Perceptual Deterrence

Author(s):  
Greg Pogarsky
Author(s):  
Henk Elffers ◽  
Pieter Van Baal

This chapter considers whether it is worthwhile and useful to enrich agent based spatial simulation studies in criminology with a real geographical background, such as the map of a real city? Using modern GIS tools, such an enterprise is in principle quite feasible, but we argue that in many cases this course is not only not producing more interesting results, but in fact may well be detrimental for the real reason of doing criminal simulation studies, which is understanding the underlying rules. The argument is first outlined in general, and then illustrated in the context of a given example of the ThESE perceptual deterrence simulation model (Van Baal, 2004), a model that actually is using a simple checkerboard as its spatial backcloth.


Criminology ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
SCOTT DECKER ◽  
RICHARD WRIGHT ◽  
ROBERT LOGIE

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica L. Buchanan ◽  
Benjamin P. Commerford ◽  
Elaine Ying Wang

Informed by Perceptual Deterrence Theory, we conduct multiple experiments to investigate when and how auditor actions can help deter manager opportunism. In Study 1A we find that managers are less likely to use real earnings management (REM) when they expect auditors to both increase scrutiny and communicate their observations to the board. However, this effect occurs only when managers' operational decisions are inconsistent (versus consistent) with peer behavior. Study 1B findings suggest that increased auditor scrutiny alone (without auditor-board communication) is not likely to deter REM. In Study 2, we find that increased auditor scrutiny with communication to the board effectively deters both accruals-based earnings management (AEM) and REM, reducing the total level of manager opportunism. However, without communication, increased auditor scrutiny deters AEM, but also induces more REM. Our findings highlight the importance of auditor-board communication and demonstrate how auditor actions can contribute to the deterrence of manager opportunism.


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