Association between Theory of Mind and Peer Problems

The current study was designed to investigate the relationship between theory of mind (ToM) development and peer problems in Pakistani children (N=80). The non-probability purposive sampling technique with survey research design had been used for data collection. Pakistani children with age ranged 4-6 years (Mage = 5.29) were recruited who?took two false belief tasks.?To tap into peer relationship of these children, their parents completed?strength and difficulty?questionnaire. For demographic variables, descriptive statistics was used. Pearson product correlation and linear regression were used to test the hypothesis. Results revealed that performance of 6 years 6 months and older was above chance on all false belief tasks, supporting the universality of ToM development with different age ranges in different cultures. Also, theory of mind negatively predicted peer relationship?problems?of this sample, revealing real life implication of mentalizing for interaction in social world. Research indicated that false belief comprehension is key to better social adjustment and the participants of this study also showed that a child's understanding of mental state terms is critical for better social adaptation.

Worse Theory of Mind in Only-Children Compared to Children With Siblings and Its Intervention

The purpose of this study was to explore theory of mind (ToM) differences in children with different birth orders (only-children, first-born children, and second-born children), and further explore the effect of cognitive verb training for only-children’s ToM. Adopting the paradigm of false belief, Study 1 was conducted in which a sample of 120 children aged 3–6, including first-born children, second-born children (siblings aged 1–13 years), and only-children were tested. The results showed that (1) children aged 3–6 had significantly higher scores on first-order false-belief than second-order false-belief. (2) Controlling for age, the only-children scored significantly lower than the first-born children. In Study 2, 28 only-children aged 4–5 (13 in the experimental group and 15 in the control group) who initially failed in false-belief tasks were trained with the cognitive verb animations. Significant post-training improvements were observed for only-children who received training of animations embedded with cognitive verb. Those findings indicated that ToM of only-children was significantly worse than first-born children of two-child families, and linguistic training could facilitate ToM of only-children whose ToM were at a disadvantage.

Children can use others’ emotional expressions to infer their knowledge and predict their behaviors in classic false belief tasks

In this study, we investigate whether emotional expressions provide cues to knowledge sufficient for predicting others’ behavior based on their true and false beliefs. We adapted the classic Sally-Anne task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) such that children (N = 62, mean: 5.58 years, range: 4.05-6.98 years) were not told whether Sally saw Anne move the object or not. However, when Sally came back looking angry, even four-year-olds inferred that she had seen Anne move her toy; when she came back looking happy, children inferred that she had not seen the transfer. Based on these inferences, five and six-year-olds, although not four-year-olds, were able to predict where Sally would look for her toy.

Are the classic false belief tasks cursed? Young children are just as likely as older children to pass a false belief task when they are not required to overcome the curse of knowledge

The question of when children understand that others have minds that can represent or misrepresent reality (i.e., possess a ‘Theory of Mind’) is hotly debated. This understanding plays a fundamental role in social interaction (e.g., interpreting human behavior, communicating, empathizing). Most research on this topic has relied on false belief tasks such as the ‘Sally-Anne Task’, because researchers have argued that it is the strongest litmus test examining one’s understanding that the mind can misrepresent reality. Unfortunately, in addition to a variety of other cognitive demands this widely used measure also unnecessarily involves overcoming a bias that is especially pronounced in young children—the ‘curse of knowledge’ (the tendency to be biased by one’s knowledge when considering less-informed perspectives). Three- to 6-year-old’s (n = 230) false belief reasoning was examined across tasks that either did, or did not, require overcoming the curse of knowledge, revealing that when the curse of knowledge was removed three-year-olds were significantly better at inferring false beliefs, and as accurate as five- and six-year-olds. These findings reveal that the classic task is not specifically measuring false belief understanding. Instead, previously observed developmental changes in children’s performance could be attributed to the ability to overcome the curse of knowledge. Similarly, previously observed relationships between individual differences in false belief reasoning and a variety of social outcomes could instead be the result of individual differences in the ability to overcome the curse of knowledge, highlighting the need to re-evaluate how best to interpret large bodies of research on false belief reasoning and social-emotional functioning.

Case Report: Theory of Mind and Figurative Language in a Child With Agenesis of the Corpus Callosum

In this case report, we studied Theory of Mind (ToM) and figurative language comprehension in a 7.2-year-old child, conventionally named RJ, with isolated and complete agenesis of the corpus callosum (ACC), a rare malformation due to the absence of the corpus callosum, the major tract connecting the two brain hemispheres. To study ToM, which is the capability to infer the other’s mental states, we used the classical false belief tasks, and to study figurative language, i.e., those linguistic usages involving non-literal meanings, we used tasks assessing metaphor and idiom comprehension. RJ’s intellectual level and his phonological, lexical, and grammatical abilities were all adequate. In both the ToM false belief tasks and novel sensory metaphor comprehension, RJ showed a delay of 3 years and a significant gap compared to a typically developing control group, while in idioms, his performance was at the border of average. These outcomes suggest that RJ has a specific pragmatic difficulty in all tasks where he must interpret the other’s communicative intention, as in ToM tasks and novel sensory metaphor comprehension. The outcomes also open up interesting insights into the relationships between ToM and figurative language in children with isolated and complete ACC.

Implementing Theory of Mind on a Robot Using Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Previous research has claimed dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) to be a suitable formalism for representing essential aspects of a Theory of Mind (ToM) for an autonomous agent. This includes the ability of the formalism to represent the reasoning involved in false-belief tasks of arbitrary order, and hence for autonomous agents based on the formalism to become able to pass such tests. This paper provides evidence for the claims by documenting the implementation of a DEL-based reasoning system on a humanoid robot. Our implementation allows the robot to perform cognitive perspective-taking, in particular to reason about the first- and higher-order beliefs of other agents. We demonstrate how this allows the robot to pass a quite general class of false-belief tasks involving human agents. Additionally, as is briefly illustrated, it allows the robot to proactively provide human agents with relevant information in situations where a system without ToM-abilities would fail. The symbolic grounding problem of turning robotic sensor input into logical action descriptions in DEL is achieved via a perception system based on deep neural networks.