scholarly journals Parameterized Complexity Results for a Model of Theory of Mind Based on Dynamic Epistemic Logic

2016 ◽  
Vol 215 ◽  
pp. 246-263
Author(s):  
Iris van de Pol ◽  
Iris van Rooij ◽  
Jakub Szymanik
2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 255-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iris van de Pol ◽  
Iris van Rooij ◽  
Jakub Szymanik

Author(s):  
Lasse Dissing ◽  
Thomas Bolander

Previous research has claimed dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) to be a suitable formalism for representing essential aspects of a Theory of Mind (ToM) for an autonomous agent. This includes the ability of the formalism to represent the reasoning involved in false-belief tasks of arbitrary order, and hence for autonomous agents based on the formalism to become able to pass such tests. This paper provides evidence for the claims by documenting the implementation of a DEL-based reasoning system on a humanoid robot. Our implementation allows the robot to perform cognitive perspective-taking, in particular to reason about the first- and higher-order beliefs of other agents. We demonstrate how this allows the robot to pass a quite general class of false-belief tasks involving human agents. Additionally, as is briefly illustrated, it allows the robot to proactively provide human agents with relevant information in situations where a system without ToM-abilities would fail. The symbolic grounding problem of turning robotic sensor input into logical action descriptions in DEL is achieved via a perception system based on deep neural networks.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Bolander ◽  
Lasse Dissing ◽  
Nicolai Herrmann

Epistemic planning based on Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) allows agents to reason and plan from the perspective of other agents. The framework of DEL-based epistemic planning thereby has the potential to represent significant aspects of Theory of Mind in autonomous robots, and to provide a foundation for human-robot collaboration in which coordination is achieved implicitly through perspective shifts. In this paper, we build on previous work in epistemic planning with implicit coordination. We introduce a new notion of indistinguishability between epistemic states based on bisimulation, and provide a novel partition refinement algorithm for computing unique representatives of sets of indistinguishable states. We provide an algorithm for computing implicitly coordinated plans using these new constructs, embed it in a perceive-plan-act agent loop, and implement it on a robot. The planning algorithm is benchmarked against an existing epistemic planning algorithm, and the robotic implementation is demonstrated on human-robot collaboration scenarios requiring implicit coordination.


1994 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 122-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael T. Hallett ◽  
H. Todd Wareham

Author(s):  
Alexandru Baltag ◽  
Aybüke Özgün ◽  
Ana Lucia Vargas Sandoval

2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arkadiusz Wójcik

The dynamic epistemic logic for actual knowledge models the phenomenon of actual knowledge change when new information is received. In contrast to the systems of dynamic epistemic logic which have been discussed in the past literature, our system is not burdened with the problem of logical omniscience, that is, an idealized assumption that the agent explicitly knows all classical tautologies and all logical consequences of his or her knowledge. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for this logic.


2005 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. P. Ditmarsch ◽  
W. Van Der Hoek ◽  
B. P. Kooi

This contribution is a gentle introduction to so-called dynamic epistemic logics, that can describe how agents change their knowledge and beliefs. We start with a concise introduction to epistemic logic, through the example of one, two and finally three players holding cards; and, mainly for the purpose of motivating the dynamics, we also very summarily introduce the concepts of general and common knowledge. We then pay ample attention to the logic of public announcements, wherein agents change their knowledge as the result of public announcements. One crucial topic in that setting is that of unsuccessful updates: formulas that become false when announced. The Moore-sentences that were already extensively discussed at the conception of epistemic logic in Hintikka’s ‘Knowledge and Belief ’ (1962) give rise to such unsuccessful updates. After that, we present a few examples of more complex epistemic updates.


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