Research on Brain Drain of Energy Environmental Protection Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game Model

2014 ◽  
Vol 602-605 ◽  
pp. 3620-3625
Author(s):  
Rui Zhang ◽  
Shi Long Dong

Due to the special nature of energy environmental protection industry, staff loss is very common in energy environmental protection enterprises, especially in the middle-high level class. Through building evolutionary game model based on the problem of employee turnover between employees and enterprises, we find out that the reason of the flow of talents in energy environmental protection enterprises is that the payment and promotion prospects after resign is better than before. In order to prevent the excessive flow of the talents, energy environmental protection enterprises should moderately improve the remuneration of its staffs, develop employees' promotion space and improve the breach penalty of those initiative employees.

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yunpeng Yang ◽  
Weixin Yang

During China’s air pollution campaign, whistleblowing has become an important way for the central government to discover local environmental issues. The three parties involved in whistleblowing are: the central government environmental protection departments, the local government officials, and the whistleblowers. Based on these players, this paper has constructed an Evolutionary Game Model under incomplete information and introduced the expected return as well as replicator dynamics equations of various game agents based on analysis of the game agents, assumptions, and payoff functions of the model in order to study the strategic dynamic trend and stability of the evolutionary game model. Furthermore, this paper has conducted simulation experiments on the evolution of game agents’ behaviors by combining the constraints and replicator dynamics equations. The conclusions are: the central environmental protection departments are able to effectively improve the environmental awareness of local government officials by measures such as strengthening punishment on local governments that do not pay attention to pollution issues and lowering the cost of whistleblowing, thus nurturing a good governance and virtuous circle among the central environmental protection departments, local government officials, and whistleblowers. Based on the study above, this paper has provided policy recommendations in the conclusion.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yudan Dou ◽  
Xiliang Sun ◽  
Ankang Ji ◽  
Yuna Wang ◽  
Xiaolong Xue

PurposeOwing to multiple superiorities to traditional counterparts, prefabricated construction (PC) has gained increasing attention worldwide. The development of PC projects reflects the effects of both policy supervision and PC practice, which aids the government in reasonably identifying the key issues of PC's promotion and rationally improving the policy deployment. However, existing studies fail to address this aspect, especially lacking quantitative exploration. This study explores the micro mechanism of PC's promotion, from the perspective of developing PC projects.Design/methodology/approachA tripartite evolutionary game model based on prospect theory of the government, developers and contractors is constructed. After rigorous theoretical deduction, this study adopts Changchun in China as a case city and collects the data using the Delphi technique, policy documents and literature analysis.FindingsResults indicate that contractors are generally willing to implement PC projects and the government chooses to actively supervise PC's promotion. The negative investment behavior of developers is the main obstacle to promote PC in Changchun currently.Practical implicationsThe conclusions are applicable to other comparable regions. This study is of value to promote PC with high efficiency and effect.Originality/valueThe tripartite evolutionary game model based on prospect theory proposed in this study is conducive to reveal the essence of PC's promotion. This is an important breakthrough in extant studies, with a broad applicability in the PC domain beyond China.


Author(s):  
Travis Eiles ◽  
Patrick Pardy

Abstract This paper demonstrates a breakthrough method of visible laser probing (VLP), including an optimized 577 nm laser microscope, visible-sensitive detector, and an ultimate-resolution gallium phosphide-based solid immersion lens on the 10 nm node, showing a 110 nm resolution. This is 2x better than what is achieved with the standard suite of probing systems using typical infrared (IR) wavelengths today. Since VLP provides a spot diameter reduction of 0.5x over IR methods, it is reasonable, based simply on geometry, to project that VLP using the 577 nm laser will meet the industry needs for laser probing for both the 10 nm and 7 nm process nodes. Based on its high level of optimization, including high resolution and specialized solid immersion lens, it is highly likely that this VLP technology will be one of the last optically-based fault isolation methods successfully used.


2013 ◽  
Vol 33 (9) ◽  
pp. 2525-2528
Author(s):  
Rui WANG ◽  
Qiuxiang YANG ◽  
Gouxi CHEN ◽  
Qiaomei MA

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Zhu Bai ◽  
Mingxia Huang ◽  
Shuai Bian ◽  
Huandong Wu

The emergence of online car-hailing service provides an innovative approach to vehicle booking but has negatively influenced the taxi industry in China. This paper modeled taxi service mode choice based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The modes included the dispatching and online car-hailing modes. We constructed an EGT framework, including determining the strategies and the payoff matrix. We introduced different behaviors, including taxi company management, driver operation, and passenger choice. This allowed us to model the impact of these behaviors on the evolving process of service mode choice. The results show that adjustments in taxi company, driver, and passenger behaviors impact the evolutionary path and convergence speed of our evolutionary game model. However, it also reveals that, regardless of adjustments, the stable states in the game model remain unchanged. The conclusion provides a basis for studying taxi system operation and management.


Author(s):  
Yunpeng Xiao ◽  
Wen Li ◽  
Shuai Qiang ◽  
Qian Li ◽  
Hanchun Xiao ◽  
...  

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