The Bayesian Approach to SLAM

This is the second chapter of the third section. It deals with the situation arising when neither the environment nor the exact localization of a mobile robot are known, that is, when we face the hard problem of SLAM. It reviews the most common solutions to that problem found in literature, especially those based on statistical estimation. Both parametric and non-parametric filters are explained as practical solutions to this problem, including analysis of their advantages and weaknesses that must be both taken into account in order to design a robust SLAM system. Complete examples and algorithms for these filters are included.

2019 ◽  
Vol 116 (10) ◽  
pp. 555-576
Author(s):  
Lei Zhong ◽  

Several leading moral philosophers have recently proposed a soft version of moral realism, according to which moral facts—though it is reasonable to postulate them—cannot metaphysically explain other facts (Dworkin 2011; Parfit 2011; Scanlon 2014). However, soft moral realism is faced with what I call the “Hard Problem,” namely, the problem of how this soft version of moral metaphysics could accommodate moral knowledge. This paper reconstructs and examines three approaches to solving the Hard Problem on behalf of the soft realist: the autonomy approach, the intuitionist approach, and the third-factor approach. I then argue that none of them is successful.


Author(s):  
M. Przystalski ◽  
T. Lenartowicz

Abstract Field trials conducted in multiple years across several locations play an essential role in plant breeding and variety testing. Usually, the analysis of the series of field trials is performed using a two-stage approach, where each combination of year and site is treated as environment. In variety testing based on the results from the analysis, the best varieties are recommended for cultivation. Under a Bayesian approach, the variety recommendation process can be treated as a formal decision theoretic problem. In the present study, we describe Bayesian counterparts of two stability measures and compare the varieties in terms of the posterior expected utility. Using the described methodology, we identify the most stable and highest tuber yielding varieties in the Polish potato series of field trials conducted from 2016 to 2018. It is shown that variety Arielle was the highest yielding, the third most stable variety and was the second best variety in terms of the posterior expected utility. In the present work, application of the Bayesian approach allowed us to incorporate the prior knowledge about the tested varieties and offered a possibility of treating the variety recommendation process as a formal decision process.


Author(s):  
Rand R. Wilcox

Inferential statistical methods stem from the distinction between a sample and a population. A sample refers to the data at hand. For example, 100 adults may be asked which of two olive oils they prefer. Imagine that 60 say brand A. But of interest is the proportion of all adults who would prefer brand A if they could be asked. To what extent does 60% reflect the true proportion of adults who prefer brand A? There are several components to inferential methods. They include assumptions about how to model the probabilities of all possible outcomes. Another is how to model outcomes of interest. Imagine, for example, that there is interest in understanding the overall satisfaction with a particular automobile given an individual’s age. One strategy is to assume that the typical response Y, given an individuals age, X, is given by Y=β0+β1X, where the slope, β1, and intercept, β0, are unknown constants, in which case a sample would be used to make inferences about their values. Assumptions are also made about how the data were obtained. Was this done in a manner for which random sampling can be assumed? There is even an issue related to the very notion of what is meant by probability. Let μ denote the population mean of Y. The frequentist approach views probabilities in terms of relative frequencies and μ is viewed as a fixed, unknown constant. In contrast, the Bayesian approach views μ as having some distribution that is specified by the investigator. For example, it may be assumed that μ has a normal distribution. The point is that the probabilities associated with μ are not based on the notion of relative frequencies and they are not based on the data at hand. Rather, the probabilities associated with μ stem from judgments made by the investigator. Inferential methods can be classified into three types: distribution free, parametric, and non-parametric. The meaning of the term “non-parametric” depends on the situation as will be explained. The choice between parametric and non-parametric methods can be crucial for reasons that will be outlined. To complicate matters, the number of inferential methods has grown tremendously during the last 50 years. Even for goals that may seem relatively simple, such as comparing two independent groups of individuals, there are numerous methods that may be used. Expert guidance can be crucial in terms of understanding what inferences are reasonable in a given situation.


2012 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-122
Author(s):  
Andrija Soc

In the first part of this paper I will outline the debate in philosophy of mind between those who, to borrow from Chalmers (Chalmers 1996) recognize the existence of the hard problem of consciousness and between those who do not. I will call the two groups non-reductivists and reductivists, respectively. The second part will put forward a specific type of criticism against reductivists - in short that its proponents incorrectly assume the resolution of another dispute, the one between the so-called pessimistic and optimistic inductivists. It will be claimed that such an assumption should not be made, and that until the latter debate is settled, or at least until a specific solution is offered within the context of the philosophy of mind, we have every right to be skeptical towards reductivist attempts. In the third part of the paper I will propose a possible solution which might offer some hope of finding the middle ground between the two sides.


Author(s):  
Marcello Massimini ◽  
Giulio Tononi

This chapter uses thought experiments and practical examples to introduce, in a very accessible way, the hard problem of consciousness. Soon, machines may behave like us to pass the Turing test and scientists may succeed in copying and simulating the inner workings of the brain. Will all this take us any closer to solving the mysteries of consciousness? The reader is taken to meet different kind of zombies, the philosophical, the digital, and the inner ones, to understand why many, scientists and philosophers alike, doubt that the mind–body problem will ever be solved.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-232
Author(s):  
Adnan Kastrati ◽  
Alexander Hapfelmeier

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