Motivation Crowding in Peer Effects: The Effect of Solar Subsidies on Green Power Purchases

I test whether economic incentives impact peer effects in public-good settings. I study how a visible and subsidized contribution to a public good (installing solar panels) affects peer contributions to the same good that are neither subsidized nor visible (electing green power). Exploiting spatial variation in the feasibility of installing solar panels, I find that on average panels increase voluntary purchases of green power by neighbors. However, when subsidies to solar are high, solar panels reduce peer contributions. The results support the hypothesis that signals drive peer responses to visible public-good contributions and that economic incentives alter those signals.

Disentangling the effect of perceived performance management system accuracy on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation

Purpose This study aims to explore the effects of performance management systems’ (PMS) perceived accuracy on employees’ motivation. More specifically, this study draws on motivation crowding theory and self-determination theory to hypothesize the relationships between perceived PMS accuracy and intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and introduce two contextual moderating factors: participation in decision-making and task uncertainty. Design/methodology/approach Data were collected through a questionnaire distributed to a sample of local government employees. Data were collected longitudinally over two measurement waves (T1 and T2), each separated by a four-month lag. Findings The results revealed that perceived PMS accuracy is positively associated with both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and participation in decision-making and task uncertainty both positively moderate the relationship between perceived PMS accuracy and extrinsic motivation. Originality/value This study contributes to clarifying the relevance of perceived PMS accuracy and the role played by significant contextual variables and offers recommendations to help design and implement PMS more effectively.

Sustainability of renewable energy investment motivations during a feed-in-tariff scheme transition: evidence from a laboratory experiment

This study analyzes the effects of a feed-in-tariff (FIT) scheme’s transition on renewable energy investments. We model an individual’s investment decisions as a public goods game where the FIT scheme’s purchasing price acts as a subsidy that lowers the individual’s investment cost. Using a laboratory experiment, we study the effects of a decreasing purchasing price by comparing it to a counterfactual situation where the FIT scheme is not introduced. Although a high purchasing price induces higher investments, this external incentive seems to crowd out an individual’s intrinsic motivation: when the purchasing price decreases to zero, an individual’s investments are lower than they are in the counterfactual situation. Considering the possibility that motivation crowding out has occurred during the FIT phase-out process, it is important to introduce a new policy instrument without a break to stimulate renewable energy investments.

"REVISITING CROWDING-OUT EFFECT OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT: ITS IMPACT ON EXTRINSIC AND INTRINSIC MOTIVATION"

Scholars have believed that motivation crowding out will occur when performance-based personnel management is practiced in the public sector. However, drawing on a more sophisticated typology of human motivation, this study demonstrates that the provision of extrinsic rewards can motivate, rather than demotivate, public employees even if public employees have strong public service motivation. Analyzing the data from the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (USA), this study found that the practice of employee performance management increases work effort and job satisfaction, and that such effects were mediated mainly by the hybrid motivational mechanisms (i.e., via enhanced self-concepts and perceived fairness), rather than by increasing sheer extrinsic motivation. This implies that the practice of employee performance management can be effective in motivating public employees.

Breaking the Vicious Circle of Escalating Control: Connecting Politicians and Public Employees through Stewardship

Politicians applying general rules as a reaction to local failures has contributed to mushrooming control in the public sector, which has in turn spurred higher transactional costs and motivation crowding among public employees. Drawing on a qualitative case study in a Danish municipality, this article explores the prospects and challenges for politicians of breaking the vicious circle of escalating control by adopting stewardship ideals into their leadership of the public employees. The results show that stewardship offers new opportunities for politicians, enabling better diagnosis of control problems, more robust control solutions, as well as a pronounced mobilization of employee support for those solutions. However, political competition, political discontinuity after elections, scandals in the press, resistance in the administration, and more diffuse decision-making processes pose potential challenges for politicians striving to tackle the problem of escalating control through stewardship.

Does Money Talk? The Impact of Monetary Incentives on User-Generated Content Contributions

Many platforms use monetary incentives to encourage user-generated content (UGC) contributions. The empirical evidence, however, is contradictory: monetary incentives are shown to either increase or decrease contribution. We make the first attempt to build a unified theoretical model to understand the complex nature of the impact of monetary incentives. We consider contributors differentiated not only by their attitudes toward monetary incentives but also by their effectiveness to attract audience. We identify two scenarios where contributors can be crowded out when monetary incentives are present: (1) when a small amount of monetary incentive is introduced, the non–money-driven contributors reduce or even stop contributing (motivation crowding out); or (2) when the monetary incentive is relatively large, the high-effectiveness contributors crowd out the low-effectiveness ones (competition crowding out). As a result, an increase in the monetary incentive can either increase or decrease contributors’ participation and the total content volume contributed. Our results offer guidelines for different UGC platforms to design monetary incentive mechanisms.