The scope for progressive tax reform in the OECD countries

2015 ◽  
Vol 141 (5) ◽  
pp. 79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Godar ◽  
Christoph Paetz ◽  
Achim Truger
2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (24) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Klemm ◽  
Paolo Mauro

Based on a survey of about 2,500 US resident adults, we show that people who have experienced serious illness or job loss caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, or who personally know someone who has, favor a temporary progressive levy or structural progressive tax reform to a greater extent than others in the sample, controlling for income, demographic characteristics, and other factors. People who reveal preferences for spending items (more on police, military, border protection; less on education, health, environment) that are associated with communitarian (rather than universalist) moral perspectives generally show weaker support for progressive reforms, but more communitarians change their views as a result of personal experience. The results are consistent with previous findings that economic upheavals can mold individuals’ views on policy matters.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Cobham ◽  
Tommaso Faccio ◽  
Valpy FitzGerald

The current OECD process to reform the international rules governing corporate tax, aimed to achieve a consensus solution by 2020, has finally recognised the need to introduce elements of formulary apportionment to allocate the profits of multinationals and is framed explicitly in terms of redistributing taxing rights between countries. In this paper we provide the first public evaluation of the redistribution of taxing rights associated with the leading proposals of the OECD, IMF and the Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation (ICRICT). The first key finding is that that reallocation of taxing rights towards “market jurisdictions”, as it is currently understood, is likely to be of little benefit to non-OECD countries. Indeed, the proposal is likely to reduce revenues for a range of lower-income countries. Second, all of the proposals deliver a much broader distribution of benefits if some element of taxing rights is apportioned according to the location of multinationals’ employment, and not only of sales.


2021 ◽  
pp. 223-232
Author(s):  
Jo Michell
Keyword(s):  

Public Choice ◽  
1975 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. M. Pestieau

2015 ◽  
pp. 39-58
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Dallera
Keyword(s):  

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Chaloff

The growing complexity of selection criteria for discretionary labour migration in OECD countries has been accompanied by an expanded demand for labour market analysis and consultation with stakeholders. While some features of general or detailed criteria may be fixed in legislation, numerical quotas or targets, shortage lists, and multiple-criteria points-based systems are generally subject to periodic review and revision based on labour market data and consultation with stakeholders. Official government bodies have maintained co-ordination of this process, with varying degrees of externalization. In most countries expertise is internal, with recourse to external mandated bodies rare. In almost all cases, however, the process is designed to promote consensus around the policy while maintaining political control.


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