A Multi-Retailer Decentralized Supply Chain Coordination Based on Revenue-Sharing Contracts

2014 ◽  
Vol 668-669 ◽  
pp. 1587-1590
Author(s):  
Jin Yu Ren ◽  
Yong Xian Liu ◽  
Peng Fei Zeng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Optimal Solutions ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Numerical Example ◽  
Coordination Model ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain

To a decentralized supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and multiple independent retailers, the game models about the decentralized solution and centralized solution are developed. Comparison of the optimal solutions to two models reveals that the supply chain needs coordination. Then a coordination model on the revenue-sharing contracts is introduced. Finally, a numerical example shows that the perfect supply chain coordination and the flexible allocation of the profit can be achieved when a complementary profit-sharing agreement is included.

Supply Chain Coordination Based on Revenue-Sharing Contracts under Random Demand

2011 ◽  
Vol 121-126 ◽  
pp. 4801-4805
Author(s):  
Rong Shuang Ma ◽  
Jin Yu Ren ◽  
Yong Ping Hao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Decision Situation ◽  
Random Demand ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Expected Performance ◽  
Total Profit

To a two-echelon supply chain system consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer under random demand, the game models about decentralized decision and centralized decision are constructed in which the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower. The retailer’s optimal purchasing strategies about two conditions above are given and the supply chain expected total profits under unique purchasing strategies of the retailer are compared with. Then the relations of supply chain expected total profit between with applying the revenue-sharing contracts situation and with the centralized decision situation are discussed. And the conditions to realize the supply chain perfect coordinating are defined. Finally, numerical analysis shows that applying the revenue-sharing contract in the decentralized supply chain could not only achieve the maximal overall expected performance but also allow both parties to benefit from it.

scholarly journals Integrated Supply Chain Contract Model With Drop-Shipper Players

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 58
Author(s):  
Faisal Ibrahim
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Actual System ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Supply Chain Contract ◽  
Total Cost ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Coordination Model ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Integrated Supply Chain

In this paper, we developed model integrated supply chain model with drop-shipper players.  The aim of the study is to integrate players in the supply chain system that one of its players is a drop shipper. This coordination model considers the policy of late payment and prosecution for delivery of goods. Previous, The author has described the supply chain system in detail. The experiments were conducted into different case scenarios, where each scenario would represent the actual system that occurred. Then also conducted sensitivity analysis on some predicted variables significantly influence the total cost of the supply chain. From the results obtained, it can be concluded that coordination with consideration of delay in payment and penalty contract for drop ship has successfully integrated the players in the supply chain system under study. This can be proved by the lower total cost of the supply chain when it is integrated with that consideration.

scholarly journals Coordinating Contracts for Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Price and Promotional Sensitive Demand

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 132
Author(s):  
Hooman Abdollahi ◽  
Mohammad Talooni
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Promotional Effort ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
The Cost

<p class="zhengwen"><span lang="EN-GB">In this paper three coordinating contracts in supply chain namely (i) revenue-sharing contract (ii) cost-sharing contract (iii) profit-sharing contract are proposed for two echelon supply chain coordination perspective under promotion and price sensitive demand. In our model buyer makes the promotional decision and undertakes the promotional sales effort cost. It is shown that in decentralized channel the results are sub-optimal. It is found analytically that the revenue-sharing contract coordinates pricing decision but not promotional decision for all values of the promotional effort cost. It is also found that the cost-sharing contract fails to coordinate channel. The profit-sharing contract is demonstrated to coordinate both the pricing and the promotional decisions in the channel.</span></p>

scholarly journals Integrated Supply Chain Contract Model With Drop-Shipper Players

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 58
Author(s):  
Faisal Ibrahim
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Actual System ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Supply Chain Contract ◽  
Total Cost ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Coordination Model ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Integrated Supply Chain

In this paper, we developed model integrated supply chain model with drop-shipper players.  The aim of the study is to integrate players in the supply chain system that one of its players is a drop shipper. This coordination model considers the policy of late payment and prosecution for delivery of goods. Previous, The author has described the supply chain system in detail. The experiments were conducted into different case scenarios, where each scenario would represent the actual system that occurred. Then also conducted sensitivity analysis on some predicted variables significantly influence the total cost of the supply chain. From the results obtained, it can be concluded that coordination with consideration of delay in payment and penalty contract for drop ship has successfully integrated the players in the supply chain system under study. This can be proved by the lower total cost of the supply chain when it is integrated with that consideration.

scholarly journals Demand Allocation and Profit Sharing to Improve Salt Farmer’s Revenue: A Cooperative Game Approach

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iffan Maflahah ◽  
Budi Santoso Wirjodirdjo ◽  
Putu Dana Karningsih
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Savings And Loans ◽  
Chain System

Abstract The main problem of the salt supply chain system is the oligopoly market structure dominated by middlemen which reduces the bargaining power of farmers. It has, however, been discovered that vertical collaboration (farmers to cooperatives) and horizontal collaboration (farmers to farmers) models have the ability to increase farmers' revenue. Therefore, this research was conducted to determine the effect of both horizontal and vertical collaboration models on the salt supply chain system with the expectation to increase farmers' revenue. This involved the application of the cooperative game theory with Shapley's value used as the basis for decision making. The result showed that the collaboration of stakeholders in the salt supply chain system has the ability to increase farmers' revenue, especially when they sell a maximum of 20% of their products through cooperatives and the rest through middlemen. This means the existence of farmers as cooperative members has a positive impact as observed in the revenue increment. Therefore, it is recommended that cooperatives improve their functions and roles as providers of savings and loans and market seekers, determine the appropriate prices for salt, and improve the quality of the products produced by their members. Moreover, a collaboration between farmers is mutually beneficial and this means efforts should be made to ensure cooperation, especially for small farmers.

scholarly journals Government Subsidies and Revenue Sharing Decisions for Port and Shipping Service Supply Chain in Emission Control Areas

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Bing Han ◽  
Xia Pan ◽  
Yu Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Emission Control ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
System Optimization ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Service Supply Chain ◽  
The Government

As the core of the port and shipping service supply chain system, the port and shipping companies must urgently solve the problem of how to balance emissions, costs, and benefits with the gradual extension of China’s emission control area (ECA) and the stringent emission requirements. From the perspective of system optimization, this research constructs a revenue sharing model of the port and shipping service supply chain and deals with the revenue sharing decision-making problem of the secondary service supply chain after port enterprises and shipping enterprises joining the government subsidy mechanism driven by ECA’s policy. Research shows that the government subsidy mechanism directly affects the profit of the port and shipping service supply chain, which is the key factor in implementing the ECA’s policy and promoting the emission reduction of the port and shipping enterprises. The revenue sharing of the port and shipping enterprises plays a decisive role in the revenue of the shipping enterprises. Cooperative emission reduction mechanism should be led by port enterprises to promote the balance between revenue and emission reduction in the supply chain system. Results provide a reference for the Chinese government to formulate corresponding incentives and subsidy policy under the new ECA’s regulations as well as solving the problems of how to balance emissions reduction and cost improvement for port and shipping enterprises.

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