scholarly journals Sequential voting rules and multiple elections paradoxes

Author(s):  
Lirong Xia ◽  
Jérôme Lang ◽  
Mingsheng Ying
2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (3) ◽  
pp. 409-424 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARCO BATTAGLINI ◽  
REBECCA MORTON ◽  
THOMAS PALFREY

We compare the behavior of voters under simultaneous and sequential voting rules when voting is costly and information is incomplete. In many political institutions, ranging from small committees to mass elections, voting is sequential, which allows some voters to know the choices of earlier voters. For a stylized model, we generate a variety of predictions about the relative efficiency and participation equity of these two systems, which we test using controlled laboratory experiments. Most of the qualitative predictions are supported by the data, but there are significant departures from the predicted equilibrium strategies, in both the sequential and the simultaneous voting games. We find a tradeoff between information aggregation, efficiency, and equity in sequential voting: a sequential voting rule aggregates information better than simultaneous voting and is more efficient in some information environments, but sequential voting is inequitable because early voters bear more participation costs.


Nature ◽  
2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Ball
Keyword(s):  

2009 ◽  
pp. 132-143
Author(s):  
K. Sonin ◽  
I. Khovanskaya

Hiring decisions are typically made by committees members of which have different capacity to estimate the quality of candidates. Organizational structure and voting rules in the committees determine the incentives and strategies of applicants; thus, construction of a modern university requires a political structure that provides committee members and applicants with optimal incentives. The existing political-economic model of informative voting typically lacks any degree of variance in the organizational structure, while political-economic models of organization typically assume a parsimonious information structure. In this paper, we propose a simple framework to analyze trade-offs in optimal subdivision of universities into departments and subdepartments, and allocation of political power.


Author(s):  
Ian Ayres ◽  
Colin Rowat ◽  
Nasser Zakariya

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 221-236
Author(s):  
Alice Guerra ◽  
Barbara Luppi ◽  
Francesco Parisi
Keyword(s):  

2007 ◽  
Vol 97 (1) ◽  
pp. 150-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilat Levy

In this paper I analyze the effect of transparency on decision making in committees. I focus on committees whose members are motivated by career concerns. The main result is that when the decision-making process is secretive (when individual votes are not revealed to the public), committee members comply with preexisting biases. For example, if the voting rule demands a supermajority to accept a reform, individuals vote more often against reforms. Transparent committees are therefore more likely to accept reforms. I also find that coupled with the right voting rule, a secretive procedure may induce better decisions than a transparent one. (JEL D71, D72)


Res Publica ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 37 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 352-388
Author(s):  
Johan Ackaert

The institutional setting of the 1994 local elections was characterized by a by law introduced limitation of campaign expenditures and the increased share (at least 25%) of female candidates.  In spite of compulsory voting rules, the turnout decreased with 1,2%. The proportion of blanc or invalid votes increased slightly with 0,3%.  The results of the local elections followed the trends drawn by the 1991 general election. This means general losses for the traditional parties and large progress for the extreme right-wing parties. In the Flemish region, the winners were the extreme right-wing Vlaams Blok, the ecologist AGALEV and the VLD liberals.  The others parties lost votes. This was particularly the case for the Flemish-nationalist VU, followed by the socialists (SP) and the christian-democrats (CVP).In the Walloons region, all the traditional parties were set back or stagnated.  The socialists (PS) suffered the largest decline, but the liberals (PRL) and christian-democrats (PSC) lost voters too. The ecologist ECOLO only kept a modest status quo position. On the other hand, the extreme right-wing parties Front National and Agir realised a breakthrough. In Brussels, we notice the same tendencies, set-backs for the traditional parties and progress for the extreme rightwing parties (of both languages). The ecologists belonged there also to the winning side. Nevertheless, the fragmentation of the local political system should not be dramatized.In general terms, parties supporting the leaving political majorities in the municipalities were no langer electorally favoured. On the contrary, the liberals realized better results in these municipalities where they belonged to the opposition.


2004 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tilman Börgers

What are good voting rules if voting is costly? We analyze this question for the case that an electorate chooses among two alternatives. In a symmetric private value model of voting we show that majority voting with voluntary participation Pareto-dominates majority voting with compulsory participation as well as random decision-making.


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