Luciano Floridi’s Metaphysical Theory of Information Ethics

Author(s):  
Edward Spence

This paper falls into five main parts. Part one, offers a critical analysis and evaluation of Luciano Floridi’s metaphysical theory of information ethics (IE). Drawing on part one, part two provides a discussion of what I consider to be the main conceptual and practical difficulties facing Floridi’s IE theory. Although in agreement with the overall motivation and objective that informs Floridi’s IE position, namely, that “all entities, qua informational objects, have an intrinsic moral value…” and that “there seems to be no good reason not to adopt a higher and more inclusive, ontocentric [moral] perspective” (Floridi, 2007, 10), part three of the paper proposes an alternative New-Gewirthian approach to Information Ethics that avoids some if not all of the difficulties facing Floridi’s own position. Part four then examines the implications for Floridi’s metaphysical theory of information ethics and finally, offers a conclusion in part five.

2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Spence

This paper falls into five main parts. Part one, offers a critical analysis and evaluation of Luciano Floridi’s metaphysical theory of information ethics (IE). Drawing on part one, part two provides a discussion of what I consider to be the main conceptual and practical difficulties facing Floridi’s IE theory. Although in agreement with the overall motivation and objective that informs Floridi’s IE position, namely, that “all entities, qua informational objects, have an intrinsic moral value…” and that “there seems to be no good reason not to adopt a higher and more inclusive, ontocentric [moral] perspective” (Floridi, 2007, 10), part three of the paper proposes an alternative New-Gewirthian approach to Information Ethics that avoids some if not all of the difficulties facing Floridi’s own position. Part four then examines the implications for Floridi’s metaphysical theory of information ethics and finally, offers a conclusion in part five.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 492-512
Author(s):  
Simon P. Philbin

Carbon capture and utilization (CCU) is the process of capturing unwanted carbon dioxide (CO2) and utilizing for further use. CCU offers significant potential as part of a sustainable circular economy solution to help mitigate the impact of climate change resulting from the burning of hydrocarbons and alongside adoption of other renewable energy technologies. However, implementation of CCU technologies faces a number of challenges, including identifying optimal pathways, technology maturity, economic viability, environmental considerations as well as regulatory and public perception issues. Consequently, this research study provides a critical analysis and evaluation of the technology pathways for CCU in order to explore the potential from a circular economy perspective of this emerging area of clean technology. This includes a bibliographic study on CCU, evaluation of carbon utilization processes, trend estimation of CO2 usage as well as evaluation of methane and methanol production. A value chain analysis is provided to support the development of CCU technologies. The research study aims to inform policy-makers engaged in developing strategies to mitigate climate change through reduced carbon dioxide emission levels and improve our understanding of the circular economy considerations of CCU in regard to production of alternative products. The study will also be of use to researchers concerned with pursuing empirical investigations of this important area of sustainability.


2015 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-37
Author(s):  
Rik Peels

This article provides a critical analysis and evaluation of Gijsbert van den Brink and Kees van der Kooi’s Christian Dogmatics, a lucid and welcome presentation of the core ideas that can be found in the Christian faith. First, the book is characterized, both from a more general perspective and from a specifically theological point of view. Next, it is argued that there is a discrepancy between the way the authors characterize systematic theology and the way they practice systematic theology themselves. After that, their assessment of natural theology is criticized and several problems in the Christian Dogmatics are highlighted, such as the fact that the authors’ anthropology fails to take holistic dualism seriously. Finally, it is argued that in some places, the authors ask important questions, but then provide answers to different questions without addressing the original issues.


Author(s):  
Sabah S. Al-Fedaghi

Beginning with information ethics that is based on the machine-independent concept of information recognized to have an intrinsic moral value, personal information ethics (PIE) goes further by conferring moral value on personal information itself. PIE gives moral consideration to the well-being of any personal information based on the moral concern for the welfare of its proprietor.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Burk

The theories of information ethics articulated by Luciano Floridi and his collaborators have clear implications for law. Information law, including the law of privacy and of intellectual property, is especially likely to benefit from a coherent and comprehensive theory of information ethics. This article illustrates how information ethics might apply to legal doctrine, by examining legal questions related to the ownership and control of the personal data representations, including photographs, game avatars, and consumer profiles, that have become ubiquitous with the proliferation of information and communication technologies. Recent controversy over the control of player performance statistics in "fantasy" sports leagues provides a limiting case for the analysis. Such data representations will in many instances constitute the kind of personal data that information ethics asserts constitutes an information entity. Legal doctrine in some instances proves sympathetic to such an assertion, but remains largely inchoate as to which data might constitute a given information entity in a given instance. Neither is information ethics, in its current state of development, entirely helpful in answering this critical question. While information ethics holds some promise to bring coherence to this area of the law, further work articulating a richer theory of information ethics will be necessary before it can do so.


1985 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 20-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allan Gibbard

Is there anything morally special about free exchange? In asking this, I am asking not only about extreme, so-called “libertarian” views, on which free exchange is sacrosanct, but about more widespread, moderate views, on which there is at least something morally special about free exchange. On these more compromising views, other moral considerations may override the moral importance of free exchange, but even when rights of free exchange are restricted for good reason, something morally important is lost. For some, free exchange may preserve liberty, in some morally significant sense, or realize some such moral value as “to each his own.” Alternatively, a system of free exchange may have a special moral status by virtue of the kinds of pragmatic arguments that economists give, arguments that free exchange produces good social results. Whether free exchange has any such virtues as these is the broad question I address in this paper. I offer what I have to say somewhat in the spirit of an overview. Philosophical scrutiny and economic analysis combine, it seems to me, to delineate fairly clearly what is, and what is not, morally special about free exchange.


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