Strategic priority-purchasing and joining rules in a retrial queue

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhongbin Wang ◽  
Jinting Wang
Keyword(s):  
Retrial Queue ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Retrial Queueing System ◽  
Retrial Queueing ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Customer Welfare

Abstract This paper considers a retrial queueing system with a pay-for-priority option. A queueing-game-theoretic model that captures the interaction among the customers, the service provider (SP) and the social planner is developed. We obtain the equilibrium strategy of customers for any fixed priority premium and identify the unique Pareto-dominant strategy. The optimal pricing strategies for the SP and the social planner are derived and compared extensively. Interestingly, we find that the equilibrium outcome of customers is non-monotone in the service reward and the profit of the SP is bimodal in the priority premium. We reveal the fact that the SP’s optimization makes the system more congested than what is socially desirable. Finally, numerical examples indicate that the customer welfare can be improved by providing priorities when the market size is large.

scholarly journals The Effect of Green Technology Adoption Strategy on Duopoly Competition

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 498-518
Author(s):  
Chenglin Shen ◽  
Xinxin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Green Technology ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
Environmental Attributes ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Abstract Given consumers’ trade-offs between conventional economic and environmental attributes of products, we provide a game-theoretic model to explore the role of GTA strategy in duopoly competition by incorporating two salient features: Two product types — The green product produced by a firm with GTA strategy and the ordinary product produced by a firm without GTA strategy, and two consumer segments, i.e., the green consumers who are willing to pay for green products and the ordinary consumers who are willing to pay for ordinary products. Our analysis shows that GTA strategy may either increase or decrease the green firm’s quality provision. The subtle relationship between the green firm’s quality strategy and GTA strategy not only affects its own equilibrium performances but its rival’s. We also find that two consumer segments may be better off in the presence of a lower GTA intensity. Additionally, although the GTA strategy benefits the environment, the GTA investment is not the more the better. Finally, we find that GTA strategy would lead to higher social welfare only when the GTA efficiency is high enough. Our work not only provides an alternative economic explanation why some firms choose to implement GTA strategy and some do not in reality, but gives managerial insights for firms with different GTA strategies as well as policy insights for the social planner.

scholarly journals An M/G/1 Retrial Queueing System with Phase Type Services and Working Vacations

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (4.10) ◽  
pp. 758
Author(s):  
P. Rajadurai ◽  
R. Santhoshi ◽  
G. Pavithra ◽  
S. Usharani ◽  
S. B. Shylaja
Keyword(s):  
Queueing System ◽  
Retrial Queue ◽  
Probability Generating Function ◽  
Retrial Queueing System ◽  
Retrial Queueing ◽  
Multiple Working Vacations ◽  
Phase Type ◽  
Working Vacations ◽  
Multi Phase ◽  
Number Of Customers

A multi phase retrial queue with optional re-service and multiple working vacations is considered. The Probability Generating Function (PGF) of number of customers in the system is obtained by supplementary variable technique. Various system performance measures are discussed. 

Numerical solution for the performance characteristics of the M/M/C/K retrial queue with negative customers and exponential abandonments by using value extrapolation method

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 767-786
Author(s):  
Zidani Nesrine ◽  
Pierre Spiteri ◽  
Natalia Djellab
Keyword(s):  
System Performance ◽  
Algebraic System ◽  
Queueing System ◽  
Retrial Queue ◽  
Practical Interest ◽  
Extrapolation Method ◽  
Negative Customers ◽  
Multiprocessor Computer ◽  
Retrial Queueing System ◽  
Retrial Queueing

This paper deals with a retrial queueing system M/M/C/K with exponential abandonment at which positive and negative primary customers arrive according to Poisson processes. This model is of practical interest: it permits to analyze the performance in call centers or multiprocessor computer systems. For model under study, we find the ergodicity condition and also the approximate solution by applying Value Extrapolation method which includes solving of some algebraic system of equations. To this end, we have resolved the algebraic system in question by different numerical methods. We present also numerical results to analyze the system performance.

Information Transparency Hypothesis

2011 ◽  
pp. 15-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Electronic Markets ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Electronic Market ◽  
Information Transparency ◽  
The Social ◽  
B2b Exchanges ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Business To Business

This chapter explores the private and social desirability of information transparency of a business-to-business (B2B) electronic market that provides an online platform for information transmission. The abundance of transaction data available on the Internet tends to make information more transparent in B2B electronic markets. In such a transparent environment, it becomes easier for firms to obtain information that may allow them to infer their rivals’ costs than in a traditional, opaque market. How then does this benefit firms participating in the B2B exchanges? To what extent does information transparency affect consumers and the social welfare in a broader sense? Focusing on the informational effects, this study explores firms’ incentives to join a B2B exchange by developing a game-theoretic model under asymmetric information. We then examine its effect on expected profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare. Our results challenge the “information transparency hypothesis” (that is, open sharing of information in electronic markets is beneficial to all participating firms). In contrast to the popular belief, we show that information transparency could be a double-edged sword. Although its overall effect on social welfare is positive, its private desirability is deeply divided between producers and consumers, and even among producers themselves.

scholarly journals An Unreliable Batch Arrival Retrial Queueing System With Bernoulli Vacation Schedule and Linear Repeated Attempts

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-109
Author(s):  
Gautam Choudhury ◽  
Lotfi Tadj
Keyword(s):  
Retrial Queue ◽  
Sensitivity Analyses ◽  
Embedded Markov Chain ◽  
State Behavior ◽  
Unreliable Server ◽  
Reliability Indices ◽  
Retrial Queueing System ◽  
Retrial Queueing ◽  
Vacation Model ◽  
Bernoulli Vacation

This article deals with the steady-state behavior of an MX/G/1 retrial queue with the Bernoulli vacation schedule and unreliable server, under linear retrial policy. Breakdowns can occur randomly at any instant while the server is providing service to the customers. Further, the concept of Bernoulli admission mechanism is introduced. This model generalizes both the classical MX/G/1 retrial queue with unreliable server as well as the MX/G/1 retrial queue with the Bernoulli vacation model. The authors carry out an extensive analysis of this model. Namely, the embedded Markov chain, the stationary distribution of the number of units in the orbit, and the state of the server are studied. Some important performance measures and reliability indices of this model are obtained. Finally, numerical illustrations are provided and sensitivity analyses on some of the system parameters are conducted.

Advertising in a social network as a signal of quality

2021 ◽  
pp. 118-139
Author(s):  
Kamilla Timerbulatova
Keyword(s):  
Social Network ◽  
Opinion Leaders ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Separating Equilibrium

Advertising in a social network has a number of characteristics that distinguish it from other types of advertising, and which may be of key importance in answering the question about its ability to serve as a signal of quality. In the game-theoretic model presented in this paper, the monopolist sends an advertising signal to bloggers who act as “opinion leaders” in the social network. The latter, in turn, make decisions about posting advertising messages on their blogs, taking into account the impact that this action may have on their reputation. The paper investigates the question of when advertising can serve as a reliable signal of quality in a separating equilibrium.

The M/G/1 Retrial Queue With Retrial Rate Control Policy

1993 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bong Dae Choi ◽  
Kyung Hyune Rhee ◽  
Kwang Kyu Park
Keyword(s):  
Retrial Queue ◽  
Control Policy ◽  
Single Server ◽  
Retrial Queueing System ◽  
Retrial Queueing ◽  
Virtual Waiting Time ◽  
The Laplace Transform ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Number Of Customers

We consider a single-server retrial queueing system where retrial time is inversely proportional to the number of customers in the system. A necessary and sufficient condition for the stability of the system is found. We obtain the Laplace transform of virtual waiting time and busy period. The transient distribution of the number of customers in the system is also obtained.

scholarly journals On the virtual waiting time for an M/G/1 retrial queue with two types of calls

1993 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bong Dae Choi ◽  
Dong Hwan Han ◽  
Guennadi Falin
Keyword(s):  
Waiting Time ◽  
Queueing System ◽  
Retrial Queue ◽  
Arrival Rate ◽  
Switching System ◽  
Stieltjes Transform ◽  
Retrial Queueing System ◽  
Retrial Queueing ◽  
Virtual Waiting Time ◽  
Incoming Call

We consider an M/G/1 retrial queueing system with two types of calls which models a telephone switching system. In the case that arriving calls are blocked due to the channel being busy, the outgoing calls are queued in priority group whereas the incoming calls enter the retrial group in order to try service again after a random amount of time. In this paper we find the Laplace-Stieltjes transform of the distribution of the virtual waiting time for an incoming call. When the arrival rate of outgoing calls is zero, it is shown that our result is consistent with the known result for a retrial queueing system with one type of call.

scholarly journals An M/G/1 Retrial Queue with Fluctuating Modes of Services

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (4.10) ◽  
pp. 762
Author(s):  
P. Rajadurai ◽  
S. Venkatesh ◽  
K. Parameswari
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Queueing System ◽  
Retrial Queue ◽  
Probability Generating Function ◽  
Single Server ◽  
Supplementary Variable ◽  
Working Vacation ◽  
Variable Technique ◽  
Retrial Queueing System ◽  
Retrial Queueing

In this paper, we consider a single server retrial queueing system with working vacation and two classes of customers, which are priority customers and ordinary customers. The single server provides fluctuating modes (optional phases) of services. Using the method of Probability Generating Function (PGF) approach and supplementary variable technique, the steady state results are obtained. 

scholarly journals How Strong Are Weak Patents?

2008 ◽  
Vol 98 (4) ◽  
pp. 1347-1369 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Farrell ◽  
Carl Shapiro
Keyword(s):  
Social Value ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Technology Users ◽  
Weak Patents ◽  
Patent Validity

We study the welfare economics of probabilistic patents that are licensed without a full determination of validity. We examine the social value of instead determining patent validity before licensing to downstream technology users, in terms of deadweight loss (ex post) and innovation incentives (ex ante). We relate the value of such pre-licensing review to the patent's strength, i.e., the probability it would hold up in court, and to the per-unit royalty at which it would be licensed. We then apply these results using a game-theoretic model of licensing to downstream oligopolists, in which we show that determining patent validity prior to licensing is socially beneficial. (JEL D82, K11, L24, O34)

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