Research on Dual-Channel Supply Chain Promotion Strategy

Author(s):  
Qi Duan ◽  
Chengcheng Li

The establishment of online direct sales channels influences the selection of pricing strategies and promotion information disclosure strategies of manufacturers and retailers. Considering the consideration of consumer preference, this paper studies the influence of different promotion information disclosure modes on the promotion effect and the income of supply chain members in the dual-channel supply chain with direct online channels. Based on hoteling model, the authors establish a model on market demand of the two channels and analyze the pricing and disclosure strategies of manufacturers and retailers under different concerns of consumers. It is found that there is a unique equilibrium threshold between the two disclosure modes. Only when the selling price after promotion is lower than the threshold are manufacturers or retailers willing to make information disclosure. It is also found that the disclosure intention and strategy of manufacturer or retailer will change with different customers' concerns and the relationship between the difference of two channels promotion and the threshold value.

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Ruchi Chauhan ◽  
Varun Kumar ◽  
Tapas Kumar Jana ◽  
Arunava Majumder

With the advancement of technology, many companies provide customization facilities to customers. This facility provides a vast variety to customers which enhances the level of customer satisfaction. This approach helps various technologically advanced companies to increase their profit. In this paper, a dual-channel supply chain model is developed with the aforementioned customization strategy with the target of increasing the profit of the firm. In dual-channel, the core or standard product is provided to the customer through a traditional retail channel, whereas the customized product is made available through the online channel. This article incorporates a modification in the existing dual-channel policy on the number of customers that switch between the offline and online channels. Moreover, a preassigned threshold value is also assumed which signifies the decrease in demand that takes place if the difference between the selling price of offline and online channels crosses a fixed specified threshold value. In addition to that, due to fluctuation and uncertainty of demand, both variability and randomness may occur simultaneously. Thus, the price-sensitive stochastic demand is considered to develop the dual-channel centralized supply chain model with customization. A max-min distribution-free approach is applied to deal with the randomness and variability of demand. The model is analyzed and validated with numerical experiments and graphical analysis. Consequently, the article concluded that it is better to adopt a dual-channel supply chain policy for better profitability than the traditional single-channel supply chain as this firm will be able to provide customized products to customers. Moreover, if the difference between the selling prices of the offline and online channels is greater than the preassigned threshold value, then the shifting of customers takes place depending upon the factor that which channel’s selling is less in comparison to another.


2014 ◽  
Vol 933 ◽  
pp. 902-906 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shu Juan Li ◽  
Ai Jun Liu

A two-level dual-channel supply chain model was established in which retailer had his own direct channel. Game model was constructed based on two cases of decentralized and centralized decision-making. Pricing strategies of manufacturer and retailer were studied. Impacts of different channel and different sale entities on manufacturer and retailer were examined. Results show that when channel substitution increases and market share of retailer direct channel is small, retailer should choose to give up direct channel and focus on retail channel sales and take direct channel as means of propaganda and brand promotion. When the difference of sale entities reduces, consumers can get more surplus.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 453-466
Author(s):  
Y.S. Hu ◽  
L.H. Zeng ◽  
Z.L. Huang ◽  
Q. Cheng

Facing competition from manufacturers' online direct channels, how retailers make sales channel decisions to increase consumer stickiness has become the core concern of the industry and academia. Empirical research showed that delivery lead time is a key factor that affects consumers' preference for online channels. To analyze the impact of consumer delivery time preference on channel selection and pricing strategy of retailers, consumer delivery lead time preference function was improved from a linear function to an exponential function and consumer demand under the mixed dual-channel supply chain of manufacturer and retailer was derived. Then, the Stackelberg game models under different channel strategies of retailer were established and solved. Results show that consumer preference for delivery lead time has four implications on the channel decision of retailers under manufacturer encroachment in the dual-channel supply chain. First, the dual retail channels strategy is the optimal choice for retailers, and the profit margins that a retailer obtains from dual retail channels supply chain and single online retail channel supply chain will increase as consumers' delivery lead time preference coefficient increases. Second, the optimal pricing of online retail channel and offline retail channel is positively related to consumers' delivery lead time preference coefficient. By contrast, the optimal pricing of online direct channel is negatively related to consumers' delivery lead time preference coefficient. Third, the optimal pricing of online retail channel is higher than that of offline retail and online direct channels. Fourth, a retailer and a manufacturer can adopt a compensation-based whole price contract to address the conflict brought about by the optimal channel choice of the retailer. This study introduces consumer delivery lead time preference into retailer channel decision making and provides a theoretical reference for retailer's mixed channel construction in practice.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (s2) ◽  
pp. 107-116
Author(s):  
Qing Fang ◽  
Zeping Tong ◽  
Liang Ren ◽  
Ao Liu

Abstract Price decision is studied in a risk-averse retailer-dominated dual-channel supply chain, which consisting of one manufacturers and one retailer with both off-line and on-line channels. Firstly, two mean-variance models in centralized and decentralized supply chain are established. Secondly, the optimal solutions under the two decision modes are compared and analyzed. The results shows that the price of dual-channel of retailer decreased with the increase of retailers’ risk- aversion coefficient and the standard deviation of the fluctuation of market demand, while the wholesale price changes is on the contrary; in addition, when the market demand is greater than a certain value, the prices of dual channel are correspondingly higher in decentralized supply chain than in centralized supply chain, and vice versa. In addition, when the retailer’s risk aversion is in a certain interval, the expected utility of the whole supply chain is greater in centralized supply chain than in decentralized decision, and vice versa. Finally, a numerical example is given to verify the above conclusions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nai-Ru Xu ◽  
Jie Cheng ◽  
Zheng-Qun Cai

When manufacturers construct a dual-channel distribution system, which includes online and offline sales channels, they need to solve the inventory management problem to ensure supply and reduce inventory costs of the supply chain system. The dual-channel supply chain is the research object, and the inventory decision model is designed to achieve optimal profit when market demand is divided into online and offline demands. The results of the numerical analysis and simulations, conducted using MATLAB, indicate that both the manufacturer and the retailer increase their inventories and that their profits decrease when demand uncertainty increases. Besides, the increase in the online demand ratio causes the increase in the manufacturer’s inventory and reduces the profits of the retailer and the entire supply chain.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (6) ◽  
pp. 189-195
Author(s):  
N. Arunfred ◽  
D. Kinslin

We study a dual channel supply chain in perishable agricultural products. In which one channel is producer (farmer) sells the produce directly to the customer and the other channel is about transfer of produce to different channel players and reach the final customer. Consumers choose the purchase channel based on price, availability, accessibility, product quality, trust-ability and service qualities. The producer decides the price of the direct channel and the intermediaries decides both price and order quantity in the traditional method. We show that the difference in problem faced by the producers’ of the two channels plays an important role in determining the existence of dual channels in equilibrium. For the study Erode and Kanyakumari districts were chosen purposively. A sample of 80 farmers was selected randomly who are involved in both of the channels. In the case that the producer and the retailer coordination and to follow a centralized decision approach, we find that a direct channel will be an optimum solution for improving the overall effectiveness. Our results show that an increase in retailer’s service quality may increase the producer’s profit in dual channel and a larger range of consumer service sensitivity may benefit both parties in the dual channel. The results suggest that both the channel have problem and the optimum solution lies in between two channels.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xueping Zhen ◽  
Dan Shi ◽  
Sang-Bing Tsai ◽  
Wei Wang

With the rapid development of the Internet, many traditional retailers have built their online channels. The fairness concern may play an important role in a dual-channel supply chain with a multichannel retailer. This paper establishes a Stackelberg game model in which a manufacturer produces and sells products through direct online channel and a retailer sells directly to consumers through online and offline channels. The manufacturer’s fairness concern (advantageous inequity) and the retailer’s fairness concern (disadvantageous inequity) are considered. Four scenarios are investigated: no fairness concern (NF), the retailer fairness concern (RF), the manufacturer fairness concern (MF), and both the manufacturer and the retailer fairness concern (MRF). The theoretical analysis shows that if the manufacturer’s advantageous inequity concern is low, the profit of the whole supply chain in the MRF scenario is the greatest. Otherwise, the supply chain profit in the NF or RF scenario is the greatest. That is, the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s fairness concern may increase the profit of the supply chain. This study also finds that the manufacturer’s advantageous inequity concern can increase the social welfare. The retailer should not concern about fairness if the manufacturer has high fairness concern. Besides, this paper shows that the manufacturer’s selling price cannot be affected by the fairness concern. Adjusting the wholesale price is the only thing that the manufacturer can do to reduce disadvantageous or advantageous inequity. In the RF scenario, the role of the retailer’s disadvantageous inequity concern is to reallocate the supply chain profit. Our findings provide some managerial insights on the pricing decision when the multichannel retailer and the manufacturer consider the fairness.


2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 1041-1056 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiumei Chen ◽  
Wen Zhang ◽  
Zhiying Liu

With the rapid development of the Internet, many manufacturers nowadays are increasingly adopting a dual-channel to sell their products, i.e., the traditional retail channel and online direct channel. In this paper, we focus on retail service, manufacturer’s direct service and quality effort, and present an analytical framework to examine the optimal decisions in dual-channel supply chain between the manufacturer and the retailer. Considering the efficacy of different supply chain structures, centralized and decentralized models are established. By using the backwards induction and the two-stage optimization technique in Stackelberg game, the corresponding analytical equilibrium solutions are obtained. Our analysis shows that the degree of customer loyalty to the direct channel strongly influences the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s services and quality strategies in the decentralized dual-channel supply chain, but not in the centralized model. Our results also point out that compared to centralized model, for any given selling price, the ratio of profit margins of selling one unit in the direct and retail channels determines the retailer’s service strategy; and the manufacturer will raise the level of direct channel service, but put less effort on quality improvement in the decentralized model. Finally, numerical examples present the contrasting view that disparate interests within a dual-channel supply chain can actually realize improving outcomes.


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