scholarly journals Null Complement Anaphors as Definite Descriptions

2012 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
pp. 125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Williams
Keyword(s):  
Definite Description ◽  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
Null Complement Anaphora

This paper develops the observation that, for many predicates, Null Complement Anaphora (NCA) is like anaphora with a descriptively empty definite description (Condoravdi & Gawron 1996, Gauker 2012). I consider how to distinguish this sort of NCA from pronouns theoretically, and then observe an unnoticed exception to the pattern. For verbs like "notice", NCA is neither like a definite description nor like a pronoun, raising a new puzzle of how to represent it

scholarly journals Null Complement Anaphors as Definite Descriptions

2015 ◽  
pp. 125
Author(s):  
Alexander Williams
Keyword(s):  
Definite Description ◽  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
Null Complement Anaphora

This paper develops the observation that, for many predicates, Null Complement Anaphora (NCA) is like anaphora with a descriptively empty definite description (Condoravdi & Gawron 1996, Gauker 2012). I consider how to distinguish this sort of NCA from pronouns theoretically, and then observe an unnoticed exception to the pattern. For verbs like "notice", NCA is neither like a definite description nor like a pronoun, raising a new puzzle of how to represent it

scholarly journals KAIP APIBRĖŽIAMOSIOS DESKRIPCIJOS VARTOJAMOS SINGULIARINIAMS TEIGINIAMS IŠREIKŠTI?

Problemos ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 85 ◽  
pp. 130-140
Author(s):  
Evgeny Borisov
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Definite Description ◽  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
Singular Proposition ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Possible World Semantics ◽  
Singular Propositions ◽  
Subject Term ◽  
The Subject

Straipsnyje keliamas klausimas: kokios sąlygos turi būti patenkintos, kad, ištarę sakinį su apibrėžiamąja deskripcija kaip sakinio subjektu, mes išreikštume singuliarinį teiginį (Kaplano prasme). Autorius teigia, kad Wettsteino įsitikinimas, jog teiginio singuliariškumas nustatomas ištarimo metu nurodant apibrėžiamosios deskripcijos referentą, yra nenuoseklus. Straipsnyje siūlomas kitas singuliariškumo kriterijus: teiginys yra singuliarinis, jeigu jame dalyvaujanti apibrėžiamoji deskripcija įvertinama vieninteliame galimame pasaulyje, o jeigu apibrėžiamoji deskripcija turi būti įvertinta daugiau nei vieno galimo pasaulio atžvilgiu, tai teiginys yra bendrasis (general). Šis kriterijus veiksmingas aiškinant kontroversiškus atvejus – kai išreiškiame teisingą singuliarinį teiginį, kurio subjekto dėmuo nedera su apibrėžiamąja deskripcija, pavartota ištartame sakinyje.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: apibrėžiamoji deskripcija, nuoroda, singuliarinis ir bendrasis teiginys, galimų pasaulių semantika. How Do We Use Definite Descriptions to Express Singular Propositions?Evgeny Borisov AbstractThe paper is devoted to the question: under what conditions do we express a singular proposition (in the Kaplanian sense) when uttering a sentence containing a definite description as the subject term. It is argued that Wettstein’s claim that singularity of a proposition is determined by the demonstration of the referent of definite description accompanying the utterance contains an inconsistency. An alternative criterion of singularity is proposed: we express a singular proposition if the definite description in question is to be evaluated at a single possible world, and we express a general one if the definite description in question is to be evaluated at a range of possible worlds. This criterion is effective in explaining controversial cases in which we manage to express a true singular proposition with a subject constituent that does not fit the definite description used in the utterance.Keywords: definite description, reference, singular and general propositions, possible world semantics

What’s really going on with the ham sandwich?

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-55
Author(s):  
Josephine Bowerman
Keyword(s):  
Relevance Theory ◽  
Definite Description ◽  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
Literal Meaning ◽  
Ham Sandwich

Abstract Working within the framework of Relevance Theory, I investigate the nature of referential metonymy (specifically, metonymically-used definite descriptions), aiming to elucidate (i) the pragmatic mechanisms involved in referential metonymy comprehension, and (ii) the contribution of a metonymically-used definite description to the explicitly communicated content of an utterance. I propose that, while the interpretation of referential metonymy is properly inferential in nature, it cannot be explained in terms of ‘meaning modulation’ (narrowing and broadening); rather, the literal meaning of a metonymically-used referring expression remains intact, and is used as evidence of the speaker’s target referent. In addition, I argue that the referential/attributive distinction proposed by Donnellan (1966) for literally-used definite descriptions also applies to metonymically-used definite descriptions. Thus, the contribution of a metonymically-used definite description to explicit utterance content differs according to whether the definite description is used ‘referentially’ or ‘attributively’.

scholarly journals (De)accenting definite descriptions

2001 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
pp. 231-249
Author(s):  
Carla Umbach
Keyword(s):  
Definite Description ◽  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
Definite Article ◽  
Descriptive Content ◽  
Discourse Referent

This paper focuses on definite descriptions. It will be shown that a definite description refers to a given discourse referent if the descriptive content is completely deaccented. But if there is a focussed element within the descriptive content it introduces a novel referent. This amounts to allowing two readings for definite descriptions without, however, allowing two readings for the definite article.  

4. Descriptions and existence: did the Greeks worship Zeus?

2017 ◽  
pp. 24-29
Author(s):  
Graham Priest
Keyword(s):  
Proper Names ◽  
Special Kind ◽  
Definite Description ◽  
Big Bang ◽  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Big Bang ◽  
Mathematics And Physics

There is a certain kind of phrase that can be the subject of a sentence. This is a definite description. Generally, descriptions have the form: the thing satisfying such and such a condition. ‘Descriptions and existence: did the Greeks worship Zeus?’ examines definite descriptions, how they can be combined with predicates to make whole sentences, and examples of how logic can be used. Descriptions are names, not quantifiers, as they usually refer to objects. However, descriptions are a special kind of name. Unlike proper names like ‘Annika’ or ‘the Big Bang’, they carry information about the object referred to and are often central to important arguments in mathematics and physics.

scholarly journals Definite descriptions of events: progressive interpretation in Ga (Kwa)

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agata Renans
Keyword(s):  
Definite Description ◽  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
Imperfective Aspect ◽  
Discourse Referent ◽  
Grammatical Aspect ◽  
Topic Time

AbstractThis paper demonstrates that the progressive interpretation in Ga is an effect of the interaction between the imperfective aspect and a definite description of events. Crucially, the data from Ga point to the consequences of the view that definite descriptions of events encode the familiarity of the discourse referent and its uniqueness in bearing the property in question. Namely, they yield direct evidentiality and the necessary ongoingness of the event at the topic time. Thus, the paper identifies previously unattested variation in the semantics of the progressive in a cross-linguistic perspective and shows that not only lexical but also grammatical aspect exhibits striking parallelisms with the nominal domain.

scholarly journals The interpretative options of anaphoric complex demonstratives

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Hinterwimmer ◽  
Umesh Patil
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Definite Description ◽  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
Complex Demonstratives ◽  
Complex Demonstrative ◽  
Acceptability Rating ◽  
Pragmatic Account ◽  
Present Experimental Evidence ◽  
Made In ◽  
Alternative Economy

In this paper, we present experimental evidence from a ‘yes’/’no’ judgement task and twoacceptability rating studies (Experiments 1a-c) for the claim made in Hinterwimmer (2019) thatsentences with two anaphorically interpreted complex demonstratives are less acceptable thansentences with two anaphorically interpreted definite descriptions and sentences where one ofthe two previously introduced referents is picked up by a complex demonstrative, while the otherone is picked up by a definite description. The results of Experiment 1a and 1b are in principlecompatible with the account argued for in Hinterwimmer (2019), according to which the (potentiallyabstract) demonstrations presupposed by demonstratives may not have overlapping trajectories.However, sentences with two anaphorically interpreted complex demonstratives are not judgedas unacceptable as would be expected if they involved a presupposition violation. Therefore, wepropose an alternative, economy-based pragmatic account that builds on Ahn (2019) and Nowak(2019). The question of whether the observed pattern is more compatible with the accountproposed by Hinterwimmer (2019) or the alternative pragmatic account is directly addressed in afurther acceptability rating study (Experiment 1c). The design of that study is similar to that ofExperiment 1b, but it includes as fillers both sentences clearly violating a presupposition andsentences violating a pragmatic constraint. Since the ratings for sentences containing twoanaphorically interpreted complex demonstratives are closer to the ratings for sentences violatinga pragmatic constraint than for sentences violating a presupposition, we conclude that thealternative pragmatic account is preferable to the account by Hinterwimmer (2019).

scholarly journals president and the man on the street: definite descriptions and proper names across possible situations

2006 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-299
Author(s):  
Daniel Rothschild
Keyword(s):  
Proper Names ◽  
Definite Description ◽  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
Modal Argument ◽  
Semantic Types

Kripke's "modal argument" uses consideration about scope within modal contexts to show that proper names and definite descriptions must be of two different semantic types. I reexamine the data that is used to motivate Kripke's argument, and suggest that it, in fact, indicates that proper names behave exactly like a certain type of definite description, which I call "particularized" descriptions.  

scholarly journals Expressing ‘the structure of’ in homotopy type theory

Synthese ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 197 (2) ◽  
pp. 681-700 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Corfield
Keyword(s):  
Homotopy Type ◽  
Type Theory ◽  
Definite Description ◽  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
Homotopy Type Theory ◽  
The Status ◽  
New Formulation

Abstract As a new foundational language for mathematics with its very different idea as to the status of logic, we should expect homotopy type theory to shed new light on some of the problems of philosophy which have been treated by logic. In this article, definite description, and in particular its employment within mathematics, is formulated within the type theory. Homotopy type theory has been proposed as an inherently structuralist foundational language for mathematics. Using the new formulation of definite descriptions, opportunities to express ‘the structure of’ within homotopy type theory are explored, and it is shown there is little or no need for this expression.

A non-Russellian treatment of the referential-attributive distinction

2004 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-294
Author(s):  
John-Michael Kuczynski
Keyword(s):  
Definite Description ◽  
Definite Descriptions ◽  
The Other ◽  
Referring Expressions ◽  
Good Case ◽  
Existence Claim ◽  
The One

Kripke made a good case that “…the phi…” is not semantically ambiguous between referential and attributive meanings. Russell says that “…the phi…” is always to be analyzed attributively. Many semanticists, agreeing with Kripke that “…the phi…” is not ambiguous, have tried to give a Russellian analysis of the referential-attributive distinction: the gross deviations between what is communicated by “…the phi..”, on the one hand, and what Russell’s theory says it literally means, on the other, are chalked up to implicature. This paper shows that, when the phenomenon of implicature is scrutinized, there is overwhelming reason to doubt that a Russellian analysis can succeed. A positive, non-Russellian analysis is proposed: it is shown that, if definite descriptions are treated as referring expressions, it is easy to deal with the referential-attributive distinction. When “…the phi…” is functioning attributively, the definite description is seen as referring to some object described in an understood, antecedent existence claim.

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