scholarly journals The metaphysical status of natural laws: A critique of Stephen Mumford’s Nomological Antirealism

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Borge
2015 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 247
Author(s):  
Bruno Borge ◽  
Roberto Azar

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n2p247A highly influential position in the debate between nomological realists and antirealists (i.e., the debate about the metaphysical status of natural laws) is the regularist theory of laws. Its main feature is the defense of a humean metaphysics which denies the existence of real causal powers and necessary connections in nature. Regularism, however, rely on a traditional reading of Hume’s philosophy. In this paper we aim to revisit the discussion around laws of nature in light of nontraditional interpretations of his work, often labeled as the ‘New Hume’.


1882 ◽  
Vol 14 (351supp) ◽  
pp. 5602-5603
Author(s):  
B. T. Giraud
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 74-89
Author(s):  
Rahim Dehghan Simakani ◽  
Maryam Khoshdel Rohani
Keyword(s):  

2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-103
Author(s):  
Vered Noam

This paper examines the rabbinic concept of impurity in terms of the essence of the reality that this term implies. Did the Rabbis consider impurity to be a force of nature, or rather an abstract formalistic structure devoid of any actual existence? A review of rabbinic sources regarding corpse impurity reveals that the essential structures of tannaitic halakhah are grounded in a natural, immanent perception of impurity, which gave rise to an entire system, intricate and coherent, of “natural laws of impurity.” Layered onto this system, as a secondary stratum of sorts comprising exceptions and “addenda,” is a more subtle halakhic tapestry woven from a diametrically opposed perception. This view subjects the concept of impurity to human awareness and intention, severing it from reality and, in so doing, also stripping it of its “natural” substance.


Author(s):  
Marc Lange

Some philosophers regard no reducible physical properties as perfectly natural. However, in scientific practice, some but not other reducible physical properties (such as the property of having a given center of mass) denote genuine, explanatorily potent respects in which various systems are alike. What distinguishes these natural reducible physical properties from arbitrary algebraic combinations of more fundamental properties? Some philosophers treat naturalness as a metaphysical primitive. However, this chapter I suggests that it is not—at least, not as far as the naturalness of reducible physical properties is concerned. Roughly speaking, it is argued here that a reducible physical property’s naturalness is grounded in its role in the explanation of laws.


Author(s):  
Barry Stroud

This chapter challenges the notion that the colours we believe to belong to the objects we see are ‘secondary’ qualities of those objects. Such a notion is endorsed by John McDowell, who has explained why he thinks the author is wrong to resist it. McDowell recognizes that the author’s focus on the conditions of successfully unmasking the metaphysical status of the colours of things is a way of trying to make sense of whatever notion of reality is involved in it. However, the author argues that the notion of reality he is concerned with is ‘independent reality’, not simply the general notion of reality. He also contends that an exclusively dispositional conception of an object’s being a certain colour cannot account for the perceptions we have of the colours of things.


1933 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 614
Author(s):  
Henry E. Bourne ◽  
Sidney A. Reeve
Keyword(s):  

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