scholarly journals Government Subsidies and Revenue Sharing Decisions for Port and Shipping Service Supply Chain in Emission Control Areas

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Bing Han ◽  
Xia Pan ◽  
Yu Zhou

As the core of the port and shipping service supply chain system, the port and shipping companies must urgently solve the problem of how to balance emissions, costs, and benefits with the gradual extension of China’s emission control area (ECA) and the stringent emission requirements. From the perspective of system optimization, this research constructs a revenue sharing model of the port and shipping service supply chain and deals with the revenue sharing decision-making problem of the secondary service supply chain after port enterprises and shipping enterprises joining the government subsidy mechanism driven by ECA’s policy. Research shows that the government subsidy mechanism directly affects the profit of the port and shipping service supply chain, which is the key factor in implementing the ECA’s policy and promoting the emission reduction of the port and shipping enterprises. The revenue sharing of the port and shipping enterprises plays a decisive role in the revenue of the shipping enterprises. Cooperative emission reduction mechanism should be led by port enterprises to promote the balance between revenue and emission reduction in the supply chain system. Results provide a reference for the Chinese government to formulate corresponding incentives and subsidy policy under the new ECA’s regulations as well as solving the problems of how to balance emissions reduction and cost improvement for port and shipping enterprises.

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (19) ◽  
pp. 8150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaifu Yuan ◽  
Guangqiang Wu ◽  
Hui Dong ◽  
Bo He ◽  
Dafei Wang

In order to make optimal decisions for pricing and emission reduction, a remanufacturing supply chain system with dual-sale channels is investigated. With regard to the preferences of consumers for different channels and carbon cap-and-trade mechanisms, profit-maximization models are developed on supply chain members and systems in decentralized and centralized cases. Based on a backward induction, the corresponding formulae for decision variables are obtained. Then the effect of the industry emission control coefficient is analyzed and the optimal decisions of two cases are compared. Finally, the coordination mechanism and numerical analysis are presented. The result indicates that: (1) As the free carbon allowances granted by the government to the manufacturer increases, the investment in carbon reduction from the manufacturer will increase. As the industry emission control coefficient increases, the carbon emissions per product and the prices of new and remanufactured products will decrease, while the demands of the new and remanufactured products and the profits of supply chain members and systems will increase. (2) As the direct sale channel preference coefficient increases, the profits of the manufacturer and the system will increase while the retailer’s profit will decrease. Correspondingly, the carbon emissions of unit product will decrease, and the sales of the direct sale channel will increase while the sales of the retail channel will decrease. (3) The decision in the coordinated case not only ensures emission reduction and system profit to reach the level of the centralized case, but also raises the profits of supply chain members in the decentralized case. Therefore, it is preferable to other decisions. (4) As the carbon trading price increases, the emission reduction investment from the manufacturer will increase while the profits of the supply chain and its members will increase.


2014 ◽  
Vol 668-669 ◽  
pp. 1587-1590
Author(s):  
Jin Yu Ren ◽  
Yong Xian Liu ◽  
Peng Fei Zeng

To a decentralized supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and multiple independent retailers, the game models about the decentralized solution and centralized solution are developed. Comparison of the optimal solutions to two models reveals that the supply chain needs coordination. Then a coordination model on the revenue-sharing contracts is introduced. Finally, a numerical example shows that the perfect supply chain coordination and the flexible allocation of the profit can be achieved when a complementary profit-sharing agreement is included.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Nai-Ru Xu ◽  
Zheng-Qun Cai

Considering the coexistence of cold chain agro-products and ordinary agro-products in the market, the research object is the cold chain logistics subsidy. It is designed that a supply chain system consisting of duopoly upstream agro-products suppliers and a downstream agro-products retailer for research. The mechanism of cold chain logistics subsidy is studied by analyzing the influence of cold chain subsidy on pricing behavior and cold chain decision-making of cold chain agro-products and ordinary agro-products. Based on the decentralized decision-making model without government subsidy, a differential pricing model for cold chain agro-products and ordinary agro-products with government subsidy is established in order to reduce the cost of cold chain agro-products. The optimal pricing strategy of two agro-products suppliers and their downstream retailer can be obtained by solving this problem. The research finds that differential pricing caused by government subsidy can achieve profit Pareto improvement of suppliers, retailer, and supply chain system of cold chain agro-products, but cannot achieve the optimal profit of the whole supply chain. Therefore, in view of the loss of supply chain efficiency caused by decentralized decision-making, the Shapley value method is used to make coordination, and the contract coordination mechanism is designed. Finally, the sensitivity of parameters is analyzed by a numerical example.


Author(s):  
Xiaojing Liu ◽  
Wenyi Du ◽  
Yijie Sun

In the market, once consumers have a low-carbon preference, they will choose green low-carbon products. The market demand for green products is not only related to product price, but also consumers’ low-carbon preference. In this way, enterprise has to consider the cost of carbon emissions in the process of production and operation. In this paper, we consider a two-level supply chain system composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The supply chain system can determine the price of products and the level of carbon emission reduction through different supply chain contracts: wholesale price contract and revenue sharing contract. However, the power control structure of a manufacturer and a retailer is different, which will further affect the decision-making strategy of the supply chain system. We set up four models (Wholesale Price—NM and NR, and Revenue-Sharing—SR and SM) of the supply chain with carbon emission reduction, and calculated and analyzed. The results show that firstly, regardless of whether the manufacturer’s power control structure or the retailer power structure is dominant, the manufacturer wholesale price with a contract on revenue-sharing is always higher than on wholesale price, and it is inversely proportional to the revenue-sharing proportion. Secondly, under the two power control structures, the carbon emission level of the manufacturer with a contract on revenue-sharing is always lower than on wholesale price, and it gradually decreases with the increase of the revenue-sharing proportion of the manufacturers. Thirdly, when the retailer dominates the supply chain, the retailer selling price with a contract on revenue-sharing is always higher than on wholesale price. Under the manufacturer’s power control structure, when the revenue-sharing ratio is small, the retailer selling price with a contract on revenue-sharing is higher than on wholesale price; when the revenue-sharing ratio is large, the retailer selling price with a contract on revenue-sharing is lower than on wholesale price. Finally, the validity of the model is verified by an example, and the sensitivity of the parameters is analyzed.


2021 ◽  
Vol 275 ◽  
pp. 01016
Author(s):  
Qi Hui Lu ◽  
Tingting Xu

The problem of difficult and expensive financing of credit funds restricts the development of agriculture in our country. The government adopts different measures to support and guide the sustainable development of agriculture, there are typical loan interest subsidy mechanism. Under the background of agricultural output is uncertain, a supply chain system composed of farmer, company, bank and the government has been established, it discusses the government subsidy for agricultural supply chain operation and the influence of the members of the decision-making, explores the differences between two kinds of mechanism and provides suggestions for the decision of the supply chain members. Studies have shown that in the context of government subsidy, when the random output factor is higher and the loan interest rate is lower, the higher the loan interest subsidy rate, the higher the profit and social welfare of farmer, company, and bank. When the bank interest rate is higher than a certain value, the government subsidy can increase the profits of farmer and bank. Finally, numerical simulation found that in the context of government subsidy, government subsidy reduces the financing cost of farmer, but the real beneficiary is bank.


2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 7170-7178
Author(s):  
A Srinivasa Reddy ◽  
P CHAKRADHAR ◽  
PAVAN KUMAR P ◽  
Teja Santosh

Vegetable quantity arrival to market varies every day with which its prices also changes rapidly. This paper analyses the factors that affect the rapid change in prices of vegetables such as demand forecasting, demand supply management, erroneous statistics of vegetables, storage facilities, and supply chain system, etc. Government of India has no control over the production of horticultural and agricultural crops, sometimes under produced and sometimes over produced, which makes demand supply management hard-won. This paper mainly focuses on advantages of demand forecasting and demand supply management of vegetable crops and their effects on farmers and consumers. The Government should find a novel method or a system which gets crop data from farmer, does demand forecasting on day to day basis, control crop acreages, generate accurate statistics and do demand supply management of crops.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 1740
Author(s):  
Cheng Che ◽  
Xiaoguang Zhang ◽  
Yi Chen ◽  
Liangyan Zhao ◽  
Zhihong Zhang

By establishing a two-level symbiotic supply chain system consisting of one supplier and one manufacturer, we use Stackelberg method to analyze the optimal price and revenue model of supplier and manufacturer in the symbiotic supply chain under two power structures in which the supplier and manufacturer are dominant respectively, and analyze the influence of the degree of symbiosis and power structure on the model. Through comparative analysis, we find that: There is a relationship between the income level and the degree of symbiosis in the symbiotic supply chain. The change of power structure will affect the relative benefits of suppliers and manufacturers in the symbiotic supply chain. The manufacturer’s expected unit product revenue will affect the supply chain revenue when the manufacturer is dominant. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of relevant parameters is carried out through an example analysis, and the validity of the conclusion is verified. This paper has a guiding significance for the behavior of enterprises in the cogeneration supply chain.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document