Pricing Decisions and Provider Choice on Extended Warranty Service in Supply Chain

Author(s):  
Rong Zhang ◽  
Mengjiao Li ◽  
Bin Liu

This article constructed a manufacturer-leading supply chain system considering the extended warranty service (EW) with a single manufacturer and a single retailer to study the influence of service cost on the choice of the EW provider. First, this article analyzed retail pricing, EW pricing, EW quality, the manufacturer's profit, the retail's profit and the total system profit in Model M and Model R. Then, the article analyzed the influence of service cost on the choice of the EW provider. Finally, it shows that if only part of consumers purchases the product with the EW, the manufacturer benefits from EW provided by the retailer. However, the retailer has to balance the ratio of the service cost coefficient. Furthermore, all consumers purchase the product with the EW, both the manufacturer and the retailer has to balance the ratio of service cost coefficient between manufacturer and retailer.

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Du Zhao ◽  
Xumei Zhang ◽  
Tinghai Ren ◽  
Hongyong Fu

This paper examines optimal pricing in a two-tier product and service supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer in the context of vertical competition in extended warranty in two cases: one considering the retailer’s fairness concerns and one without considering the retailer’s fairness concerns. A manufacturer-dominated product and service supply chain game-theoretic model on the Stackelberg model is developed to analyse how the level of vertical competition in extended warranty service and the intensity of a retailer’s fairness concerns influence the optimal pricing of products and extended warranties for the manufacturer and retailer. This study finds the following: (i) Two parties of the supply chain employ differential pricing strategies for extended warranties when the retailer has fairness concerns. (ii) Compared to the same pricing strategies for extended warranty service when the retailer has no fairness concerns, the increase of competition intensity of vertical extended warranty service will enlarge the price difference of extended warranty service. Meanwhile, it is the intensity of fairness concerns that determines the influences of retailer’s fairness concerns on the price difference of extended warranties. (iii) If no fairness concerns are raised, an increase in the level of vertical competition in extended warranty service would benefit both supply chain parties, rather than hurting their profit. If the retailer is fair-minded, its fairness utility increases when the intensity of the fairness concerns rises in a reasonable range and decreases when the intensity exceeds the reasonable range, but for the manufacturer, its profits will be damaged as long as the retailer raises fairness concerns.


Author(s):  
Di Wu ◽  
Juhong Chen ◽  
Ruyu Yan ◽  
Ruijun Zhang

The fierce competition in the recycling industry and the rapid development of internet technology has prompted recycling centers to develop a dual-channel reverse supply chain with both offline and online recycling channels. After the introduction of online channels, recycling centers and third-party recyclers (TPR) have paid attention to the division of profits in supply chain systems and the behavior of fairness concerns. Therefore, it is necessary to help recycling enterprises make pricing decisions in consideration of fairness concerns. This paper is aimed at answering the following two main questions: (1) When the recycling center or TPR have fairness concerns, how does the optimal pricing and revenue of supply chain members change when both sides are neutral? (2) When the fairness concern coefficient changes, how does the overall revenue of the supply chain system change? How should supply chain members adjust their pricing decisions to maximize their own profits? In order to solve the above problems, Stackelberg game models were made from three aspects: both sides are neutral, only the TPR has fairness concerns, and only the recycling center has fairness concerns. Based on the results of the example analyses for the model, we found that when only the TPR has fairness concerns, the profit of the recycling center and the transfer price of offline channels will decrease, while the profit of TPR is the opposite. Furthermore, when only a recycling center has fairness concerns, it will lead to the reduction of not only the recycling price and transfer price of offline channels, but also the profits of the entire supply chain system. Specially, whether it is for a recycling center or TPR, a lower level of fairness concern coefficient has a stronger impact on pricing and revenue than at high levels.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4738 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Lingfei Yu ◽  
Ji Zhang ◽  
Chenliang Li ◽  
Yizhao Zhao

The remanufacturing warranty strategy has become an effective mechanism for reducing consumer risk and stimulating market demand in closed-loop supply chain management. Based on the characteristics of consumers’ behavior of purchase decisions, this paper studies the warranty decision model of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain under the Stackelberg game model. The present study discussed and compared the decision variables, including remanufacturing product pricing, extended warranty service pricing, warranty period and supply chain system profit. The research shows that consumers’ decision-making significantly affirms the dual marginalization effect of the supply chain system while significantly affecting the supply chain warranty decision; the improved revenue sharing contract and the two charge contracts respectively coordinates the manufacturer-led and retail-oriented closed-loop supply chain system, which effectively implements the Pareto improvement of the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services. In the present study, the model is verified and analyzed by numerical simulation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 332
Author(s):  
Pablo Biswas ◽  
Bhaba Sarker

Purpose: A supply chain consists of raw material suppliers, manufacturers and retailers where inventory of raw materials and finished goods are involved, respectively. Therefore, it is important to find optimal solutions, which are beneficial for both supplier, manufacturer and retailer.Design/methodology/approach: This research focuses on a semi-continuous manufacturing facility by assuming that the production of succeeding cycle starts immediately after the production of preceding cycle. In reality, the inventory of a supply chain system may not be completely empty. A number of products may be left over after the deliveries are made. These leftover inventories are added to the next shipment after the production of required amount to makeup a complete batch for shipment. Therefore, it is extremely important to search for an optimal strategies for these types production facilities where leftover finished goods inventory remains after the final shipment in a production cycle. Considering these scenarios, an inventory model is developed for an imperfect matching condition where some finished goods remains after the shipments.Findings: Based on the previous observation, this research also considers a single facility that follows JIT delivery and produces multiple products to satisfy customers’ demand. For this problem a rotational cycle model is developed to optimize the facility operations. Both problems are categorized as mixed integer non-linear programming problems which are to be solved to find optimum number of orders, shipments and rotational cycle policy for multiple products. Also, this solution will lead to estimate the optimum production quantity and minimum total system cost.Research limitations: This research considers the supply chain based on manufacturers point of view and it does not consider the transportation cost associated with supply chain. Next study will be focused on issues with joint decision making, information sharing, and transportation decision.Practical implications: This study will help the managers of refinery and paper industries in making their operation smooth by applying optimizing techniques and robust decision making.Originality/value: Based on the literature, no research was found on continuous production system supply chain and its optimization with JIT delivery. This research will definitely provide a direction for such problem to the researchers.


Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (12) ◽  
pp. 1998
Author(s):  
Mohamed Seliaman ◽  
Leopoldo Cárdenas-Barrón ◽  
Sayeed Rushd

This paper extends and generalizes former inventory models that apply algebraic methods to derive optimal supply chain inventory decisions. In particular this paper considers the problem of coordinating production-inventory decisions in an integrated n-stage supply chain system with linear and fixed backorder costs. This supply chain system assumes information symmetry which implies that all partners share their operational information. First, a mathematical model for the supply chain system total cost is formulated under the integer multipliers coordination mechanism. Then, a recursive algebraic algorithm to derive the optimal inventory replenishment decisions is developed. The applicability of the proposed algorithm is demonstrated using two different numerical examples. Results from the numerical examples indicate that adopting the integer multiplier mechanism will reduce the overall total system cost as compared to using the common cycle time mechanism.


2012 ◽  
Vol 452-453 ◽  
pp. 663-668 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong Wei Jiang

With awareness of environmental protection strengthens and constraints of regulations and laws to environmental protection increasing, more and more enterprises focus on the closed-loop supply chain management. Considering difference between new product and remanufactured product, this paper constructs closed-loop supply chain system with manufacturers recycling used products directly from the consumers based on game theory. The optimal pricing decisions and the optimal profit of centralized and decentralized closed-loop supply chain are obtained. It is found that the efficiency of decentralized closed-loop supply chain decreases by 25%. At last, the coordination mechanism is designed to solve the profit conflict in the decentralized closed-loop supply chain by the two-part tariff contract.


2012 ◽  
Vol 220-223 ◽  
pp. 319-322
Author(s):  
Hong Wei Jiang

Based on game theory, this paper constructs closed-loop supply chain system with retailer recycling used products from the consumers incorporating difference between new product and remanufactured product. The optimal pricing decisions and the optimal profits of centralized coordinated and decentralized closed-loop supply chain are obtained. It is found that the efficiency of decentralized closed-loop supply chain decreases by 25%. Finally, the coordination mechanism is designed to solve the profit conflict in the decentralized closed-loop supply chain by the profit sharing contract.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (16) ◽  
pp. 8725
Author(s):  
Jian Wang ◽  
Wenxuan Shao

In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of one manufacturer and one supplier is considered. The capacity of the manufacturer is limited, the manufacturer can increase capacity by investing in capacity, and there are different cooperation contracts among the supply chain members. This paper pushes collecting activities upstream, assumes that the collecting activity can be completed by the supplier, and accepts that there is cooperation between the members, which increases supplier involvement. Dynamic game models among CLSC members are formulated. The optimal decisions of pricing, capacity investment, and collecting channels of the CLSC members are obtained, and the impacts of some important factors, for example, the capacity investment cost coefficient and the cost-sharing factors, on optimal decisions are investigated. The results reveal that the supplier collecting mode performs better in some scenarios; therefore, the management enlightenment desired by the supplier can be obtained. Additionally, the coordination between the manufacturer and the supplier sometimes fails to increase the closed-loop supply chain’s sustainability, which is a finding quite different from some current research results.


2018 ◽  
Vol 118 (1) ◽  
pp. 164-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiangang Pang ◽  
Kim Hua Tan

Purpose In today’s global competition, supply chain quality management is the key to a firms’ competitiveness. However, managers find that making sound quality and pricing decisions under a complex multi-echelon in the current competitive electronic commerce environment is daunting and challenging. The purpose of this paper is to examine the optimum quality strategies under different cooperative mechanisms and investigate its effects on channel members’ profits. Design/methodology/approach This paper is a result of a China-UK collaborative research effort, involving researchers with expertise in information systems, quality management, supply chain management, pricing, and game theory models. The authors consider the quality decisions of a single product in a supply chain system that consists of a supplier and two competing manufacturers. The authors examine the optimum quality strategies under different cooperative mechanisms and investigate its effects on channel members’ profits. A modified Nerlove-Arrow model is employed to investigate the quality levels on goodwill and product sales. Findings The results reveal that the traditional cooperative program is not very effective in the horizontal competitive market; and each channel member may have a profit improvement when the supplier integrates with a manufacturer. Originality/value The authors believe that this paper will contribute to the existing body of knowledge. Moreover, the paper provides insights for managers to better manage their supply chain quality management in an information-centric context.


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