Peer‐Confirming Equilibrium

Econometrica ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 87 (2) ◽  
pp. 567-591 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elliot Lipnowski ◽  
Evan Sadler
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
Strategic Knowledge ◽  
Strategic Information ◽  
Outcome Set ◽  
Good Provision ◽  
Simultaneous Move

We can often predict the behavior of those closest to us more accurately than that of complete strangers, yet we routinely engage in strategic situations with both: our social network impacts our strategic knowledge. Peer‐confirming equilibrium describes the behavioral consequences of this intuition in a noncooperative game. We augment a game with a network to represent strategic information: if two players are linked in the network, they have correct conjectures about each others' strategies. In peer‐confirming equilibrium, there is common belief that players (i) behave rationally and (ii) correctly anticipate neighbors' play. In simultaneous‐move games, adding links to the network always restricts the set of outcomes. In dynamic games, the outcome set may vary non‐monotonically with the network because the actions of well‐connected players help poorly‐connected players coordinate. This solution concept provides a useful language for studying public good provision, highlights a new channel through which central individuals facilitate coordination, and delineates possible sources of miscoordination in protests and coups.

Noncooperative Game Theory

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
João P. Hespanha
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Computer Science ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
Noncooperative Game Theory ◽  
Original Design ◽  
Theoretical Perspectives ◽  
Engineering Designs ◽  
Zero Sum

This book is aimed at students interested in using game theory as a design methodology for solving problems in engineering and computer science. The book shows that such design challenges can be analyzed through game theoretical perspectives that help to pinpoint each problem's essence: Who are the players? What are their goals? Will the solution to “the game” solve the original design problem? Using the fundamentals of game theory, the book explores these issues and more. The use of game theory in technology design is a recent development arising from the intrinsic limitations of classical optimization-based designs. In optimization, one attempts to find values for parameters that minimize suitably defined criteria—such as monetary cost, energy consumption, or heat generated. However, in most engineering applications, there is always some uncertainty as to how the selected parameters will affect the final objective. Through a sequential and easy-to-understand discussion, the book examines how to make sure that the selection leads to acceptable performance, even in the presence of uncertainty—the unforgiving variable that can wreck engineering designs. The book looks at such standard topics as zero-sum, non-zero-sum, and dynamic games and includes a MATLAB guide to coding. This book offers students a fresh way of approaching engineering and computer science applications.

On the Limits of Cheap Talk for Public Good Provision

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco J. M. Costa ◽  
Humberto Moreira
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Good Provision

scholarly journals Social Pressure in Networks Induces Public Good Provision

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 4
Author(s):  
David Jimenez-Gomez
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Small Group ◽  
Dynamic Model ◽  
Network Topology ◽  
Social Pressure ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Public Good Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Good Provision

I develop a dynamic model with forward looking agents, and show that social pressure is effective in generating provision in a public good game: after a small group of agents start contributing to the public good, other agents decide to contribute as well due to a fear of being punished, and this generates contagion in the network. In contrast to earlier models in the literature, contagion happens fast, as part of the best response of fully rational individuals. The network topology has implications for whether contagion starts and the extent to which it spreads. I find conditions under which an agent decides to be the first to contribute in order to generate contagion in the network, as well as conditions for contribution due to a self-fulfilling fear of social pressure.

Local Public Good Provision under Uncertainty: Do Monopoly Bureaus Wield Carrots — or Sticks?

1994 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 184-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven G. Craig ◽  
Edward Wei-Te Hsieh
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Local Public Good ◽  
Good Provision

scholarly journals The Evolution of Networks and Local Public Good Provision: A Potential Approach

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 55
Author(s):  
Markus Kinateder ◽  
Luca Paolo Merlino
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Potential Game ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Local Public Good ◽  
Steady State Distribution ◽  
State Distribution ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Split Graphs ◽  
Good Provision

In this paper, we propose a game in which each player decides with whom to establish a costly connection and how much local public good is provided when benefits are shared among neighbors. We show that, when agents are homogeneous, Nash equilibrium networks are nested split graphs. Additionally, we show that the game is a potential game, even when we introduce heterogeneity along several dimensions. Using this result, we introduce stochastic best reply dynamics and show that this admits a unique and stationary steady state distribution expressed in terms of the potential function of the game. Hence, even if the set of Nash equilibria is potentially very large, the long run predictions are sharp.

A Model of Inequality Aversion and Private Provision of Public Goods

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hide-Fumi Yokoo
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Theoretical Foundation ◽  
Inequality Aversion ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Marginal Rate ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
Marginal Rate Of Substitution ◽  
Good Provision ◽  
Corner Solutions

AbstractI develop a model of inequality aversion and public goods that allows the marginal rate of substitution to be variable. As a theoretical foundation, utility function of the standard public goods model is nested in the Fehr-Schmidt model. An individual’s contribution function for a public good is derived by solving the problem of kinky preference and examining both interior and corner solutions. Results show that the derived contribution function is not monotonic with respect to the other individual’s provision. Thus, the model can be used to explain empirical evidence for the effect of social comparison on public-good provision.

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