scholarly journals Well-Founded Extensive Games with Perfect Information

2021 ◽  
Vol 335 ◽  
pp. 7-21
Author(s):  
Krzysztof R. Apt ◽  
Sunil Simon
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Information ◽  
Extensive Games

THE CENTIPEDE OF ROSENTHAL

2007 ◽  
Vol 09 (02) ◽  
pp. 341-345
Author(s):  
EZIO MARCHI
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Short Note ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Private Communication ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Payoff Functions ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Extensive Games

In this short note we extend the very well known Centipede game of Rosenthal to the same extensive games with perfect information. The only difference that here the Centipede games have instead of numbers as payoff functions, they have variables. We introduce and study the relationship between the structure of subgame perfect equilibrium points (see Osborne (1994), Binmore (1994)) and the friendly equilibrium points due to Marchi (2004a) and (2004b). We solve an Asheim's conjecture (private communication).

ON THE COMPLEXITY OF COALITIONAL REASONING

2002 ◽  
Vol 04 (03) ◽  
pp. 237-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARC PAULY
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Information ◽  
Effectivity Function ◽  
Multistage Processes ◽  
Extensive Game ◽  
Coalition Logic ◽  
Implementation Problem ◽  
The World ◽  
Np Complete ◽  
Two Parameters ◽  
Extensive Games

Coalitional power in multistage processes is modeled using effectivity frames, which link an effectivity function to every possible state of the world. Effectivity frames are general enough to capture, e.g., what groups of agents can bring about in extensive games of perfect and almost perfect information. Coalition Logic is used to describe effectivity frames, and the question of generating an extensive game satisfying a given specification is formulated as a satisfiability problem in Coalition Logic. Using this logical reformulation, we show that the complexity of this implementation problem depends on two parameters: For coalitional specifications, the problem is shown to be PSPACE-complete. For individual specifications on the other hand, i.e., for specifications which only refer to the powers of individual agents, generating an implementation with perfect information is PSPACE-complete, whereas generating an implementation with almost perfect information is NP-complete.

The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information

2009 ◽  
Vol 45 (12) ◽  
pp. 860-868
Author(s):  
Xiao Luo
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Information ◽  
Extensive Games

Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information

2001 ◽  
Vol 25 (11) ◽  
pp. 1801-1825 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiao Luo ◽  
Chenghu Ma
Keyword(s):  
Stable Equilibrium ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Extensive Games ◽  
Equilibrium In Beliefs

Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe Aghion ◽  
Drew Fudenberg ◽  
Richard Holden
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Information

Exploring the effects of computational costs in extensive games via modeling and simulation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chanjuan Liu ◽  
Enqiang Zhu ◽  
Qiang Zhang ◽  
Xiaopeng Wei
Keyword(s):  
Modeling And Simulation ◽  
Computational Costs ◽  
Extensive Games

scholarly journals The simple geometry of perfect information games

2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Demichelis ◽  
Klaus Ritzberger ◽  
Jeroen M. Swinkels
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Information ◽  
Simple Geometry ◽  
Perfect Information Games ◽  
Information Games

Interpreting Knowledge in the Backward Induction Problem

Episteme ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 248-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ken Binmore
Keyword(s):  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Finite Games ◽  
Common Knowledge Of Rationality

AbstractRobert Aumann argues that common knowledge of rationality implies backward induction in finite games of perfect information. I have argued that it does not. A literature now exists in which various formal arguments are offered in support of both positions. This paper argues that Aumann's claim can be justified if knowledge is suitably reinterpreted.

Worth of perfect information in bernoulli bandits

1991 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald A. Berry ◽  
Robert P. Kertz
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Information ◽  
Prior Distributions ◽  
Minimax Approach

For k-armed Bernoulli bandits with discounting, sharp comparisons are given between average optimal rewards for a gambler and for a ‘perfectly informed' gambler, over natural collections of prior distributions. Some of these comparisons are proved under general discounting, and others under non-increasing discount sequences. Connections are made between these comparisons and the concept of ‘regret' in the minimax approach to bandit processes. Identification of extremal cases in the sharp comparisons is emphasized.

Informácia o jednej zaujímavej všeobecno-vzdelávacej aktivite časopisu Quark

2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 24-25
Author(s):  
Karol Jesenák
Keyword(s):  
Everyday Life ◽  
Correct Answer ◽  
Science And Technology ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Editorial Office ◽  
School Problems ◽  
Basic Premise ◽  
Original Picture ◽  
Type Of School ◽  
Typical School

At the end of 2020, the Quark editorial office launched on its Facebook page an interesting competition called "Photo Puzzle". The basic premise is that the editors of the journal publish an original picture related in some way to science and technology, with an enclosed question. However, the image itself usually does not provide enough information to identify the correct answer. Instead, it provides an opportunity to creatively think about possible solutions in the absence of perfect information. In this sense, the questions differ from the typical school problems, which require accurate formulation and have clear answers. Since in everyday life we rarely encounter this type of „school“ questions, this activity by Quark staff should be appreciated.

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