scholarly journals CAPACITY SHARING STRATEGY WITH SUSTAINABLE REVENUE-SHARING CONTRACTS

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Junlong Chen ◽  
Jiayan Shi ◽  
Jiali Liu
Keyword(s):  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Capacity Constraints ◽  
The Sustainable Development ◽  
Marginal Costs ◽  
Capacity Sharing ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Duopoly Model ◽  
Sharing Strategy ◽  
Realistic Assumption ◽  
Tariff Method

This paper develops a duopoly model to analyse capacity sharing strategy and the optimal revenue-sharing contract under a two-part tariff and examines the effects of capacity sharing, cost, and sharing charges in three scenarios. The paper uses the two-part tariff method and adds a more realistic assumption of incremental marginal costs to improve the research on capacity sharing strategies. The results show that capacity constraints affect the sustainable development of firms. A sustainable revenue-sharing contract can create a win-win situation for both firms and promote capacity sharing. Capacity sharing, cost, and the revenue-sharing rate have different impacts in different scenarios; the optimal revenue-sharing rate and fixed fee can be determined to maximise the profits of firms that share capacity. However, capacity sharing may not improve social welfare.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Coordination under Stock- and Price-Dependent Selling Rates under Declining Market

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subrata Saha ◽  
Sambhu Das ◽  
Manjusri Basu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Stackelberg Games ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Demand Rate ◽  
Time Price

We explore coordination issues of a two-echelon supply chain, consisting of a distributor and a retailer. The effect of revenue-sharing contract mechanism is examined under stock-time-price-sensitive demand rate. First, we investigate relationships between distributor and retailer under noncooperative distributor-Stackelberg games. Then we establish analytically that revenue sharing contact is able to coordinate the system and leads to the win-win outcomes. Finally, numerical examples are presented to compare results between the different models.

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

Impact of carbon permit allocation rules on incentive contracts for carbon emission reduction

Kybernetes ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1143-1167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qinqin Li ◽  
Yujie Xiao ◽  
Yuzhuo Qiu ◽  
Xiaoling Xu ◽  
Caichun Chai
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Allocation Rules ◽  
Permit Allocation ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of carbon permit allocation rules (grandfathering mechanism and benchmarking mechanism) on incentive contracts provided by the retailer to encourage the manufacturer to invest more in reducing carbon emissions. Design/methodology/approach The authors consider a two-echelon supply chain in which the retailer offers three contracts (wholesale price contract, cost-sharing contract and revenue-sharing contract) to the manufacturer. Based on the two carbon permit allocation rules, i.e. grandfathering mechanism and benchmarking mechanism, six scenarios are examined. The optimal price and carbon emission reduction decisions and members’ equilibrium profits under six scenarios are analyzed and compared. Findings The results suggest that the revenue-sharing contract can more effectively stimulate the manufacturer to reduce carbon emissions compared to the cost-sharing contract. The cost-sharing contract can help to achieve the highest environmental performance, whereas the implementation of revenue-sharing contract can attain the highest social welfare. The benchmarking mechanism is more effective for the government to prompt the manufacturer to produce low-carbon products than the grandfathering mechanism. Although a loose carbon policy can expand the total emissions, it can improve the social welfare. Practical implications These results can provide operational insights for the retailer in how to use incentive contract to encourage the manufacturer to curb carbon emissions and offer managerial insights for the government to make policy decisions on carbon permit allocation rules. Originality/value This paper contributes to the literature regarding to firm’s carbon emissions reduction decisions under cap-and-trade policy and highlights the importance of carbon permit allocation methods in curbing carbon emissions.

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