Locked In By Services

Contemporary Research in E-Marketing, Volume 2 ◽

10.4018/978-1-59140-824-6.ch013 ◽

2011 ◽

pp. 322-346

Author(s):

Manlio Del Giudice ◽

Michel Polski

Keyword(s):

Empirical Study ◽

Willingness To Pay ◽

Dynamic Model ◽

Web Site ◽

Switching Costs ◽

Switching Behavior ◽

Lock In

We discuss a dynamic model of cognitive and behavioral e-loyalty developed through the analysis of barriers (perceived switching costs) which can be raised against customer’s switching behavior. Using results from an empirical study, our chapter will be focused particularly on the determinants of the switching behavior online and on the opportunity to change Web site usability in a powerful lock-in strategy. Finally, as a result, we will discuss one of the main consequences of loyal behavior, in presence of positive perceived switching costs: the customer willingness to pay more.

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An empirical study of consumer acceptance of e-commerce Web site

Information Science and Management Engineering ◽

10.2495/isme130301 ◽

2013 ◽

Author(s):

Junjun Li

Keyword(s):

Empirical Study ◽

Web Site ◽

Consumer Acceptance

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An experimental study of Web switching behavior

Human Systems Management ◽

10.3233/hsm-2003-22204 ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 22 (2) ◽

pp. 87-93

Author(s):

James Otto ◽

Mohammad Najdawi ◽

William Wagner

Keyword(s):

Experimental Study ◽

Electronic Commerce ◽

Web Site ◽

Waiting Times ◽

Switching Behavior ◽

The Internet ◽

Wait Times ◽

Web Page ◽

Extensive Growth ◽

The Impact

With the extensive growth of the Internet and electronic commerce, the issue of how users behave when confronted with long download times is important. This paper investigates Web switching behavior. The paper describes experiments where users were subjected to artificially delayed Web page download times to study the impact of Web site wait times on switching behavior. Two hypotheses were tested. First, that longer wait times will result in increased switching behavior. The implication being that users become frustrated with long waiting times and choose to go elsewhere. Second, that users who switch will benefit, in terms of decreased download times, from their decision to switch.

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Tacit Collusion with Consumer Preference Costs

The B E Journal of Theoretical Economics ◽

10.1515/bejte-2020-0042 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 0 (0) ◽

Author(s):

Guillem Roig

Keyword(s):

Switching Costs ◽

Consumer Preference ◽

Hand Preference ◽

Dominant Strategy ◽

The Other ◽

Tacit Collusion ◽

Other Hand ◽

The One ◽

Opposing Effects ◽

Lock In

Abstract When consumers have preference costs, two opposing effects need to be assessed to analyse the incentives of firms to set collusive prices. On the one hand, preference costs make a deviation from collusion less attractive, as the deviating firm must offer a large enough discount to cover the preference costs. On the other hand, preference costs lock in consumers and make punishment from rivals less effective. When preference costs are low, the latter of the two effects dominates and collusion is more challenging to sustain than in a situation with no preference costs. With high enough preference costs, collusion is a (weakly) dominant strategy. These results do not eventuate in a model with switching costs.

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