scholarly journals An Investigation into Labouchère’s Betting System to Improve Odds of Favorable Outcomes to Generate a Positive Externality Empirically

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 186-196
Author(s):  
Jake Billings ◽  
Sebastian Del Barco
Keyword(s):  
Positive Externality ◽  
Betting System

Using Epidemiological Data to Value the Positive Externality of Vaccination

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Cook ◽  
Donald Lauria ◽  
Brian Maskery ◽  
Marc Jeuland ◽  
Dale Whittington
Keyword(s):  
Epidemiological Data ◽  
Positive Externality

AN INTERSTATE OFF-TRACK BETTING SYSTEM

1979 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-213
Author(s):  
DONN R. PESCATRICE
Keyword(s):  
Betting System

Standard minimi di qualitŕ: un approccio teorico

2012 ◽  
pp. 29-41
Author(s):  
Grassi Iacopo
Keyword(s):  
High Standard ◽  
Policy Instrument ◽  
Quality Standard ◽  
Average Quality ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Positive Externality ◽  
Experience Good ◽  
The Government ◽  
Minimum Quality

At least since Akerlof (1970), asymmetric information in the case of experience goods has been a central issue in the economic literature. This paper studies regulation in markets where the quality of the experience good is never completely verifiable by consumers even after purchase. In the proposed model firms can decide the quality of the good: always producing a high quality good creates a positive externality in the market, but it causes an incentive to the firms to deviate and produce low quality goods. The main policy instrument for the government, in order to maximize Social Welfare, is to fix a minimum quality standard, but imposing a too high standard might, in some cases, lower the average quality of the good in the market.

scholarly journals Welfare Consequences of Information Aggregation and Optimal Market Size

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 303-323 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kei Kawakami
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Information Aggregation ◽  
Market Size ◽  
Positive Externality ◽  
Trading Model ◽  
Welfare Implications ◽  
The Right

We analyze the welfare implications of information aggregation in a trading model where traders have both idiosyncratic endowment risk and asymmetric information about security payoffs. The optimal market size balances two forces: (i) the risk-sharing role of markets, which creates a positive externality amongst traders, against (ii) the information-aggregation role of prices, which leads to prices that are more correlated with security payoffs, thereby undermining the hedging function of markets. Our analysis indicates that a market with infinitely many traders may not be the right welfare benchmark in the presence of risk aversion and information aggregation. (JEL D43, D62, D82, D83)

Support of Social Innovations

2017 ◽  
pp. 165-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jarmila Šebestová ◽  
Zuzana Palová
Keyword(s):  
Czech Republic ◽  
Financial Support ◽  
Social Innovation ◽  
Theoretical Knowledge ◽  
The Czech Republic ◽  
Social Innovations ◽  
Positive Externality ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Support Evaluation

The aim of this chapter is to summarize the theoretical knowledge from the field of social entrepreneurship and the creation of social innovation and highlight the impact EU funds have on the development of social innovation in selected regions of the Czech Republic. The authors assumed that there could be a positive link between the amount of financial support and the number of created social innovations within the chosen EU programmes. Classification of created social innovation according to type, creator, priority axis in relation to beneficiary etc. came under other objectives. Social innovations are created as a positive externality from other social projects. Finally, recommendation for sustainable support evaluation is provided.

scholarly journals Improving Food Quality through Institutional Innovations: Using a Free-Rider Approach for Collective Action

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Ernst-August Nuppenau
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Food Quality ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Economies Of Scale ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Team Building ◽  
Team Work ◽  
Positive Externality ◽  
Good Provision

This paper applies an innovation from institution economics to agribusiness: profit (cost) sharing as arrangements to promote public good provision. It outlines how a team work approach can be employed to promote food quality. In institutional economics it was recently suggested to use sharing arrangements to overcome the problem of externalities, in particular by using the above mentioned team work approach. Cost sharing as “team work” is analyzed in this paper as a novel institution to improve food quality, then by indirectly creating incentives to overcome the public good character of “quality”. It is assumed that consumers recognize industry quality; not individual by firm in case of asymmetric information. We trans­late a general approach of negative externality to a positive one. (1) We make a reference to the current state of art on how food quality depends on joint efforts of an industry. The aim is to get a better image and discuss the extent to which group efforts are needed to improve quality. (2) We present a mathematical approach on team work for quality. Quality is seen as positive externality and (3) team building is modelled as a likely a process of forming groups sharing efforts in food industries. Finally some remarks are made on how to actively stimulate the needed process of team formation. Also the role of the govern­ment is addressed. At the core of the paper we see the argument that <em>free riding</em> on quality images can be avoided if collective action prevails. A team is modeled as partnership of producers in which costs for image raising are shared. A prerequisite is that <em>economies of scale</em> and jointness in image exist.

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