scholarly journals The no‐upward‐crossing condition, comparative statics, and the moral‐hazard problem

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 445-476
Author(s):  
Hector Chade ◽  
Jeroen Swinkels

We define and explore no‐upward‐crossing (NUC), a condition satisfied by every parameterized family of distributions commonly used in economic applications. Under smoothness assumptions, NUC is equivalent to log‐supermodularity of the negative of the derivative of the distribution with respect to the parameter. It is characterized by a natural monotone comparative static and is central in establishing quasi‐concavity in a family of decision problems. As an application, we revisit the first‐order approach to the moral‐hazard problem. NUC simplifies the relevant conditions for the validity of the first‐order approach and gives them an economic interpretation. We provide extensive analysis of sufficient conditions for the first‐order approach for exponential families.

2013 ◽  
Vol 148 (6) ◽  
pp. 2313-2343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ohad Kadan ◽  
Jeroen M. Swinkels

Philosophia ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ricardo Parellada

AbstractThe relation between conceptual analysis and empirical observations when ascribing or denying concepts and beliefs to non-human animals is not straightforward. In order to reflect on this relation, I focus on two theoretical proposals (Davidson’s and Allen’s) and one empirical case (vervet monkeys’ alarm calls), the three of which are permanently discussed and considered in the literature on animal cognition. First, I review briefly Davidson’s arguments for denying thought to non-linguistic animals. Second, I review Allen’s criteria for ascribing concepts to creatures capable of correcting their discriminatory powers by taking into account their previous errors. Allen affirms that this is an empirical proposal which offers good reasons, but not necessary or sufficient conditions, for concept attribution. Against Allen, I argue that his important proposal is not an empirical, but a conceptual one. Third, I resort to vervet monkeys to show that Allen’s criteria, and not Davidson’s, are very relevant for ascribing first-order and denying second-order beliefs to this species and thus make sense of the idea of animal cognition.


1980 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-268
Author(s):  
Ewa Orłowska

The central method employed today for theorem-proving is the resolution method introduced by J. A. Robinson in 1965 for the classical predicate calculus. Since then many improvements of the resolution method have been made. On the other hand, treatment of automated theorem-proving techniques for non-classical logics has been started, in connection with applications of these logics in computer science. In this paper a generalization of a notion of the resolution principle is introduced and discussed. A certain class of first order logics is considered and deductive systems of these logics with a resolution principle as an inference rule are investigated. The necessary and sufficient conditions for the so-called resolution completeness of such systems are given. A generalized Herbrand property for a logic is defined and its connections with the resolution-completeness are presented. A class of binary resolution systems is investigated and a kind of a normal form for derivations in such systems is given. On the ground of the methods developed the resolution system for the classical predicate calculus is described and the resolution systems for some non-classical logics are outlined. A method of program synthesis based on the resolution system for the classical predicate calculus is presented. A notion of a resolution-interpretability of a logic L in another logic L ′ is introduced. The method of resolution-interpretability consists in establishing a relation between formulas of the logic L and some sets of formulas of the logic L ′ with the intention of using the resolution system for L ′ to prove theorems of L. It is shown how the method of resolution-interpretability can be used to prove decidability of sets of unsatisfiable formulas of a given logic.


Author(s):  
K. C. Panda ◽  
R. N. Rath ◽  
S. K. Rath

In this paper, we obtain sufficient conditions for oscillation and nonoscillation of the solutions of the neutral delay differential equation yt−∑j=1kpjtyrjt′+qtGygt−utHyht=ft, where pj and rj for each j and q,u,G,H,g,h, and f are all continuous functions and q≥0,u≥0,ht<t,gt<t, and rjt<t for each j. Further, each rjt, gt, and ht⟶∞ as t⟶∞. This paper improves and generalizes some known results.


1977 ◽  
Vol 99 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. S. Bonderson

The system properties of passivity, losslessness, and reciprocity are defined and their necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for a class of linear one-dimensional multipower distributed systems. The utilization of power product pairs as state variables and the representation of the dynamics in first-order form allows results completely analogous to those for lumped-element systems.


Author(s):  
Javier Vidal

According to the method of transparency, genuine self-knowledge is the outcome of an inference from world to mind. A. Byrne (2018) has developed a theory in which the method of transparency consists in following an epistemic rule in order to form self-verifying second-order beliefs. In this paper, I argue that Byrne’s theory does not establish sufficient conditions for having self-knowledge of first-order beliefs. Examining a case of self-deception, I strive to show that following such a rule might not result in self-knowledge when one is involved in rational deliberation. In the case under consideration, one precisely comes to believe that one believes that p without coming to believe that p. The justification for one’s not forming the belief that p with its distinctive causal pattern in mental life and behaviour, is that one already had the unconscious belief that not-p, a belief that is not sensitive to the principles governing theoretical and practical reasoning.


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