Research on the Peer Behavior of Local Government Green Governance Based on SECI Expansion Model

Exploring the cohort behavior of local governments in green governance from the perspective of knowledge management can help promote the implementation of new development concepts. This article firstly explains the differentiation logic of local governments’ green governance cohort behavior based on the SECI expansion model. Secondly, by constructing a dynamic evolutionary game model, the conditions for the formation of positive and negative cohorts are analyzed. Finally, corresponding countermeasures are proposed. The results show that under the effect of knowledge management, the explicit and tacit knowledge, such as green governance ability and willingness of local government transform into each other, finally differentiates into four kinds of peer behavior states. Willingness stimulation, learning effect perception, complementary knowledge stock, knowledge synergy income, cooperation value-added income, punishment and reputation loss increase, which promotes local government green governance into a positive-peer state. Knowledge learning effect only exists in the early and middle stages of green governance, while the knowledge spillover effect has a more significant impact in the later stage of green governance; a higher gap between explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge, and a lower level of tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge, are conducive to the formation of positive-peer status.

Personality and Peer Groups in Adolescence: Reciprocal Associations and Shared Genetic and Environmental Influences

Peer groups provide a critical developmental context in adolescence, and there are many well-documented associations between personality and peer behavior at this age. However, the precise nature and direction of these associations are difficult to determine as youth both select into and are influenced by their friends. We thus examined the phenotypic, genetic, and environmental links between antisocial and prosocial peer characteristics and several personality traits from middle childhood to late adolescence (ages 11, 14, and 17 years) in a longitudinal twin sample (N = 3762) using teacher ratings of personality, and self-reports of peer characteristics. At both within-person and between-person levels of analysis, less adaptive trait profiles (i.e., high negative emotionality, low conscientiousness, and low agreeableness) were associated with more antisocial and fewer prosocial peer characteristics. Associations between personality traits related to emotionality (negative emotionality and extraversion) and peer behavior were largely attributable to shared genetic influences, while associations between personality traits related to behavioral control (conscientiousness and agreeableness) and peer behavior were due to overlapping genetic and shared environmental influences. There was also some evidence for reciprocity and corresponsive processes such that traits in early adolescence contributed to selection into certain peer groups, which in turn extenuated those personality traits. Taken together, results suggest a set of environmental presses that push youth towards both behavioral undercontrol and antisocial peer affiliations, making the identification of such influences and their relative importance a critical avenue of future work.

Auditor Actions and the Deterrence of Manager Opportunism: The Importance of Communication to the Board and Consistency with Peer Behavior

Informed by Perceptual Deterrence Theory, we conduct multiple experiments to investigate when and how auditor actions can help deter manager opportunism. In Study 1A we find that managers are less likely to use real earnings management (REM) when they expect auditors to both increase scrutiny and communicate their observations to the board. However, this effect occurs only when managers' operational decisions are inconsistent (versus consistent) with peer behavior. Study 1B findings suggest that increased auditor scrutiny alone (without auditor-board communication) is not likely to deter REM. In Study 2, we find that increased auditor scrutiny with communication to the board effectively deters both accruals-based earnings management (AEM) and REM, reducing the total level of manager opportunism. However, without communication, increased auditor scrutiny deters AEM, but also induces more REM. Our findings highlight the importance of auditor-board communication and demonstrate how auditor actions can contribute to the deterrence of manager opportunism.

Peer Behavior Profoundly Influences Dishonesty: Will Individuals Seek-out Information about Peers’ Dishonesty?

Seeing others engage in unethical behavior helps individuals justify their own unethical actions. In this article, we explore whether and how individuals search for information about others’ unethical behavior. Across two financially incentivized studies (total N = 617), participants could search either free (in Study 1) or costly (in Study 2) information about others’ behavior. Our findings reveal that individuals are both curious and are significantly influenced by the information they observe. However, individuals do not aggressively seek information about others’ unethical behavior, and are very sensitive to the costs to obtain this information. Free information promotes information search, which increases the likelihood that individuals will observe others’ unethical behavior and ultimately engage in unethical behavior themselves. When information is costly, individuals are far less likely to search for information, and are subsequently less likely to observe and engage in unethical behavior themselves. In contrast to prior work that has asserted that “sunlight” and greater access to information will curb dishonesty, we find that free access to information about others’ transgression may promote, rather than deter, unethical behavior. To curb unethical behavior, however, organizations may not have to shield individuals from learning about others’ transgressions; they may merely need to make this information difficult to obtain.