Research on Incentive Equilibrium Mechanism of Agent-Construction Relationship Based on Multitask Principal-Agent Model
2011 ◽
Vol 250-253
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pp. 2440-2445
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Most of the Chinese scholars have simplified the relationship between the client and the agent-construction enterprise as a single-task principal-agent problem, which has ignored the important fact of multitasks, such as progress, quality and cost. In this paper, a multi-task principal-agent model with three tasks, i.e. progress, quality and cost, is constructed to analyze the optimal incentive contractual conditions and multi-task incentive equilibrium mechanism of the agent-construction enterprise, which can provide theoretical basis for the regulatory policy of government investment project.
2012 ◽
Vol 106
(3)
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pp. 622-643
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2012 ◽
Vol 4
(3)
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pp. 34-56
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1993 ◽
Vol 44
(2)
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pp. 193-198
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2021 ◽
pp. 101489
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