The Static Game Analysis of Travel Agency Service Supply Chain Optimization

Author(s):  
Liu Hong ◽  
Ji Yan ◽  
GU Mingchong
2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 274-297 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cansu Yildirim ◽  
Bengu Sevil Oflaç ◽  
Oznur Yurt

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore the doer effect of service failure (SF), good prior experience (GPE) and recovery on overall customer satisfaction and repurchase intentions for multi-agents in tourism service supply chain (TSSC). It specifically focuses on internal and external failure and recovery. Design/methodology/approach The study employs a 2×2×3 between-subjects experimental design with 12 diverse scenarios. It aims to examine the main effects of GPE and the interaction effects of SF and recovery on overall customer satisfaction and repurchase intentions. Findings The main findings show that consumers do not show favorable behavioral outcomes when they have GPE with an affiliated party. Results of the experiments demonstrate that for hotels, there is no interaction effect between failure and recovery regarding overall customer satisfaction and repurchase intentions; however, for travel agencies, an interaction effect has been found. This indicates that an internal failure (by travel agency) should be recovered internally to increase the behavioral outcomes for travel agency. However, if there is an external failure (by hotel) then the essential thing is providing a recovery. Originality/value Although the service literature covers failure and recovery in diverse contexts, these concepts are rarely studied from a multi-agent perspective in the service supply chain literature. In such a chain, a failure by a different party may remain unresolved, and this may create a positive effect on another party, if they provide recovery for the failure. This means that the doer of the failure and/or recovery (the party responsible from the failure and/or recovery) may have an impact on behavioral outcomes. However, previous literature has neglected to focus on the important issue of which entity/party performs the failure and/or recovery, and the effect on behavioral outcomes. By focusing on a principal-agent relationship in a TSSC, the study aims to address this research gap.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (15) ◽  
pp. 8228
Author(s):  
Lu Zhang ◽  
Deqing Ma ◽  
Jinsong Hu

This paper integrates a low-carbon tourism supply chain consisting of a low-carbon tourist attraction (LTA) providing a low-carbon service and an online travel agency (OTA) responsible for big data marketing. Consumers may also encounter sudden crisis events that occur in the tourist attraction during their visit, and the occurrence of crisis events can damage the low-carbon goodwill of the tourist attraction to the detriment of the sustainable development of the supply chain. Therefore, this paper aims to investigate how tourism firms can develop dynamic strategies in the pre-crisis environment if they envision the occurrence of a crisis event and how crisis events affect interfirm cooperation. This paper uses stochastic jump processes to portray the dynamic evolution of low-carbon goodwill in the context of crisis events and introduces the methods of the differential game and Bellman’s continuous dynamic programming theory to study the sustainable operations of low-carbon tourism supply chains. Our findings provide important managerial insights for enterprises in the tourism supply chain and suggest that they need to not only become aware of the tourist attraction crisis events, but also, more importantly, they need to adjust their appropriate input strategies based on the degree of anticipation of the crisis.


2013 ◽  
Vol 448-453 ◽  
pp. 1002-1010
Author(s):  
Cong Liu

To analyze the willingness to cooperate of farmers to participate in water management, we base on game theory and first carry on single static game analysis of willingness to cooperate for farmers to participate in water management, and find that farmers are into a Prisoners Dilemma in a single game, individual rationality comes into conflict with collective rationality, at this time farmers have a tendency to "free riders", so it is difficult to achieve cooperation between the farmers. Then trying to break the prisoners' dilemma, we carry on the farmers repeated dynamic game, the analysis is carried on in the context of incomplete information and limited rationality, we carry on game evolution analysis for willingness to cooperate for farmers to participate in water management. In order to guarantee the rationality of the study, we conduct a survey of willingness to cooperate of farmers to participate in water management in province of Zhejiang and finally confirm that the study is reasonable. And through the analysis of the full text, we conclude six important conclusions.


2005 ◽  
Vol 29 (6) ◽  
pp. 1305-1316 ◽  
Author(s):  
E.P. Schulz ◽  
M.S. Diaz ◽  
J.A. Bandoni

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