scholarly journals Equilibrium computation in discrete network games

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 1325-1347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael P. Leung
Keyword(s):  
Network Formation ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Network Formation Games ◽  
Data Generating Process ◽  
Finite Action ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Bounded Below ◽  
Action Spaces

Counterfactual policy evaluation often requires computation of game‐theoretic equilibria. We provide new algorithms for computing pure‐strategy Nash equilibria of games on networks with finite action spaces. The algorithms exploit the fact that many agents may be endowed with types such that a particular action is a dominant strategy. These agents can be used to partition the network into smaller subgames whose equilibrium sets may be more feasible to compute. We provide bounds on the complexity of our algorithms for models obeying certain restrictions on the strength of strategic interactions. These restrictions are analogous to the assumption in the widely used linear‐in‐means model of social interactions that the magnitude of the endogenous peer effect is bounded below one. For these models, our algorithms have complexity O p ( n c ), where the randomness is with respect to the data‐generating process, n is the number of agents, and c depends on the strength of strategic interactions. We also provide algorithms for computing pairwise stable and directed Nash stable networks in network formation games.

A Structural Econometric Analysis of Network Formation Games Through Subnetworks

Econometrica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 88 (5) ◽  
pp. 1829-1858 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuyang Sheng
Keyword(s):  
Multiple Equilibria ◽  
Network Formation ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Partial Identification ◽  
Strategic Interactions ◽  
Large Networks ◽  
Network Formation Games ◽  
Identification Approach ◽  
Structural Econometric ◽  
Simultaneous Move

The objective of this paper is to identify and estimate network formation models using observed data on network structure. We characterize network formation as a simultaneous‐move game, where the utility from forming a link depends on the structure of the network, thereby generating strategic interactions between links. With the prevalence of multiple equilibria, the parameters are not necessarily point identified. We leave the equilibrium selection unrestricted and propose a partial identification approach. We derive bounds on the probability of observing a subnetwork, where a subnetwork is the restriction of a network to a subset of the individuals. Unlike the standard bounds as in Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), these subnetwork bounds are computationally tractable in large networks provided we consider small subnetworks. We provide Monte Carlo evidence that bounds from small subnetworks are informative in large networks.

On network formation games with heterogeneous players and basic network creation games

2018 ◽  
Vol 717 ◽  
pp. 62-72
Author(s):  
Christos Kaklamanis ◽  
Panagiotis Kanellopoulos ◽  
Sophia Tsokana
Keyword(s):  
Network Formation ◽  
Heterogeneous Players ◽  
Network Formation Games ◽  
Basic Network ◽  
Network Creation Games

scholarly journals Network Formation Games Among Relay Stations in Next Generation Wireless Networks

2011 ◽  
Vol 59 (9) ◽  
pp. 2528-2542 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walid Saad ◽  
Zhu Han ◽  
Tamer Basar ◽  
Merouane Debbah ◽  
Are Hjorungnes
Keyword(s):  
Wireless Networks ◽  
Network Formation ◽  
Next Generation ◽  
Next Generation Wireless Networks ◽  
Network Formation Games ◽  
Relay Stations

Identi cation of Preferences in Network Formation Games

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aureo de Paula ◽  
Seth Richards-Shubik ◽  
Elie T. Tamer
Keyword(s):  
Network Formation ◽  
Network Formation Games

Strategic priority-purchasing and joining rules in a retrial queue

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhongbin Wang ◽  
Jinting Wang
Keyword(s):  
Retrial Queue ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Retrial Queueing System ◽  
Retrial Queueing ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Customer Welfare

Abstract This paper considers a retrial queueing system with a pay-for-priority option. A queueing-game-theoretic model that captures the interaction among the customers, the service provider (SP) and the social planner is developed. We obtain the equilibrium strategy of customers for any fixed priority premium and identify the unique Pareto-dominant strategy. The optimal pricing strategies for the SP and the social planner are derived and compared extensively. Interestingly, we find that the equilibrium outcome of customers is non-monotone in the service reward and the profit of the SP is bimodal in the priority premium. We reveal the fact that the SP’s optimization makes the system more congested than what is socially desirable. Finally, numerical examples indicate that the customer welfare can be improved by providing priorities when the market size is large.

Local dynamics for network formation games

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Esteban Arcaute ◽  
Ramesh Johari ◽  
Shie Mannor
Keyword(s):  
Network Formation ◽  
Local Dynamics ◽  
Network Formation Games

A Game-Theoretic Approach to Defending Nuclear Instrumentation and Control Systems From Cyber-Threats

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee T. Maccarone ◽  
Daniel G. Cole
Keyword(s):  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Cyber Attack ◽  
State Variables ◽  
Balance Of Plant ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Physical Assets ◽  
Computational Resources ◽  
And Control ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

Cyber-physical systems consist of interconnected physical processes and computational resources. Because the cyber and physical worlds are integrated, the system’s physical assets are vulnerable to cyber-attack. An attacker who is able to access control inputs and mask measurements can damage the system while remaining undetected. By masking certain measurement signals, an attacker may render part of the state space unobservable, meaning that it is impossible to reconstruct those states. This is called an observability attack. A game-theoretic approach is presented to analyze observability attacks. The attacker’s strategy set includes all possible combinations of masked measurements. The defender’s strategy set includes redundant sensing and direct measurement of state variables. Attacker and defender payoffs are quantified using the responses of the observable and unobservable states. The observability attack game is analyzed for a nuclear balance of plant system. Combinations of sensor omissions are analyzed to find observability attacks with high impact and low detection. The effects of sensor augmentation are examined. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is identified.

scholarly journals On the Existence of Pairwise Stable Weighted Networks

2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 1393-1404 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe Bich ◽  
Lisa Morhaim
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Existence Theorem ◽  
Network Theory ◽  
Network Formation ◽  
Pairwise Stability ◽  
Weighted Networks ◽  
Standard Application ◽  
Unweighted Network ◽  
Game Theoretic

In network theory, Jackson and Wolinsky introduced a now widely used notion of stability for unweighted network formation called pairwise stability. We prove the existence of pairwise stable weighted networks under assumptions on payoffs that are similar to those in Nash's and Glicksberg’s existence theorem (continuity and quasi concavity). Then, we extend our result, allowing payoffs to depend not only on the network, but also on some game-theoretic strategies. The proof is not a standard application of tools from game theory, the difficulty coming from the fact that the pairwise stability notion has both cooperative and noncooperative features. Last, some examples are given and illustrate how our results may open new paths in the literature on network formation.

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