrimination is relatively poor at age 4, and then improves markedly. We investigated whether motivation to encode items with fine grain resolution would change this picture of development, using an engaging computer-administered memory task in which a bird ate items that made the bird healthier (gain frame), sicker (loss frame), or led to no change (control condition). Using gain-loss framing led to enhanced mnemonic discrimination in 4- and 5-year-olds, but did not affect older children or adults. Despite this differential improvement, age-related differences persisted. An additional finding was that loss framing led to greater mnemonic discrimination than gain framing across age groups. Motivation only partially accounts for development in mnemonic discrimination.


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